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Abstract 
This thesis examines the impact of sources of financing on the performance of 
M&As and the value of firm diversification. 
Chapter Three examines how sources of financing between corporate cash 
holdings and bank lines of credit affect the performance of M&As. The evidence 
shows that the M&As financed by bank lines of credit have higher stock return 
performance and operating performance than those financed by corporate cash 
holdings. Firms with higher institutional ownership are more likely to use bank 
lines of credit as a source of financing in M&As. Moreover, M&As that are 
financed entirely by bank lines of credit are associated with lower acquisition 
premiums than those financed by corporate cash holdings. The outperformance 
is only significant in firms with a lower level of corporate governance and firms 
with a lower level of bankruptcy risk. Further, the fraction of bank lines of credit 
used as the source of financing is positively related to the performance of M&As, 
and the costs associated with bank lines of credit are negatively related to the 
performance of M&As. The results are consistent with the hypothesis based on 
agency problems between shareholders and managers. 
Chapter Four examines how sources of financing between corporate cash 
holdings, other bank loans, debt issues, and equity issues affect the performance 
of M&As.  The evidence shows that the M&As financed by other bank loans and 
debt issues are associated with higher announcement returns, higher operating 
performance, and lower premiums than those financed by corporate cash 
holdings. Moreover, poorly governed firms benefit from the use of debt financing, 
and the positive effect of debt financing on M&As is only pronounced among firms 
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with a lower level of bankruptcy risk. The results are consistent with the 
hypothesis based on agency problems between shareholders and managers. 
Chapter Five examines how the sources of financing between bank lines of credit 
and corporate cash holdings in M&As affect the value of firm diversification. The 
evidence shows that firms financed by bank lines of credit in M&As have a smaller 
reduction in excess value, more efficient internal resources transfers, and a 
higher value added by allocation than those financed by corporate cash holdings. 
Firms with higher institutional ownership are more likely to use bank lines of credit 
in M&As. Moreover, firms financed by bank lines of credit have a higher value of 
firm diversification than those financed by corporate cash holdings if they have a 
lower level of corporate governance and a lower level of bankruptcy risk. The 
results are consistent with the hypothesis based on agency problems between 
shareholders and managers.
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
1. 1 Background and Motivation 
A growing literature shows that different sources of financing affect the 
performance of M&As differently. It has been mentioned by both Schlingemann 
(2004) and Martynova and Renneboog (2009) that a large number of studies use, 
“methods of payment” as the proxy of, “ sources of financing”. However, for cash-
paid mergers and acquisitions (M&As), a large proportion of deals are financed 
by external sources of financing. According to Martynova and Renneboog (2009), 
at least one-third of takeovers entirely paid in cash are partially financed by 
external sources financing. Given the magnitude of external financing in cash-
paid M&As, it is crucial to analyse the impact of different sources of financing.  
To my knowledge, only a few papers study the sources of financing in M&As. 
Schlingemann (2004) shows that the announcement returns are positively related 
to the cash raised by equity issuance when firms have poor investment 
opportunities, and returns are negatively related to internally generated cash 
flows. Martynova and Renneboog (2009) show that the choice of sources of 
financing is firstly determined by the cost of capital; equity financing is associated 
with negative bidder returns, and takeovers financed by internally generated 
funds underperform those financed by debt. Bharadwaj and Shivdasani (2003) 
find that tender offers entirely financed by bank receive positive and significant 
announcement returns. However, most existing studies analyse debt in general 
or a particular type of deals. The effect of different types of debt used in M&As is 
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under-researched. The motivation of this thesis is to complement the literature in 
M&As by providing a more comprehensive analysis based on different sources 
of financing.  
In Chapter Three, I examine the impact of sources of financing between different 
forms of corporate liquidity on the performance of M&As.  
Corporate cash holdings have drawn considerable attention in the past few 
decades. The literature of corporate cash holdings shows that managers are 
likely to hold excess cash for agency motives and that is detrimental to firms (e.g., 
Jensen, 1986; Harford, 1999; Lang, Stulz and Walkling, 1991; Dittmar, Mahrt-
Smith and Servaes, 2003). With the existence of agency problems, the 
performance of M&As financed by corporate cash holdings may be affected 
negatively. Bank lines of credit, also known as revolving credit facility, are an 
alternative source of corporate liquidity which has been widely used by U.S. firms. 
Sufi (2009) shows 85% of firms in his sample have bank lines of credit, and bank 
lines of credit account for 16% of total assets. The revolving feature makes a 
bank line of credit distinguishable from other forms of debt. Unlike corporate cash 
holdings, the use of bank lines of credit is monitored by banks. Firms have to 
comply with financial covenants which include a wide range of restrictions on 
capital expenditures (Nini, Smith and Sufi, 2009).  Nini, Smith and Sufi (2012) 
show that after the violation of covenants, a firm's performance improved, 
implying that banks play an important role in corporate governance. Given the 
significant magnitude of bank lines of credit, I believe it is crucial to separately 
examine bank lines of credit as a source of financing in M&As.  
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In Chapter Four, I provide additional analysis on the impact of sources of 
financing between corporate cash holdings, other bank loans, debt issues and 
equity issues on the performance of M&As in order to link with Chapter Three.  
As I already mentioned, corporate cash holdings are associated with agency 
problems, which may lead to value-destructive M&As (Jensen, 1986; Harford, 
1999), while other sources of financing may bring different performance to the 
firm. As to bank loans, the literature on financial intermediation shows both the 
monitoring function (e.g., Byers, Fields and Fraser, 2008; Ahn and Choi, 2009) 
and the potential hold-up problems (e.g., Rajan, 1992; Houston and James, 1996; 
Santos and Winton, 2008) associated with bank financing. As to the valuation 
effect of bank financing in M&As, Bharadwaj and Shivdasani (2003) find that bank 
financing is positively related to the announcement returns for tender offers. Debt 
issues, which are directly placed by the firm, may also mitigate agency problems 
associated with internally generated cash. Jensen (1986) demonstrates that debt 
limits managerial discretion associated with free cash flow because managers 
are forced to pay back debt obligations. Martynova and Renneboog (2009) show 
that acquisitions financed by debt have better stock return performance than 
internally generated funds. In terms of equity issues, the previous literature shows 
different views on the effect on the performance of M&As. Schlingemann (2004) 
finds a positive relationship between equity financing and bidder returns. 
However, Martynova and Renneboog (2009) show a negative relationship. Since 
the literature does not explicitly examine different types of debt separately as 
sources of financing, I provide additional analysis on this issue in Chapter Four.  
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In Chapter Five, I investigate how sources of financing between bank lines of 
credit and corporate cash holdings affect the value of firm diversification.  
Diversified firms play an important role in the economy. The effect of 
diversification has been studied by a large number of studies. Lang and Stulz 
(1994) and Berger and Ofek (1995) find that there is a significant discount 
associated with diversification. The prevailing idea among scholars is that 
diversification stems from agency problems (e.g., Servaes, 1996; Denis, Denis 
and Sarin, 1997; Hoechle, Schmid, Walter and Yermack, 2012). Event studies 
(e.g., Moeller and Schlingemann, 2005; Dos Santos, Errunza and Miller, 2008) 
linking diversification and M&As show that diversifying M&As have poor 
performance and acquiring firms show a significant decrease in excess value. On 
the contrary, other literature argues that diversification does not destroy value 
and that the discount of diversified firms is due to endogeneity problems (Campa 
and Kedia, 2002), acquisitions to already discounted firms (Graham, Lemmon 
and Wolf, 2002), measurement bias (Custodio, 2014) and risk-reducing effects 
via leverage (Mansi and Reeb, 2002; Glaser and Müller, 2010). M&As are 
frequently used by entrenched managers to pursue their personal benefits. Since 
corporate cash holdings are associated with agency problems, while bank lines 
of credit are associated with discipline. When they are used in M&As, different 
sources of financing may lead to different value consequences. Since previous 
literature does not provide evidence from the perspective of sources of financing, 
I investigate how bank lines of credit and corporate cash holdings affect the value 
of firm diversification around the M&As.  
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As discussed above, there is a gap in the literature on how the sources of 
financing affect the performance of M&As, and how the sources of financing affect 
the value of firm diversification. I provide a comprehensive analysis to explore the 
effect of sources of financing on the performance of M&As and the value of firm 
diversification in this thesis.  
1. 2 Main Findings 
In Chapter Three and Chapter Four, I investigate how sources of financing 
between corporate cash holdings and various external sources of financing affect 
the performance of M&As.  
In Chapter Three, I find that the M&As entirely financed by bank lines of credit 
are associated with higher announcement returns, higher operating performance 
and lower acquisition premiums than the M&As entirely financed by corporate 
cash holdings. Moreover, acquiring firms with higher institutional ownership are 
more likely to use bank lines of credit as a source of financing in M&As. The sub-
group analysis based on corporate governance shows that the performance is 
higher for the M&As entirely financed by bank lines of credit than those entirely 
financed by corporate cash holdings only in weaker-governed firms. Further, I 
find that the fraction of bank lines of credit used as the source of financing is 
positively related to the performance of M&As, and the costs associated with bank 
lines of credit are negatively related to the performance of M&As. I also find that 
only when an acquiring firm has lower bankruptcy risk, the M&As entirely financed 
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by bank lines have higher performance than those financed by corporate cash 
holdings.  
 In Chapter Four, I find that the M&As entirely financed by other bank loans and 
debt issues have higher announcement returns, higher operating performance 
and lower acquisition premiums than the M&As entirely financed by corporate 
cash holdings. The sub-group analysis based on corporate governance shows 
that the performance is higher for the M&As entirely financed by other bank loans 
and debt issues than those financed by corporate cash holdings in weaker-
governed firms. Moreover, I find that only when an acquiring firm has lower 
bankruptcy risk, the M&As entirely financed by other bank loans and debt issues 
have higher performance than those financed by corporate cash holdings.  
In Chapter Five, I examine how sources of financing between bank lines of credit 
and corporate cash holdings affect the value of firm diversification. I find that the 
firms entirely financed bank lines of credit have a smaller reduction in excess 
value, more efficient internal resource transfers and a higher value added by 
allocation than the M&As entirely financed by corporate cash holdings. An 
acquiring firm is more likely to use bank lines of credit when institutional 
ownership is higher. The positive effect of bank lines of credit on the value of firm 
diversification is only significant among the sub-group of firms with a lower level 
of corporate governance and the sub-group of firms with a lower level of 
bankruptcy risk.  
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1. 3 Contributions 
My research contributes to the literature in the following areas:  
First, my research contributes to the literature on the performance of M&As 
by examining the difference of various sources of financing, including 
corporate cash holdings, bank lines of credit, other bank loans, debt issues 
and equity issues. To my knowledge, previous studies show limited evidence 
on sources of financing and the performance of M&As. For example, 
Schlingemann (2004) and Martynova and Renneboog (2009) examine debt 
financing in general without differentiating bank debt and non-bank debt. 
Bharadwaj and Shivdasani (2003) examine bank financing without 
differentiating bank lines of credit and other bank loans. However, I believe it 
is important to examine different types of debt, including bank lines of credit, 
other bank loans and debt issues separately, due to different features and the 
significant magnitude of bank lines of credit.   
Second, my research contributes to the literature on sources of financing in 
the settings of M&As by providing a more comprehensive analysis. I examine 
several issues that have not been explored in the existing literature on the 
sources of financing and M&As. For example, in Chapter Three and Chapter 
Four, I employ the net change in return on assets as the measure of operating 
performance and I examine the relation between sources of financing and 
acquisition premiums. Also, I analyse the costs associated with bank lines of 
credit, which are not examined in Bharadwaj and Shivdasani (2003), 
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Schlingemann (2004) and Martynova and Renneboog (2009). By conducting 
additional analysis, I believe this thesis complements the limited literature on 
sources of financing in the settings of M&As.  
Third, my research contributes to the literature on corporate liquidity from the 
agency perspective. Existing studies focus on the choice between bank lines 
of credit and corporate cash holdings (e.g., Sufi, 2009; Yun, 2009).  However, 
these papers only focus on how agency problems affect the level of holding 
bank lines of credit. Since a firm can choose whether to use or not use the 
bank lines of credit, it raises the issue that whether a firm’s choice of liquidity 
brings about different performance and different value consequences to the 
firm. I extend the literature by examining the performance and the changes in 
the value of firm diversification brought by bank lines of credit.  
Fourth, my research contributes to the literature on firm diversification in the 
settings of M&As. Most studies in firm diversification focus on the debate of 
the value of firm diversification. These papers generally attempt to answer 
whether firm diversification increase or reduce firm value (e.g., Lang and Stulz, 
1994; Rajan, Servaes and Zingales, 2000; Berger and Ofek, 1995; Stein, 
1997; Campa and Kedia, 2002; Graham et al., 2002; Mansi and Reeb, 2002; 
Glaser and Müller, 2010; Custodio, 2014), and how agency problems affect 
the choice of diversification and value consequence (e.g., Servaes, 1996; 
Denis et al., 1997; Hoechle et al., 2012). Moeller and Schlingemann (2005) 
and  Dos Santos et al. (2008) examine the effect of cross-border M&As on 
the stock return performance and the changes in excess value. However, 
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these papers do not examine the effect when the M&As are financed by 
different sources of financing. I explore the difference in value consequence 
when acquiring firms are financed by different sources of financing, providing 
additional evidence from the perspective of agency problems.  
Overall, my thesis provides comprehensive analysis on how sources of financing 
affect the performance of M&As, as well as the value of firm diversification. The 
thesis highlights the corporate governance role of various types of debt including 
bank lines of credit, other bank loans and debt issues when they are used as 
sources of financing in M&As.  
1. 4 Organisation of the Thesis 
The remainder of the thesis is organised as follows.  
In Chapter Two, I provide a comprehensive analysis of existing literature on 
sources of financing and the performance of M&As, corporate liquidity, the role 
of bank financing and firm diversification. In Chapter Three, Chapter Four and 
Chapter Five, I present the major research of this study. Each Chapter has its 
own introduction, hypotheses, data and variables, empirical results and a 
conclusion. In Chapter Six, I conclude the findings. I also describe the limitations 
and provide directions for future research.  
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Chapter 2. Literature Review 
In the following section, I discuss the recent literature on the following aspects:  
First, I review the literature on sources of financing and the performance of 
M&As. Recent growing literature (e.g., Schlingemann, 2004; Martynova and 
Renneboog, 2009) shows that external sources of financing are frequently 
employed in M&As with cash payment, and that different sources of financing 
have different impacts on the performance of M&As.  
Second, I review the literature on different forms of corporate liquidity. The 
literature demonstrates that agency problems are associated with corporate 
cash holdings. Bank lines of credit are an alternative form of corporate 
liquidity which have been widely used and the use of bank lines of credit have 
a wide range of restrictions. The level of corporate governance of a firm is 
one important determinant of the choice between bank lines of credit and 
corporate cash holdings.  
Third, I review the literature on the role of bank financing. The literature shows 
that the use of financial intermediation is a double-edged sword. I summarise 
the literature which shows the benefits of bank monitoring and the advantages 
in response to information asymmetry. I also discuss the literature that 
indicates the problems associated with bank financing.  
In the final part of this section, I review the literature on firm diversification. 
There is no consensus agreement on the effect of firm diversification on firm 
value. I review both the studies that support diversification discount and the 
studies that do not support the value destruction of diversification.  
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2. 1 Sources of Financing and the Performance of M&As 
The sources of financing affect the performance of M&As for various reasons. 
First, agency problems arise when a firm’s ownership and control are separated. 
Managers as the agent, may not always engage in shareholder value 
maximisation activities (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The free cash flow theory 
(Jensen, 1986) demonstrates that internally generated cash are provide flexibility 
to managers to pursue their own agenda through acquisitions due to lack of 
monitoring from external markets. These acquisitions benefit managers by 
increasing firm size thereby increase their compensation, however, destroy 
shareholder value. While there is a control function of debt, where debt financing 
mitigates agency problems by reducing the free cash flow that available for 
managerial discretionary activities. The performance of M&As is affected by the 
sources of financing since managers may prefer internally generated cash to 
external sources when undertaking low return acquisitions. 
Second, agency problems also arise when a firm is financed by both equity and 
debt. Jensen and Meckling (1976) show that there are incentive effects 
associated with debt. A firm can transfer wealth from debtholders to shareholders 
by first issue debt by promising to take a low variance project, then take a high 
variance project and sell part of all of his claims. Myers (1977) also shows that 
when a firm has high leverage, raising debt to finance new projects benefit 
debtholders instead of shareholders, therefore, the firm may forgo good 
investments. Such loss in market value is absorbed by the firm’s current 
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shareholders. Given agency cost of debt exists, M&As financed by debt may 
generate lower performance than those financed by internally generated funds. 
Third, information asymmetry between the firm and external markets affects the 
cost of capital. According to Myers and Majluf (1984), external sources of 
financing are more expensive than internally generated cash, and equity 
financing is more expensive than debt financing. When managers have inside 
information that investors do not have, issuing equity could be interpreted as 
overvaluation by the market. In such circumstance, firms may not issue equity 
and thereby forgo good investment opportunities. Nevertheless, bank financing 
substitute for financial slack, therefore, provides a solution to information 
asymmetry. Since different sources of financing convey different degrees of 
asymmetric information, there are potential links between the performance of 
M&As and the sources of financing. 
The performance of M&As has been studied by a wide range of literature. Recent 
literature (e.g., Schlingemann, 2004; Martynova and Renneboog, 2009) argues 
that, for M&As with cash payment, a large proportion of the deals are financed by 
external sources of financing and the sources of financing have different impacts 
on the performance of M&As.  
Schlingemann (2004) studies the relationship between prior financing decision 
and bidder gains. The paper suggests the announcement returns of bidders are 
positively related to the amount of cash raised by equity issuance the year before 
the takeover, particularly for firms with good investment opportunities. Moreover, 
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bidder gains are negatively related to the internally generated free cash flow for 
firms with poor investment opportunities, supporting the free cash flow hypothesis 
(Jensen, 1986), in that entrenched managers are likely to waste their resources 
on value destructive projects. In addition, the result in debt financing shows an 
insignificant relationship, consisting with the notion that debt serves as a 
monitoring role and limits managerial discretion depending on investment 
opportunities.  
Martynova and Renneboog (2009) investigate the determinates of financing 
decision for European M&As and whether the choice of source of financing is 
related to an acquirer’s return. Their result shows a bidder’s financing decision is 
firstly determined by the cost of capital in that firms prefer the least expensive 
source of financing: internally generated funds. Moreover, they do not find 
evidence that the choice of source of financing is driven by agency problems. In 
terms of announcement returns, they find acquisitions with equity financing 
receive negative returns, and acquirers financed by internally generated funds 
underperform those financed by debt.  
The valuation effects of bank financing in tender offers have been studied by 
Bharadwaj and Shivdasani (2003). They empirically test a sample of 115 cash 
tender offers in the U.S. between 1990 and 1996 and find that acquisitions 
entirely financed by banks are associated with higher announcement returns. 
They suggest that the benefits are particularly important for small, poorly 
performing firms and firms facing substantial information asymmetry. The finding 
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suggests that banks play an important role in monitoring and certification for 
acquiring firms in tender offers.  
In M&As, there are several methods of payment, such as cash payment, equity 
payment and mixed payment. Among the M&As with cash payment, the cash 
may come from external sources, such as debt and equity. The sources of 
financing are important determinants of market reaction to the announcement of 
M&As.  
2. 2 Corporate Liquidity  
Corporate liquidity accounts for a large proportion of total assets. Corporate cash 
holdings are the most important forms of corporate liquidity. According to Bates, 
Kahle and Stulz (2009), the mean of the ratio of cash to total assets is 23.2% for 
U.S. firms in 2006. Bank lines of credit, another important form of corporate 
liquidity, have been viewed as the substitute for corporate cash holdings. 
According to Sufi (2009), 85% of the firms in his sample have bank lines of credit, 
and the mean of the ratio of total lines of credit to total assets is 16%. Lins, 
Servaes and Tufano (2010) conduct a survey of CFOs in 29 countries and show 
that the ratio of bank lines of credit to total assets is 15%.  
Firms can use corporate liquidity to hedge against risks and fund investment 
opportunities. Previous literature in corporate liquidity management 
demonstrates the motives of holding cash. For example, transition motives 
(Keynes, 1936; Baumol, 1952; Miller and Orr, 1966), precautionary motives 
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(Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson, 1999; Almeida, Campello and Weisbach, 
2004; Acharya, Almeida and Campello, 2007; Bates et al., 2009) and agency 
motives (Jensen, 1986; Lang et al., 1991; Harford, 1999; Dittmar et al., 2003; 
Harford, Mansi and Maxwell, 2008). The agency motives of holding cash suggest 
that self-interested managers can use corporate cash holding in a discretionary 
way.  
2. 2. 1 Corporate Cash Holdings  
Jensen (1986) proposes the theory of agency of cost of free cash flow. Free cash 
flow is defined as the cash flow exceeding the amount that is required to fund all 
positive NPV projects. He argues that managers have the incentive to hold 
excess cash rather than pay it out to shareholders because paying out reduces 
the resources under managers' control, reducing their power. This incurs 
monitoring costs from the external markets. Managers would like to use the free 
cash flow to derive personal benefits through acquisitions.  
Lang et al. (1991) test the free cash flow hypothesis with a sample of tender offers. 
They find that bidder returns are significantly negatively related to cash flow for 
firms with low investment opportunities, while this is not related to firms with high 
investment opportunities. This supports the free cash flow hypothesis, that the 
acquisitions engaged in by firms with high cash flow and low investment 
opportunities decrease shareholders’ wealth.  
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Harford (1999) empirically tests corporate cash reserves and the performance of 
acquisitions. The result shows that firms with high level of cash are more likely to 
make acquisitions, and stock return evidence shows these acquisitions are value-
decreasing. Moreover, cash-rich firms are more likely to make diversifying 
acquisitions, and they are likely to acquire unattractive targets. The finding shows 
strong evidence of agency problems with corporate cash holdings.   
Dittmar et al. (2003) argue agency problems are the primary determinant of 
corporate cash holdings. They examine international data and find that in 
countries with low shareholder rights, corporations are more likely to hold cash 
than in countries with strong shareholder protection, while other determinants of 
corporate cash holdings seem less important in such countries.   
Harford et al. (2008) find that U.S. firms with weaker corporate governance 
structure tend to hold less cash reserves and these firms prefer repurchase over 
dividends. Moreover, firms with both low shareholder rights and excess cash will 
increase capital expenditures and acquisitions, and these firms have lower 
valuation and profitability. Their evidence shows that weakly controlled managers 
are less likely to hoard cash. Instead, they tend to spend cash quickly on 
acquisitions and capital expenditures.  
Although the literature shows poor performance associated with excess cash, 
Pinkowitz, Sturgess and Williamson (2013) suggest that cash-rich firms are 23% 
less likely to use cash payment relative to firms that do not have a high level of 
cash. They find that larger deals, firms with greater investment opportunities, 
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friendly bids and public targets are more likely to use stock payment. They 
examine potential explanations for this and find that corporate governance, 
financial constraints, information asymmetry, tax issues, equity overvaluation or 
capital structure are not able to explain the results.  
Corporate cash holdings enable firms to overcome underinvestment problems, 
while corporate cash holdings also provide flexibility to managers to derive private 
benefits through value-destructive acquisitions. Since corporate cash holdings 
are associated with agency problems, the use of corporate cash holdings in 
M&As may negatively affect the performance.  
2. 2. 2 Bank Lines of Credit 
Theory and evidence suggest that bank lines of credit are an important alternative 
form of corporate liquidity to corporate cash holdings. In this section, I review the 
literature of bank lines of credit. According to Sufi (2009), bank lines of credit, 
also known as revolving credit facility, or loan commitments, are provided by 
banks or financing companies. The used portion is debt obligation, and unused 
portion is off-balance sheet. A firm pays a commitment fee for the unused portion 
of bank lines of credit and a predetermined interest rate for the drawn portion.  
Theoretical literature models bank lines of credit are based on an insurance idea. 
Boot, Thakor and Udell (1987) demonstrate that a loan commitment with a fixed 
rate prevents the borrower from the interest rate shock in the spot market and 
banks can recoup the loss with a commitment fee upfront. Holmström and Tirole 
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(1998) show that banks can serve as liquidity pools that prevent firms from 
liquidity shocks through optimal allocation.  
However, Demiroglu and James (2011) suggest that the insurance provided by 
bank lines of credit is contingent on the changes of both the lender’s and the 
borrower’s financial health. First, firms have to remain compliant with the 
operating performance and balance sheet benchmarks set up in the covenants. 
Second, the “Material Adverse Change” clauses allow the lenders to withhold 
funds if a borrower's credit quality deteriorates significantly. Third, the borrowing 
base limits the amount of credit available to the borrower. Fourth, some lenders 
tie the loan spread to borrower’s Debt/EBITDA ratio or credit rating, so the cost 
of borrowing increases if borrower’s operating performance deteriorates or 
EBITDA remains while the drawn portion of bank lines of credit increases. Fifth, 
bank financial condition affects the ability and willingness of supply funds. Last, 
since bank lines of credit are mostly short-term, the availability and pricing of bank 
lines of credit may change due to change in risk of the borrower or the change in 
credit market conditions. Thus, borrowers face rollover risk.  
Literature shows that financial covenants contain a wide range of restrictions on 
the borrowers. Nini et al. (2009) examine the direct contractual restrictions on firm 
investment in the debt agreements. They show that 32% of credit agreements 
contain restrictions on firms’ capital expenditures. Banks also limit firm investment 
in response to firm’s increase in credit risk. Failure to comply with the covenants 
may lead to the acceleration of repayment which could force firms to bankrupt. 
The evidence suggests that conflict of interest between creditors and borrowers 
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has a significant impact on firm investment policy. Nonetheless, financial 
covenants violations are common. According to Nini et al. (2012) between 10% 
and 20% firms report financial covenants violations in any given year and 40% 
firms were in violation at some points during the period. Nonetheless, the study 
shows that the post-violation stock return performance and operating 
performance improved, implying bank lines of credit increase the level of 
corporate governance of these firms.  
Overall, as an important form of corporate liquidity, bank lines of credit show an 
insurance idea that is similar to the precautionary motive of corporate cash 
holdings, but the insurance provided by bank liquidity may be insufficient. On the 
other hand, the restrictions on borrowers limit the access of bank lines of credit 
and affect firms’ investment policy. When bank lines of credit are used as sources 
of financing in M&As, the acquiring firms may have higher performance than 
those financed by corporate cash holding due to the monitoring effect of banks.  
2. 2. 3 The Choice between Corporate Cash Holdings and Bank Lines of 
Credit 
Recent empirical literature examines the determinants of the choices between 
corporate cash holdings and bank lines of credit. Agency problems between 
shareholders and managers are an important determinant of the choice.  
Sufi (2009) investigates the determinants of bank lines of credit by using a sample 
of Compustat universal data and a random sample with the total lines of credit, 
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unused portion and covenant compliance status information. The paper shows 
that cash flow is a strong predictor of a firm’s use of bank lines of credit in 
corporate liquidity management. Firms with low cash flow or high cash flow 
volatility are less likely to obtain a line of credit, and they rely more heavily on 
cash. In addition, the sensitivity of the use of bank lines of credit to cash flow is 
only among firms with high financial distress likelihood. Overall, the paper 
suggests that maintaining cash flow is an important determinant of whether a firm 
uses bank lines of credit because they allow firms access to and maintaining 
compliance with covenants.  
Yun (2009) examines how corporate governance influences a firm's choice 
between corporate cash holdings and bank lines of credit. The author employs 
state-level changes in takeover protection as exogenous shocks to corporate 
governance and finds that poorly governed firms increase their level of corporate 
cash holdings relative to bank lines of credit when takeover threat is weaker, while 
no such tendencies exist in well-governed firms. The finding suggests that self-
interested managers will balance private benefits of discretion against increased 
oversight by the bank to avoid control challenges from shareholders. Therefore, 
bank lines of credit not only substitute cash but also provide a function to limit 
managerial discretion on the use of corporate liquidity.  
Other firm characters also affect a firm’s choice between the two forms of 
corporate liquidity. Lins et al. (2010) conduct a survey of the CFOs in 29 countries 
and find the two forms of liquidity are employed to hedge a different kind of risks 
– corporate cash holdings are employed to prevent against future cash flow 
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shocks, while bank lines of credit are employed when future external financing 
needs are high and when managers believe that their equity is undervalued. 
Campello, Giambona, Graham and Harvey (2011b) show that small, private, non-
investment grade and unprofitable firms have a significantly higher ratio of bank 
lines of credit to assets than larger, public, investment-grade and profitable firms. 
Acharya, Almeida and Campello (2013) find a firm's exposure to aggregate risks 
is a fundamental determinate of choice between the two forms of liquidity. 
Acharya, Almeida, Ippolito and Perez (2014) extend the literature by proposing a 
theory that bank lines of credit are a form of monitored liquidity insurance. The 
model indicates that liquidity risk is an important determinant of choice between 
the two forms of liquidity. Firms with greater liquidity risk incur more monitoring 
costs, leading to a switch from monitored liquidity insurance (bank lines of credit) 
to self-insurance (corporate cash holdings).  
Overall, the choice of sources of financing may be reflected by various firm 
characteristics, while agency problems are one of the important determinants. 
Nevertheless, how the choice of using different forms of liquidity may affect firms’ 
performance is not addressed in the literature of corporate liquidity.  
2. 3 Bank Financing 
As to the benefits and costs of bank financing, on the one hand, there is an 
extensive literature on the benefit of financial intermediation. Some literature 
indicates that banks have the informational advantage to mitigate information 
asymmetry (e.g., Leland and Pyle, 1977; Campbell and Kracaw, 1980; Diamond, 
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1984; Fama, 1985; James, 1987; Lummer and McConnell, 1989; Diamond, 1991), 
and some literature indicates that bank monitoring improves the corporate 
governance (e.g., Byers et al., 2008; Ahn and Choi, 2009), on the other hand, 
some literature suggests that information monopoly of bank limit leading to hold-
up problems (e.g., Rajan, 1992; Houston and James, 1996; Santos and Winton, 
2008).  
2. 3. 1 Benefit of Bank Financing 
Leland and Pyle (1977) demonstrate the importance of the validation role of 
financial intermediation in the financial market where information asymmetry is 
pronounced. Since moral hazard prevents direct information transfer, the market 
value will reflect the average value of the projects and the supply of good quality 
projects may decrease due to higher costs. Information about the projects may 
be transferred when the person having inside information has the willingness to 
invest in the project or firm. Such willingness serves as a signal to the market of 
the true quality of the projects. An information-efficient financial intermediary with 
the capability to sort a class of risks is a natural response to information 
asymmetry.  
Campbell and Kracaw (1980) show the information production role of financial 
intermediation. Contrary to Leland and Pyle (1977), the authors suggest financial 
intermediations are not sufficient to solve the moral hazard and appropriability 
problems in the market of information. They conclude that the initial wealth 
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endowment acts as a barrier to entry in the market for information and as a 
general constraint on liability.  
Diamond (1984) proposes a theory of financial intermediation based on the 
minimum cost of monitoring information. The paper suggests that financial 
intermediaries can monitor the firm with loan covenants. The information 
advantage allows banks to re-negotiate the contract with new interest rates and 
contingent promises. Thus, banks provide an incentive to avoid value-decreasing 
investment decisions. Moreover, the costs of delegation approach zero when the 
returns of the projects are independent since there is a cost advantage in 
monitoring for well-diversified financial intermediaries.   
Fama (1985) shows banks have advantages in short-term inside debt. The 
difference between inside debt and outside debt is that the lender for inside debt 
can get access to information from an organisation's decision process which is 
not available to the public. Banks loans are inside debt. Banks have low 
information cost, and such cost will translate into low prices of their service. 
Positive signals about the organisation will transform into the outside debt market. 
Therefore, banks have the advantage in monitoring and serve as an information 
transmitter. Similar ideas are shown in James (1987),  who argues that banks 
have a uniqueness in their service which is not available from other borrowers by 
showing evidence that positive stock returns are associated with the 
announcement of a new bank credit agreement. Lummer and McConnell (1989) 
also support the information transmitter role of banks. They find favourable loan 
renewals accompany by stock price increases, while unfavourable loan renewals 
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accompany by stock price decreases, implying that banks are important and 
credible transmitters of firm-specific information to the capital market.   
Diamond (1991) shows a reputation building theory of monitoring. He indicates 
that there is a "life cycle" effect of borrowing through intermediaries. Borrowers 
will first borrow from banks and later issue debt directly. Middle credit-rated 
borrowers are relying on bank loans because high-rated borrowers do not need 
monitoring and low-related borrowers have less to lose. Moreover, banks play a 
screening role for borrowers with low credit-rating by filtering out borrowers with 
self-interested actions.  
Ahn and Choi (2009); Byers et al. (2008)find borrowing firms’ earning 
management behaviour is negatively related to the strength of bank monitoring 
(measured by the magnitude of a bank loan, the reputation of a lead bank and 
the length of bank loans). This implies that for bank-dependent firms, bank 
monitoring plays an important role in corporate governance.  
Byers et al. (2008); Ahn and Choi (2009)find loan announcement abnormal 
returns are more positive for firms with weaker corporate governance structures 
(e. g. less independent directors, low ownership by offers and directors, low 
incentive-based CEO compensations). However, bank financing can serve as a 
substitute only for borrowers with a weaker external market for corporate control.  
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2. 3. 2 Cost of Bank Financing 
Rajan (1992) shows that banks can access the information which is not available 
to arm's length creditors (e.g., bondholders). Such advantage in information 
enables banks to have bargaining power over the borrower's profits, controlling 
the borrower's investment decisions. However, the monitoring adversely affects 
the firm's incentive of shareholder wealth maximisation.   
Houston and James (1996) find that for firms with single bank relationship, the 
reliance on bank debt is negatively related to the importance of growth 
opportunities, while for multiple banking relationships, the relationship is positive. 
This implies that information monopolies associated with borrowing from single 
bank lender limit the use of bank debt. Multiple banking relationships or borrowing 
in public debt market either resolve the hold-up problems or indicate that bank 
information rents are lower.  
Santos and Winton (2008) find the loan spread is higher for bank-dependent firms 
than firms with access to public bond market: the interest rate rises during 
recessions and it rises more for bank-dependent firms.  
Overall, bank financing tends to be a double-edged sword. The positive side is 
banks mitigate the information asymmetry and limit the managerial discretion of 
the firm. The negative side is information monopolies enable firms to pursue 
debtholder value maximisation at the expense of the borrower's shareholders 
interest.  
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2. 4 Firm Diversification 
There is an extensive literature on the consequence of firm diversification. 
Shleifer and Vishny (1989) demonstrate that managers are likely to make 
diversifying acquisitions to increase their entrenchment, thereby reduce the risk 
of being replaced. Several papers suggest that firm diversification is associated 
with a cost (e.g., Lang and Stulz, 1994; Berger and Ofek, 1995; Servaes, 1996; 
Denis et al., 1997; Hoechle et al., 2012; Rajan et al., 2000; Moeller and 
Schlingemann, 2005; Dos Santos et al., 2008), while others argue that 
diversification not destroy value (e.g., Stein, 1997; Campa and Kedia, 2002; 
Graham et al., 2002; Mansi and Reeb, 2002; Glaser and Müller, 2010; Custodio, 
2014).  
2. 4. 1 Firm Diversification Destroys Shareholder Value 
Lang and Stulz (1994) find a negative relationship between Tobin's q and the 
degree of diversification. By comparing Tobin's q of diversified firms and single 
segment firms, the authors find that diversified firms have a lower q ratio than 
specialised firms. The result shows that highly diversified firms are consistently 
valued less than specialised firms. Berger and Ofek (1995) also find that 
diversification destroys value. They estimate the value of diversification using the 
imputed stand-alone values for business segments and find diversification leads 
to an average of 13% to 15% value loss, where the loss is larger for firms 
diversified in unrelated segments. Moreover, the lower value of diversified firms 
is due to overinvestment and cross-subsidisation.  
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A vast number of studies show the linkage between diversification discount and 
agency problems. Servaes (1996) examines the performance of diversified firms 
during conglomerate merger waves and finds that diversified firms are not valued 
at a premium. It shows firms with higher insider ownership remain focused when 
there is substantial diversification discount, but these firms tend to diversify when 
diversification discount declines. The findings suggest that diversification does 
not benefit U.S. firms. Denis et al. (1997) also provide an agency explanation 
about firm diversification. They find the level of diversification is negatively related 
to managerial ownership and ownership of outside blockholders. Further, the 
result shows that external corporate control, financial distress and management 
turnover are related to the decreases in diversification. The firms did not respond 
quickly and voluntarily when the excess value of diversification was significantly 
negative, implying that agency problems are responsible for firms maintaining 
value-reducing diversification strategies. Hoechle et al. (2012) further examine 
the link between corporate governance and diversification discount. They show 
that corporate governance variables can mostly explain diversification discount. 
Even after controlling endogeneity problems, diversification discount persists. 
However, diversification discounts approach zero when introducing corporate 
governance variables to these models. Moreover, the authors show that better 
corporate governance results in less value loss in mergers and acquisitions. 
Rajan et al. (2000) address the model of that internal resources transfer between 
divisions of diversified firms. They argue that when diversity increases, resources 
transfer from divisions with high investment opportunities to divisions with low 
investment opportunities. The inefficient internal allocation contributes to the loss 
of firm value.  
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Recent literature provides evidence on the effect of diversification by examining 
M&As. Moeller and Schlingemann (2005) investigate a sample of U.S. firms 
which conduct cross-border acquisitions as to their stock return performance and 
operating performance. The study shows that both stock return performance and 
operating performance are significantly lower for cross-border acquisitions than 
domestic acquisitions. Moreover, increases in both geographical and industrial 
diversification are negatively related to stock returns. In addition, bidder returns 
are positively related to takeover activity in the target country and to a legal 
system offering better shareholder rights, supporting the agency explanation. Dos 
Santos et al. (2008) extend the research by examining the valuation effects of a 
sample of cross-border mergers and acquisitions of U.S. firms. They find that 
unrelated acquisitions lead to a significant decline in excess value, while the 
acquisition of "fairly valued" business units does not destroy value. Overall, the 
study suggests that international diversification does not destroy value while 
industry diversification results in diversification discount.  
2. 4. 2 Firm Diversification Does Not Destroy Shareholder Value 
Stein (1997) argues that diversified firms benefit from the efficient internal capital 
market. The model indicates that there is a "winner picking" function of 
headquarters, which means headquarters can reallocate the limited funds 
efficiently across projects. Thus, the headquarters can create value which 
distinguishes it from a bank lender.  
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Campa and Kedia (2002) also show diversification does not destroy value. They 
consider endogeneity of the diversification decision and conclude that a firm 
chooses to diversity in order to respond to exogenous changes in its environment 
which also affect firm value. Moreover, firm's choice to diversify is negatively 
related to firm value. The inverse premium becomes positive when a firm’s 
diversification discount and its firm value are estimated jointly. Overall, the paper 
does not support the view that diversification is a value-reducing strategy.  
Graham et al. (2002) argue that the reduction of excess value of diversified firms 
are largely due to the acquisition of already discounted firms. Moreover, the 
excess value is not reduced when a firm increases its number of business 
segment without making an acquisition. They conclude that the benchmark for 
valuing conglomerate firms to stand-alone firms should be carefully reconsidered.  
Mansi and Reeb (2002) indicate that there is a function of leverage which reduces 
shareholder value while enhancing bondholder value. They find that all equity 
firms do not exhibit a diversification discount and using debt to compute excess 
value creates a downward bias. They conclude that the relation between 
diversification and excess value is insignificant. Glaser and Müller (2010) 
examine whether the discount is due to the book value of debt bias by using the 
market value of credit instead of the book value of debt and find that 
diversification discount is reduced, supporting the risk reduction view. 
Nonetheless, their results remain a significant diversification discount, revealing 
that the book value of debt bias is not the sole explanation. 
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Custodio (2014) argues that the q-based measures of diversification discount are 
biased because the transaction value is normally greater than the book value of 
the target. Therefore, the q is usually lower for the merged firm than the pre-
merger entities. The author finds that diversification discount is eliminated after 
subtracting goodwill from the book value of assets.  
Overall, the effect of firm diversification on the value of a firm is a debatable topic. 
Since managers may engage in M&As that destroy firm value, there are changes 
in the value of firm diversification. The question arises as to whether the use of 
different sources of financing brings different value consequences.  
2. 5 Summary 
The literature discussed above are summarised as follow: 
First, the performance of M&As financed by different sources of financing is 
different. The literature on sources of financing and the performance of M&As 
shows that equity financing, debt financing and cash financing have different 
impact on performance. Specifically, firms with excess corporate cash 
holdings have poor performance.  
Second, corporate liquidity is important for a firm either to fund future 
investments or to hedge against risks. Bank lines of credit are an alternative 
source of corporate liquidity which have different features when compared 
with corporate cash holdings. The choice between the two sources of 
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financing is determined by firm characteristics. And agency problems are an 
important determinant.  
Third, the effect of bank financing is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, 
firms benefit from the informational advantage and monitoring from banks. On 
the other hand, bank-dependent firms are associated with hold-up problems 
due to information monopoly.  
Lastly, the value of firm diversification also gives rise to discussion. One 
argument is diversification destroys shareholder value by virtue of agency 
problems and inefficient allocation of internal resources among divisions 
within a firm. The opposite view is that diversification discount is due to 
endogeneity problems and the measures should be carefully reconsidered. 
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Chapter 3. Corporate Cash Holdings, Bank Lines of Credit and 
the Performance of M&As 
3. 1 Introduction 
Corporate cash holdings and bank lines of credit are two important forms of 
corporate liquidity. Previous literature shows that firms hold high corporate 
liquidity to total assets. For example, Bates et al. (2009) find that the mean of the 
ratio of cash to total assets is 23.2% for U.S. firms in 2006. Bank lines of credit, 
also known as revolving credit facilities, are an alternative form of corporate 
liquidity. A firm obtains a certain amount of debt capacity when it receives bank 
lines of credit. Used lines of credit are recorded as debt obligations, while unused 
lines remain off the balance sheet. A firm can choose use or not use the bank 
lines of credit. The costs associated with bank lines of credit are the "commitment 
fee" and the "predetermined interest rate". A borrower pays an up-front 
commitment fee to the unused portion and a predetermined interest rate on the 
drawn amount. Sufi (2009) finds that 85% of the firms in his sample have bank 
lines of credit and the mean of the ratio of total lines of credit to total assets is 
16%. Lins et al. (2010) conduct a survey of CFOs in 29 countries and find that 
bank lines of credit accounts for 15% of total assets.  
The sources of financing affect the performance of M&As. Jensen (1986) shows 
that entrenched managers can use free cash flow easily to spend on value-
decreasing acquisitions, while debt financing limits managerial discretion. 
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However, when debt financing is used, the conflict of interest between 
shareholders and debtholders may also lead to the value loss of shareholder 
(Myers, 1977). Moreover, the cost of capital is higher for external sources of 
financing than internally generated funds due to asymmetric information between 
firms and the external markets (Myers and Majluf, 1984). Therefore, when 
different sources of financing are used to finance M&As, acquiring firms have 
different performance. 
In this chapter, I examine how the performance of M&As is affected by the 
sources of financing between corporate cash holdings and bank lines of credit. I 
develop three hypotheses based on agency problems between shareholders and 
managers, agency problems between shareholders and debtholders and 
information asymmetry. First, since bank lines of credit are subject to monitoring 
by banks which can reduce agency problems between shareholders and 
managers, I expect that the M&As financed by bank lines of credit will outperform 
the M&As financed by corporate cash holdings. Second, corporate cash holdings 
are internal sources of financing, while used bank lines of credit are debt 
obligations. Banks may not benefit shareholders when a conflict of interest 
between shareholders and debtholders exists. Therefore, I expect that the M&As 
financed by bank lines of credit will underperform the M&As financed by corporate 
cash holdings. Third, information asymmetry increases the cost of external 
financing. Corporate cash holdings are associated with a lower cost due to a 
lower degree of information asymmetry, whereas banks have the informational 
advantage and the function of substitution for financial slack which alleviates the 
problems associated with information asymmetry. Therefore, I expect that the 
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performance of M&As financed by bank lines of credit will not be significantly 
different from the M&As financed by corporate cash holdings.  
I construct a sample of 723 cash-paid U.S. M&As from 1985 to 2013 to investigate 
the relation between sources of financing and the performance of M&As. The 
sources of financing of these M&As are bank lines of credit, corporate cash 
holdings or a mixed source of bank lines of credit and corporate cash holdings. I 
find that both the announcement returns and the operating performance are 
higher for the M&As entirely financed by bank lines of credit than those financed 
by corporate cash holdings. The multinomial logistic regression shows an 
acquirer is more likely to use bank lines of credit as the source of financing when 
institutional ownership is higher. Moreover, the M&As entirely financed by bank 
lines of credit are associated a lower acquisition premiums. I further divide the 
sample into sub-groups based on the degree of corporate governance. I find that 
only in the sub-group with weaker corporate governance, the M&As financed by 
bank lines of credit have higher performance than those financed by corporate 
cash holdings. I find consistent results after controlling for the self-selection 
problems.  
I conduct further analysis. First, I find that the performance of M&As is better if a 
higher fraction of bank lines of credit is used when an M&A is financed by a mixed 
source of bank lines of credit and corporate cash holdings. Second, I find that the 
performance of M&As is higher if there are lower costs associated with bank lines 
of credit, such as the commitment fee and the predetermined interest rate. Third, 
I conduct the sub-group analysis based on the bankruptcy risk and find that the 
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performance is higher for the M&As entirely financed by bank lines of credit in the 
sub-group with lower bankruptcy risk.  
I find strong evidence supporting the interpretation that the performance of M&As 
is higher for acquirers financed by bank lines of credit than those financed by 
corporate cash holdings. This is consistent with the hypothesis of agency 
problems between shareholders and managers.  
This chapter contributes to the literature in the following ways:   
First, my research contributes to the literature on the sources of financing in 
the setting of M&As by disclosing the relationship between the performance 
of M&As and bank lines of credit as a source of financing. To my knowledge, 
no previous study in this literature has separately examined bank lines of 
credit as a source of financing. For example, Bharadwaj and Shivdasani 
(2003) examine bank financing, but do not differentiate between bank lines of 
credit and other bank loans. Schlingemann (2004) and Martynova and 
Renneboog (2009) examine debt financing in general, but do not differentiate 
between bank financing and non-bank financing. However, the recent 
growing literature on bank lines of credit shows that bank lines of credit are 
an important form of corporate liquidity. Given the large magnitude of bank 
lines of credit, I believe that it is important to examine bank lines of credit as 
a source of financing in the setting of M&As separately.  
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Second, my research also contributes to the literature on the sources of 
financing in the setting of M&As by conducting a more comprehensive 
analysis. I examine how the costs associated bank lines of credit, such as the 
commitment fee and the predetermined interest rate, affect the performance 
of M&As. This has not been studied in either Bharadwaj and Shivdasani (2003) 
or Martynova and Renneboog (2009). I examine the relation between 
acquisition premiums and various sources of financing, which has not been 
studied in the two papers in the literature. I examine the net changes in 
operating performance as a measure of the performance of M&As, which has 
not been studied in the two papers in the literature. Therefore, I believe that 
this thesis extends the literature and provides a more comprehensive analysis.  
Third, my research complements the literature on bank lines of credit from the 
agency perspective. Previous literature examines how the agency problems 
affect the level of bank lines of credit. For example, Yun (2009) finds that after 
a change in takeover legislation, poorly-governed firms increase the fraction 
of corporate liquidity held in the form of corporate cash holdings relative to 
bank lines of credit. Sufi (2009) finds that firms with low cash flow are less 
likely to obtain a line of credit, and argues that firms must maintain high cash 
flow to remain compliant with covenants associated with bank lines of credit. 
My research differs from the previous literature in that I examine the 
performance brought by bank lines of credit. To my knowledge, only Nini et 
al. (2012) examine a sample of lines of credit loans and find that a firm's 
operating and stock price performance improve following a violation of the 
covenant, which implies that banks play an important role in corporate 
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governance and their actions benefit shareholders. My study differs from Nini 
et al. (2012) in that I conduct the research in the setting of M&As.  
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 3. 2 develops the 
hypotheses. Section 3. 3 describes the data and the variables. Section 3. 4 
presents the results. Section 3. 5 concludes the chapter.  
3. 2 Hypotheses 
In this section, I develop hypotheses based on three different perspectives: (1) 
Agency problems between shareholders and managers, (2) Agency problems 
between shareholders and debtholders and (3) Information asymmetry.  
3. 2. 1 Agency Problems between Shareholders and Managers 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) expound the agency theory. Since managers (the 
agent) may not act in the best interests of shareholders (the principal), there is 
an agency cost of managerial discretion. When agency problems between 
shareholders and managers exist, the sources of financing with higher agency 
cost may generate lower performance.  
Theories and evidence show that corporate cash holdings are associated with 
higher agency cost than external sources of financing because managers can 
use internally generated cash in a discretionary way with less scrutiny. Jensen 
(1986) indicates that internally generated free cash flow provides flexibility for 
managers to derive private benefits at the expense of shareholders. Managers 
49 
 
can use the free cash flow in value-destructive acquisitions. Lang et al. (1991) 
test the free cash flow hypothesis on tender offers and show supporting evidence, 
in that bidder returns are negatively related to free cash flow when firms have low 
investment opportunities. Myers and Rajan (1998) argue that, with excess liquid 
asset, managers can easily take or transform the assets in the form of perks that 
benefit themselves. Entrenched managers can also use the excess cash conduct 
empire building activities through acquisitions. Harford (1999) shows that cash-
rich firms are more likely to make value-decreasing acquisitions, supporting the 
agency cost of free cash flow.  
Regarding bank lines of credit, an extensive literature on financial intermediation 
indicates that firms benefit from the monitoring of banks reducing agency 
problems. For example, Diamond (1984) argues that banks can monitor a firm’s 
compliance with loan covenants with their cost advantage in collecting the 
information. James (1987) finds a larger positive stock price response to the 
announcement of new bank credit agreements than the stock price response 
associated with announcements of private placements or public debt offerings. 
Byers et al. (2008) find that loan announcements are more likely to be associated 
with positive wealth effects for firms with weak internal corporate governance. 
Ahn and Choi (2009) find that the level of earnings management in a borrowing 
firm is lower when the degree of bank monitoring is higher.  
The literature on bank lines of credit also shows evidence about the role of bank 
lines of credit on corporate governance. For example, Sufi (2009) finds that banks 
use covenant violations to restrict the availability of bank lines of credit, and 
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argues that covenants facilitate bank monitoring. Moreover, Yun (2009) finds that 
firms increase the fraction of corporate liquidity held in the form of corporate cash 
holdings relative to bank lines of credit after a change in takeover legislation 
which decreases the possibility of takeovers. This draws the interpretation that 
self-interested managers exploit the reduced threat of takeover and increase their 
discretion by holding more cash and reducing bank lines of credit which are 
associated with the monitoring by the banks.  
Since bank financing reduces the agency problems between shareholders and 
managers, I expect that the performance of M&As is higher if bank lines of credit 
as the source of financing. I have the following hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 1: The performance is higher for acquirers financed by bank lines of 
credit in M&As than those financed by corporate cash holdings in M&As.  
3. 2. 2 Agency Problems between Shareholders and Debtholders 
When the interest of shareholder and debt claimants diverge, the activities that 
maximise shareholder value may not benefit debtholder. When there is 
substantial conflict of interest between the two parties, different sources of 
financing may affect the performance differently.  
Corporate cash holdings are internally generated cash. Therefore, a firm’s capital 
structure should not change when corporate cash holdings are used in M&As. 
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When firms have good investment opportunities, holding internally generated 
funds enables firms to pay for investment expenditures (Opler et al., 1999).  
When bank lines of credit are used, they will become debt obligations. Agency 
problems arise when the interest of shareholders differs from debtholders. One 
potential issue is debt overhang. Myers (1977) shows that, as highly leveraged 
firms find it difficult and expensive to raise external financing, firms may maintain 
low leverage. The existence of debt can reduce the present market value of firms 
by weakening the incentive to undertake good future investments. The loss in the 
market value will be transferred to the firm’s current shareholders. Another issue 
associated with the agency problems between shareholders and debtholders is 
risk-shifting. As Jensen and Meckling (1976) demonstrate, managers can choose 
risky projects with high variance, which maximise shareholders' interests at the 
expense of debtholders’ interests. In this circumstance, acquirers financed by 
debt may have lower performance due to the shareholder-debtholder conflict of 
interest.  
The literature on financial intermediation also shows that banks may interfere the 
borrower to undertake the activities that maximise the interests of the lenders 
which may not necessarily maximise the value of shareholders of the borrowers. 
For example, Rajan (1992) argues that the information monopoly enables a bank 
to have the bargaining power over a firm's profits, which can adversely affect the 
firm's incentive to achieve shareholder value maximisation. Houston and James 
(1996) find that potential hold-up problems are associated with borrowing from a 
single bank. Santos and Winton (2008) find that banks largely raise their rates for 
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bank-dependent borrowers during recessions and argue that this is due to 
informational hold-up effects.  
Since bank financing increases the agency problems between shareholders and 
debtholders, I expect that the performance of M&As is lower if bank lines of credit 
as the source of financing. I have the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: The performance is lower for acquirers financed by bank lines of 
credit in M&As than those financed by corporate cash holdings in M&As.  
3. 2. 3 Information Asymmetry 
Myers and Majluf (1984) propose the pecking order theory. They argue that the 
financing costs are different for various sources of financing, depending on the 
degree of asymmetric information. They argue that the internal source of 
financing is the cheapest source of financing because they are not associated 
with asymmetric information. In this case, if a firm uses corporate cash holdings 
as the source of financing for M&As, the cost of the source of financing is lower 
than external sources of financing and thus the firm can generate higher 
performance than using external sources of financing in M&As.  
Bank financing is an external source of financing, it can mitigate the asymmetric 
information problem due to a bank’s informational advantage. For example, 
Leland and Pyle (1977) and Campbell and Kracaw (1980) argue that banks 
produce information. Consistent with the information production role of banks, 
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Myers and Majluf (1984) argue that informed bank debt can substitute for financial 
slack.  
Since bank financing mitigates information asymmetry and can substitute for 
financial slack such as corporate cash holdings, I expect that bank financing and 
corporate cash holdings have a similar impact on the performance of M&As. I 
have the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3:  The performance of the acquirers financed by bank lines of credit 
in M&As is NOT significantly different from those financed by corporate cash 
holdings in M&As.  
3. 3 Data and Variables 
3. 3. 1 Data 
Financial data are collected from Compustat and stock return data are collected 
from CRSP. U.S. data on M&As are collected from Thomson One database. Bank 
lines of credit data are manually collected from 10-K annual reports. The data of 
commitment fee and the predetermined interest rate that are associated with 
bank lines of credit are collected from 10-K annual reports. Institutional ownership 
data are collected from Thomson Financial/Institutional. In the sample, the 
acquirers are public firms because stock market data is used to calculate a 
measure of firm performance. The targets are either public firms or private firms.  
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The sample period is from 1985 to 2013. The following screening procedures are 
used. The deals are U.S. M&As with cash payment1 and the sources of financing 
are identified by Thomson One database as, “corporate fund”, “line of credit”, or 
a mixed source of the “corporate fund” and “line of credit”. Financial firms (SIC 
codes between 6000 and 6999) are excluded from the sample. The M&As whose 
deal value is less than one million dollars are excluded. The observations with 
incomplete data are excluded. After the screening procedures, a final sample of 
723 M&A events is obtained. Among them, 271 M&As are entirely financed by 
corporate cash holdings. 308 M&As are entirely financed by bank lines of credit. 
144 M&As are financed by a mixed source of bank lines of credit and corporate 
cash holdings.  
3. 3. 2 Variables 
3. 3. 2. 1 Source of Financing 
The sources of financing for M&As are identified in Thomson One database. For 
example, the database records an acquisition made by, “Actuant Corp” with the 
announcement date on 3 March 2008. The source of financing is recorded as, 
“Line of Credit”, and its description is, “The transaction was financed through 
Actuant Corp's revolving credit facility”. For another example, the database 
records an acquisition made by, “Select Comfort Corp”, with the announcement 
date on 17 January 2013. The source of financing is recorded as, “Corporate 
                                            
1 This is consistent with Bharadwaj and Shivdasani (2003) who examines cash tender offer. 
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Funds”, and its description is, “The transaction was financed through Select 
Comfort Corps existing cash reserves”.  
Two dummy variables are constructed to indicate the sources of financing of 
M&As. Bank Lines of Credit Dummy equals ones if an M&A is entirely financed 
by bank lines of credit and equals zero otherwise. Mixed Lines & Cash Dummy 
equals one if an M&A is financed by a mixed source of bank lines of credit and 
corporate cash holdings and equals zero otherwise.  
3. 3. 2. 2 Announcement Returns 
An acquirer’s announcement return, which is calculated as the cumulative 
abnormal return over days (–3, +3) around the announcement date, is used as a 
measure of the stock market performance of M&As. The cumulative abnormal 
returns are calculated using the market model with the CRSP equally weighted 
index as the market return. To estimate the market model, the acquirer’s daily 
return and the return on the CRSP equally weighted index over days -200 to -20 
is used, where day 0 is the event date.  
3. 3. 2. 3 Changes in Operating Performance 
The Change in ROA is used as a measure of the operating performance of M&As. 
ROA defines as the ratio of earnings before interest and tax to non-cash assets. 
The Change in ROA is calculated from year 𝑡 − 1 to year 𝑡 + 1.  
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3. 3. 2. 4 Net Changes in Operating Performance 
The Net Change in ROA is used as another measure of the operating 
performance of M&As. Net Change in ROA is the difference between an 
acquirer’s change in ROA and its matched comparable firm’s change in ROA 
from year 𝑡 − 1 to year 𝑡 + 1. The sample of comparable firms is constructed with 
propensity score matching. The propensity scores are calculated based on the 
estimates from the logistic regression using the data one year before the M&As 
for both acquiring firms and non-acquiring firms. Each acquiring firm is matched 
to a non-acquiring firm2 within the same industry based on 2-digit SIC code, 
requiring that the non-acquirer firm have a minimum difference in propensity 
score based on firm size, market-to-book ratio, cash flow, leverage, tangibility, 
capital expenditure, R&D, dividends and cash flow volatility. These variables 
have been used by the previous research in the literature. For example, Harford 
(1999) use a probit model to predict the likelihood to be a bidder and use the 
variable such as size, market-to-book ratio, leverage, and so on.  
“With replacement method” is used in the propensity score matching. For each 
acquiring firm, a comparable firm is selected if the firm has the nearest neighbour 
of propensity score. Suppose for another acquiring firm, the same comparable 
firm is chosen in this procedure, and this comparable firm is used twice in the 
                                            
2 The non-acquiring firms are the firms do not make any mergers and acquisitions, no matter what 
sources of financing are involved. 
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sample. The details about the propensity score matching are provided in Table 
3.4A.  
Table 3.4B shows the univariate statistics concerning the difference in the 
propensity score between acquirer firms and their matched non-acquirer firms. 
The propensity scores are generated based on the data one year before the 
acquisitions for both acquirers and non-acquirers. The mean of the difference is 
0.056 and the median is 0.022. The small difference in the propensity score 
implies a reasonable matching between acquirer firms and their matched non-
acquirer firms.  
3. 3. 2. 5 Institutional Ownership 
An acquirer’s level of corporate governance is measured with Institutional 
Ownership, which is the ratio of shares owned by institutional investors to the 
total shares outstanding at the end of a quarter before the announcement date. 
Block is a dummy variable which equals one if there exists a block institutional 
ownership which exceeds 5% of the total shares outstanding and equals zero 
otherwise.  
3. 3. 2. 6 Bankruptcy Risk 
Altman (1968) Z-score is used as the measure a firm’s bankruptcy risk. Following 
Altman (1968), if a firm has a Z-score less than 1.81, then the firm is considered 
to have high bankruptcy risk. If a firm has a Z-score greater than 1.81, then the 
firm is considered to have low bankruptcy risk.  
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3. 3. 2. 7 Control Variables 
The following control variables are used: Relative Value is the ratio of deal value 
to the sum of the acquirer's market value of equity and deal value, Hostile is a 
dummy variable that equals one if an M&A is hostile and zero otherwise, Unused 
Lines of Credit is the ratio of unused lines of credit to assets (e.g., Sufi, 2009), 
Cash is the ratio of cash and marketable securities to non-cash assets, where 
non-cash assets are total assets less corporate cash holdings, Size is the 
logarithm of non-cash assets, Cash Flow is the ratio of income before 
extraordinary items to non-cash assets, M/B is defined as the market value of 
equity plus non-cash assets minus book value of equity, divided by non-cash 
assets, Leverage is the ratio of long-term debts to non-cash assets, Tangibility is 
the ratio of plant, property and equipment to non-cash assets, Capital 
Expenditure is the ratio of capital expenditures to non-cash assets, R&D is the 
ratio of research and development expenses to non-cash assets, Dividends is the 
ratio of dividends to non-cash assets and Cash Flow Volatility is the standard 
deviation of Cash Flow in the prior five years.  
The control variables are used because they can affect a firm’s choice of the 
sources of financing. For example, it is expected that if a firm has more unused 
lines of credit (corporate cash holdings), then it is more likely that the firm will use 
bank lines of credit (corporate cash holdings) as the source of financing for the 
M&As. If a firm has a higher cash flow volatility, a firm may have a lower fraction 
of bank lines of credit in the corporate liquidity (e.g.,  Sufi, 2009), which can further 
affect a firm’s choice of using bank lines of credit as the source of financing for 
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the M&As. Moreover, the above control variables such as size, market-to-book 
ratio, hostile dummy, and so on are used, because they have been commonly 
used in the literature to control for their impact on the performance of M&As. For 
example, Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz (2004) argue that there is a size effect 
associated with gains from acquisitions, and show that large firms have lower 
announcement returns than small firms. Lang et al. (1991) find that bidder returns 
are significantly negatively related to cash flow for low q bidders but not for high 
q bidders. Servaes (1991) finds that hostile takeovers reduce bidder gains. Heron 
and Lie (2002) find that the improvement in the operating performance following 
acquisitions is positively related to the acquirer's market-to-book ratio.  
3. 4 Results 
This section reports the results. First, I report the summary statistics. Second, I 
report the univariate analysis based on announcement returns. Next, I analyse 
how do the sources of financing affect an acquiring firm’s the stock return 
performance and operating performance. Then I examine the determinants of an 
acquirer’s choice of sources of financing. Further, I report the results on 
acquisition premiums. I also report further analysis based on the fraction of bank 
lines of credit used and costs associated with bank lines of credit. In addition, I 
report the sub-groups analysis based on bankruptcy risk.  Finally, I conduct 
robustness checks. 
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3. 4. 1 Summary Statistics 
Table 3.1A reports the summary statistics. CAR (-3, +3) is used as the measure 
of stock return performance around announcement period. The mean of CAR (-
3, +3) for all M&As in the sample is 0.0161 and the median is 0.0091. The table 
shows on average the M&As have positive announcement returns, which are 
slightly greater than zero. Regarding operating performance, the average 
changes in operating performance for all M&As in the sample is -0.0279, and the 
median is -0.0135. By matching with non-acquiring firms with propensity score 
matching, the mean of Net Change in ROA is 0.0111 and the median is 0.0120 
for all firms in the sample. Therefore, the performance of all acquirers in the 
sample shows positive changes in operating performance compared with their 
peers who do not have acquisitions.  
Table 3.1B reports the number of deals. In the sample, U.S. M&As with cash 
payment are chosen. The M&As in the sample are entirely financed by corporate 
cash holdings, financed by bank lines of credit or a mixed source of corporate 
cash holdings and bank lines of credit. In this sample, 271 M&As are entirely 
financed by corporate cash holdings, 308 M&As are entirely financed by bank 
lines of credit and 144 M&As are financed by a mixed source of bank lines of 
credit and corporate cash holdings.  
3. 4. 2 Univariate Analysis of Announcement Returns 
Table 3.2 shows the univariate analysis on acquirers' announcement returns 
based on three groups. CAR (-3, +3) is the cumulative abnormal return over days 
61 
 
(-3, +3) around announcement date based on the market model with the equally 
weighted index.  
The first row shows that the mean of announcement returns for the M&As entirely 
financed by bank lines of credit (corporate cash holdings) is 0.031 (0.002). The 
difference is 0.029. A t-test shows that the difference is significant between the 
two groups. The second row shows that the mean of CAR (-3, +3) for the M&As 
financed by a mixed source of bank lines of credit and corporate cash holdings is 
not significantly different from the mean of announcement returns for the group 
of acquirers entirely financed by corporate cash holdings. The third row compares 
the M&As entirely financed by bank lines of credit with the M&As financed by a 
mixed source of bank lines of credit and corporate cash holdings. The difference 
in the mean of announcement returns between the two groups is significant. The 
results support the interpretation that the M&As entirely financed by bank lines of 
credit have the highest announcement returns. This is consistent with the agency 
hypothesis related to the shareholders-managers conflict.  
3. 4. 3 Regression on Announcement Returns 
The effect of the sources of financing between corporate cash holdings and bank 
lines of credit on acquirers’ announcement returns is examined based on the 
following equation: 
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𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐿𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝛽2 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐿𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠 & 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦
+ 𝛽3𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 + 𝛽4𝐻𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑒 + 𝛽5𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑡−1
+ 𝛽7 𝑀 𝐵⁄ 𝑡−1 + 𝛽8𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑡−1 + 𝛽9𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡−1
+ 𝛽10𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑡−1 + 𝛽11𝑅&𝐷𝑡−1 + 𝛽12𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠𝑡−1
+ 𝛽13𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠
+ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                              (3.1)   
The results are reported in Table 3.3. The dependent variable is CAR (-3, +3). 
The coefficient of Bank Lines of Credit Dummy is 0.020 (p-value = 0.01). It implies 
that on average the M&As entirely financed by bank lines of credit have an 
additional 2% announcement returns more than the M&As entirely financed by 
corporate cash holdings. The coefficient of Mixed Lines & Cash Dummy is 0.004 
(p-value = 0.60). Among the control variables, the coefficient of Size is negative 
and significant. This is consistent with the findings in Moeller et al. (2004) who 
find the existence of a size effect on acquisition announcement returns. The 
results are consistent with the interpretation that the M&As entirely financed by 
bank lines of credit have the best stock market performance. This is consistent 
with the hypothesis based on agency problems between shareholders and 
managers.  
3. 4. 4 Changes in Operating Performance 
The effect of sources of financing on the changes in operating performance are 
analysed based on the following equation: 
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∆𝑅𝑂𝐴(𝑜𝑟 𝑁𝑒𝑡 ∆𝑅𝑂𝐴)
= 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐿𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦
+ 𝛽2 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐿𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠 & 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝛽3𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 + 𝛽4𝐻𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑒
+ 𝛽5𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡−1 + 𝛽7 𝑀 𝐵⁄ 𝑡−1 + 𝛽8𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑡−1
+ 𝛽9𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝛽10𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑡−1 + 𝛽11𝑅&𝐷𝑡−1
+ 𝛽12𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠𝑡−1 + 𝛽13𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡−1
+ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠
+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                                                                              (3.2) 
The results are reported in Table 3.4C. Consistent with the stock return 
performance during announcement period, the results of the changes in 
operating performance show a similar pattern. The M&As financed by bank lines 
of credit have higher changes in operating performance than the M&As financed 
by corporate cash holdings.  
The dependent variable in Column 1 is the Change in ROA from one year after 
the M&As and one year before the M&As.3  The coefficient of Bank Lines of Credit 
Dummy is 0.022 (p-value = 0.06) and the coefficient of Mixed Lines & Cash 
Dummy is 0.012 (p-value = 0.25). This implies that the M&As entirely financed by 
bank lines of credit have higher changes in operating performance than the M&As 
entirely financed by corporate cash holdings. The dependent variable in Column 
2 is Net Change in ROA. The Net Change in ROA compared with matched non-
acquiring peers is employed to isolate the effect of the M&As. This filters out the 
                                            
3 Since the dependent variable requires the availability of the data from year t-1 to year t+1, the 
sample size is reduced to 676 M&As in this table. 
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general trend of the changes of the time. After matching with non-acquiring firms 
in the same industry, a positive effect for acquirers financed by bank lines of credit 
is found. The coefficient of Bank Lines of Credit Dummy is 0.048 (p-value = 0.02). 
The coefficient of Mixed Lines & Cash Dummy is 0.010 (p-value = 0.62). The 
results in Table 3.4C are consistent with the interpretation that the M&As entirely 
financed by bank lines of credit have the best operating performance. This is 
consistent with the agency hypothesis.  
3. 4. 5 The Choice of Sources of Financing 
Multinomial logistic regression is used to estimate the likelihood of an acquirer's 
choice between bank lines of credit and corporate cash holdings as the source of 
financing. The estimate is based on the following equation: 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 + 𝛽2 𝐻𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑒 + 𝛽3𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑡−1
+ 𝛽4𝑈𝑛𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝐿𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑡−1
+ 𝛽6𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡−1 + 𝛽7𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑡−1 + 𝛽8𝑀/𝐵𝑡−1 + 𝛽9𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑡−1
+ 𝛽10𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝛽11𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑡−1 + 𝛽12𝑅&𝐷𝑡−1
+ 𝛽13𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠𝑡−1 + 𝛽14𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡−1
+ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠
+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                                                                               (3.3) 
The dependent variable is categorical. It equals zero if an M&A is entirely 
financed by corporate cash holdings, equals one if an M&A is financed by bank 
lines of credit holdings and equals two if an M&A is entirely financed by a mixed 
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source of corporate cash holdings and bank lines of credit. It is expected that 
firms with better corporate governance are more likely to choose bank lines of 
credit as the sources of financing because they are more likely to meet either the 
monitoring requirements of the banks or the disciplinary effect associated with 
higher leverage.  
The results are reported in Table 3.5.4  Column 1 shows the likelihood of an 
acquirer’s choice of the sources of financing between bank lines of credit and 
corporate cash holdings. The coefficient of Cash is -11.221 (p-value = 0.01), 
suggesting that firms with higher level of cash are less likely to use bank lines of 
credit as the source of financing for M&As. The coefficient of Unused Lines of 
Credit is 5.845 (p-value = 0.01), suggesting that firms with higher level of unused 
lines of credit are more likely to use bank lines of credit as the source of financing 
for M&As.5  Regarding the effect of corporate governance, Column 1 shows that 
the coefficient of Institutional Ownership is 1.017 (p-value = 0.08). It implies that 
a firm with higher institutional ownership is more likely to choose bank lines of 
credit than corporate cash holdings as the source of financing. Moreover, similar 
results are found in Column 2 that an acquirer with higher institutional ownership 
is more likely to choose a mixed source of financing than corporate cash holdings 
as the only source of financing. Therefore, some evidence in Table 3.5 supports 
the interpretation that firms with better corporate governance are more likely to 
choose bank lines of credit as a source of financing for M&As. This is consistent 
                                            
4 Since the data of Unused Lines of Credit starts from 1995 when 10-K fillings are available online, 
the sample size reduced to 506 M&As. Among them, 191 M&As are entirely financed by corporate 
cash holdings, 220 M&As are entirely financed by bank lines of credit and 95 are financed by a 
mixed source of corporate cash holdings and bank lines of credit. 
5 Similar results are found when Total Lines of Credit is used in the regression. 
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with the hypothesis based on agency problems between shareholders and 
managers.  
3. 4. 6 Acquisition Premiums 
The choice of sources of funding and acquisition premiums are investigated in 
this section. The estimate is based on the regression with the same control 
variables as Equation (3.1). Three measures of acquisition premiums are used: 
the ratios of the offer price to the target share price one day, or one week, or four 
weeks before the announcement of M&As. Acquirers with greater agency 
problems between shareholders and managers may tend to overpay the target 
firms. From this viewpoint, acquirers financed by cash pay a higher premium, 
while acquirers financed by bank lines of credit pay a lower premium.  
Table 3.6 shows the results. 6  Column 1 shows that the coefficient of Bank Lines 
of Credit Dummy is -0.154 (p-value = 0.05). It implies that M&As entirely financed 
by bank lines of credit are associated with lower acquisition premiums. The 
coefficient of Mixed Lines & Cash Dummy is insignificant. Similar results are 
shown in Column 2 and Column 3 when acquisition premiums are measured at 
different time intervals. Therefore, the results in Table 3.6 support the 
interpretation that self-interested managers waste their resources in acquisitions, 
while acquirers financed by bank financing alleviates agency problems, leading 
                                            
6  There are 157 M&As in the sample whose data of acquisition premiums are available at 
Thomson One. 
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to a lower acquisition premium. This is consistent with the agency hypothesis 
related to shareholder-debtholder conflict.  
3. 4. 7 Sub-Group Analysis on Corporate Governance 
The sample is split into sub-groups depending upon whether the acquirer has an 
institutional blockholder. Acquirers with a blockholder indicate a higher level of 
corporate governance, while acquirers do not have a blockholder indicate a lower 
level of corporate governance.  
Table 3.7A shows the results of the announcement returns. The estimate is based 
on Equation (3.1). Column 1 shows that the coefficient of Bank Lines of Credit 
Dummy is 0.025 (p-value = 0.06) when there is not a blockholder and Column 2 
shows that the coefficient is insignificant when there is a blockholder.  Table 3.7B 
shows the results of the Net Change in ROA. The estimate is based on Equation 
(3.2). Column 1 shows that the coefficient of Bank Lines of Credit Dummy is 0.076 
(p-value = 0.01) when there is not a blockholder, and Column 2 shows that the 
coefficient is insignificant when there is a blockholder. Table 3.7C reports the 
results of acquisition premiums. The estimate is based on Equation (3.1). Column 
1 shows that the coefficient of Bank Lines of Credit Dummy is -0.191 (p-value = 
0.03) when there is not a blockholder and Column 2 shows that the coefficient is 
insignificant when there is a blockholder. Consistent results are found in Column 
3 to Column 6 for the acquisition premiums at different time intervals.  
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The results in Table 3.7A, Table 3.7B and Table 3.7C consistently imply that as 
a source of financing, bank lines of credit improve the corporate governance in 
poorly governed firms due to the monitoring by banks. This results in a 
significantly positive relation between bank lines of credit as a source of financing 
and stock market performance as well as the operating performance. Moreover, 
this results in a significantly negative relation between bank lines of credit as a 
source of financing and the acquisition premiums. This effect is insignificant for 
well-governed firms because these firms already have good governance and 
there is less room for improvements in corporate governance for these firms when 
they use bank lines of credit as a source of financing. Moreover, these well-
governed firms tend not to overpay for the M&As no matter whether bank lines of 
credit or corporate cash holdings are used as a source of financing. This is 
consistent with the agency hypothesis related to the shareholders-managers 
conflict.  
3. 4. 8 Heckman Two-Stage Estimation 
In the research setting, firms first self-select to undertake M&As, and then firms 
self-select to use different sources of financing. Heckman (1979) two-stage 
selection model is used to tackle self-selection problems. In the first stage, 
Inverse Mills Ratio 1 is obtained from the prediction of logistic regression in Table 
3.4A and Inverse Mills Ratio 2 is obtained from the multinomial logistic regression 
in Table 3.5. In the second stage, Inverse Mills Ratio 1 and Inverse Mills Ratio 2 
are included in the regressions. The extended Heckman two-stage selection 
model has been used in previous literature such as Wu and Shen (2013) and 
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Grace and Phillips (2008) who employ the multinomial logistic model as the first 
stage of the selection model. Also, a number of papers (e.g., Rutherford, Springer 
and Yavas, 2005; Muller III and Riedl, 2002; Huang and Rutherford, 2007; 
Daniels, Ejara and Vijayakumar, 2009; Grace and Phillips, 2008) include two or 
more Inverse Mills Ratios generate from several first stage regressions in the 
second stage of this analysis. 
The second stage regression for acquiring firms’ announcement returns are 
based on the following regression: 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡
= 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐿𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 (𝑜𝑟 𝛽1𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐿𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠 & 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦)
+ 𝛽2𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 + 𝛽3𝐻𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑒 + 𝛽4𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑡−1 + 𝛽6 𝑀 𝐵⁄ 𝑡−1
+ 𝛽7𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑡−1 + 𝛽8𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝛽9𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑡−1 + 𝛽10𝑅&𝐷𝑡−1
+ 𝛽11𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠𝑡−1 + 𝛽12𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝛽13𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒 𝑀𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑠 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 1
+ 𝛽14𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒 𝑀𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑠 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 2 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠
+ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                               (3. 4)     
The results of announcement returns are reported in Table 3.8A. After controlling 
the self-selection problems, Column 1 shows that the coefficient of Bank Lines of 
Credit Dummy is 0.041 (p-value = 0.01). The result is not significant for the 
coefficient of Mixed Lines & Cash Dummy.  
The second stage regression for acquiring firms’ operating performance is based 
on the following equation: 
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𝑁𝑒𝑡 ∆𝑅𝑂𝐴
= 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐿𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠 & 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 (𝑜𝑟 𝛽1𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐿𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠 & 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦)
+ 𝛽2𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 + 𝛽3𝐻𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑒 + 𝛽4𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡−1 + 𝛽6 𝑀 𝐵⁄ 𝑡−1
+ 𝛽7𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑡−1 + 𝛽8𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝛽9𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑡−1 + 𝛽10𝑅&𝐷𝑡−1
+ 𝛽11𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠𝑡−1 + 𝛽12𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝛽13𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒 𝑀𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑠 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 1
+ 𝛽14𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒 𝑀𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑠 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 2 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠
+ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                    (3.5) 
The results of changes in operating performance in Table 3.8B. A similar pattern 
with Table 3.8A is found. Column 1 shows that the coefficient of Bank Lines of 
Credit Dummy is 0.051 (p-value = 0.06).  No significant coefficient for Mixed Lines 
& Cash Dummy is found. The results in Table 3.8A and Table 3.8B are consistent 
with the findings in Table 3.3 and Table 3.4C in that the M&As entirely financed 
by bank lines of credit have both better stock market performance and better 
operating performance than the M&As entirely financed by corporate cash 
holdings. Therefore, similar results after controlling for the self-selection problems 
are found.  
3. 4. 9 Further Analysis 
This section shows further analysis. 
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3. 4. 9. 1 Fractions of Bank Lines of Credit in the Mixed Source of 
Financing 
In the previous analysis, Mixed Lines & Cash Dummy is used to indicate the 
situation when an M&A is financed by a mix of bank lines of credit and corporate 
cash holdings. In this section, further analysis is conducted as to how the fraction 
of bank lines of credit in the mixed source of financing affects the performance of 
M&As. Data on the fraction of bank lines of credit in the mixed source of financing 
is collected from 10-K annual reports. Since the data are only available for a 
subset of the M&As in our sample, analysis for 42 M&As is carried out for which 
such data are available. A variable called Fraction of Lines of Credit, which is the 
fraction of bank lines of credit used is constructed when an M&A is financed by a 
mix of bank lines of credit and corporate cash holdings.  
The analysis of acquiring firms’ announcement returns used the control variables 
in Equation (3.1). Table 3.9A shows the results. Column 1 shows the regression 
whose dependent variable is CAR (-3, +3).  The coefficient of Fraction of Lines 
of Credit is 0.301 (p-value = 0.04). It implies that a higher announcement return 
is associated with a higher fraction of bank lines of credit used in the mixed source 
of financing. Table 3.9B shows the regression whose dependent variable is the 
Net Change in ROA. The model uses the control variables in Equation (3.2). The 
coefficient of Fraction of Lines of Credit is 0.350 (p-value = 0.02). It implies that a 
higher net change in operating performance is associated with a higher fraction 
of bank lines of credit used in the mixed source of financing. Therefore, the results 
in Table 3.9A and Table 3.9B are consistent with the agency hypothesis.  
72 
 
3. 4. 9. 2 Commitment Fee and Predetermined Interest Rate 
Further analysis to examine how the costs associated with bank lines of credit 
affect the performance of M&As is conducted. After a firm obtains the bank lines 
of credit, the firm pays a commitment fee for a certain percentage of the unused 
amount of lines of credit and pays a predetermined interest rate on the used 
amount of lines of credit. It predicts that the performance of the M&As is higher if 
the costs associated with bank lines of credit are lower. Data of the commitment 
fee and the predetermined interest rate associated with bank lines of credit are 
manually collected from 10-K annual reports. Two variables Commitment Fee 
and Predetermined Interest Rate are included in the regressions, which 
correspond to the weighted average commitment fee and the weighted average 
predetermined interest rate associated with bank lines of credit as reported in the 
10-K annual reports at year 𝑡 − 1, where the weighting is the amount of each 
bank line of credit that a firm has.  
Table 3.10A shows the univariate statistics of the commitment fee and 
predetermined interest rate. The mean of Commitment Fee is 0.0036, and the 
median is 0.0038. The mean of Predetermined Interest Rate is 0.0518, and the 
median is 0.0572.  Table 3.10B shows the regressions on announcement returns. 
The control variables are the same as Equation (3.1). In Column 1, the coefficient 
of Commitment Fee is -18.991 (p-value = 0.03). In Column 2, the coefficient of 
Predetermined Interest Rate -0.775 (p-value = 0.08). The results imply that either 
a higher commitment fee or a higher predetermined interest rate is associated 
with a lower announcement return. Table 3.10C shows the regressions on 
73 
 
operating performance. The control variables are the same as Equation (3.2). In 
Column 1, the coefficient of Commitment Fee is -12.238 (p-value = 0.05). It 
implies that a higher commitment fee is associated with a lower net change in 
operating performance. In Column 2, the coefficient of Predetermined Interest 
Rate is -1.049 (p-value = 0.08). The results imply that either a higher commitment 
fee or a higher predetermined interest rate is associated with a lower net change 
in operating performance. Therefore, the results in Table 3.10B and Table 3.10C 
support the interpretation that the performance of the M&As is higher if the costs 
associated with bank lines of credit are lower. It implies that while bank lines of 
credit can reduce the agency problems between shareholders and managers as 
revealed by the findings in the previous tables, bank lines of credit are themselves 
associated with the costs that can affect the performance of M&As.  
3. 4. 9. 3 Sub-Group Analysis on Bankruptcy Risk 
Sub-group analysis is conducted to differentiate the hypotheses related to the 
shareholders-managers conflict and the hypotheses related to the shareholders-
debtholders conflict. Further, the sample is divided into two sub-groups based on 
the bankruptcy risk. Agency problems between shareholders and debtholders are 
more severe in the sub-group of firms with higher bankruptcy risk. Altman Z-score 
is used as the measure of bankruptcy risk. Following the literature (e.g., Altman, 
1968),  a firm is classified into the sub-group with higher (lower) bankruptcy risk 
if the firm's Altman Z-score is below (above) 1.81.  
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Table 3.11A reports the results of announcement returns. The estimate is based 
on Equation (3.1). The dependent variable is CAR (-3, +3).  Column 1 shows the 
regression for the sub-group with lower bankruptcy risk the coefficient of Bank 
Lines of Credit Dummy is 0.021 (p-value =0.01). Column 2 shows the regression 
for the sub-group with higher bankruptcy risk the coefficient of Bank Lines of 
Credit Dummy is insignificant. Table 3.11B reports the results of operating 
performance. The estimate is based on Equation (3.2). The dependent variable 
is Net Change in ROA. The results show a similar pattern with the stock return 
performance. The coefficient of Bank Lines of Credit Dummy is 0.047 (p-value 
=0.06). In Column 1 for the sub-group of firms with lower bankruptcy risk, and 
that is insignificant in Column 2 for the sub-group of firms with higher bankruptcy 
risk.  
The results in Table 3.11A and Table 3.11B are interpreted as follows. When a 
firm has lower bankruptcy risk, the agency problems focus on the conflict of 
interest between shareholders and managers. Due to the monitoring effect of 
bank financing and disciplinary effect of higher leverage, positive and significant 
coefficients of Bank Lines of Credit Dummy are found in the sub-group of firms 
with lower bankruptcy risk. However, the conflict of interest between shareholders 
and debtholders increases when a firm has higher bankruptcy risk. In this case, 
bank lines of credit will have a negative impact on shareholder value due to the 
agency problems between shareholders and debtholders. This negative effect 
offsets the positive monitoring or disciplinary effect, resulting in the insignificant 
coefficients of Bank Lines of Credit Dummy as observed in the table. Therefore, 
the results in Table 3.11A and 3.11B are consistent with both the agency 
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hypotheses related to the shareholders-managers conflict and the agency 
hypotheses related to the shareholders-debtholders conflict.  
3. 4. 10 Robustness Testing 
I conduct the following tests for robustness testing.  
3. 4. 10. 1 Acquiring Firms with Multiple M&As 
Some acquirers in our sample have more than one M&A in a fiscal year. Since 
the announcement return is used as a measure of the performance of M&As, the 
market reaction of shareholders for these acquirers with more frequent M&As can 
be different from the market reaction of shareholders for a firm with only one M&A 
in a fiscal year. Robustness checks are conducted on this issue. For an acquirer 
with more frequent M&As, the first M&A in a fiscal year is retained but the 
subsequent M&As in the same fiscal year are excluded. This reduces the sample 
size to 680 M&As.  
The results of announcement returns are reported in Table 3.12A. Equation (3.1) 
is used in this estimation. The coefficient for Bank Lines of Credit Dummy is 
positive and significant. The results show a similar pattern with Table 3.3 in that 
acquirer financed by bank lines of credit outperform acquires financed by 
corporate cash holdings. The results of the changes in operating performance 
are reported in Table 3.12B. Equation (3.2) is used in this estimation. A similar 
pattern is found with the results on Table 3.4 that the coefficients for Bank Lines 
of Credit Dummy are positive and significant in the two columns. After conducting 
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robustness testing for firms with frequent M&As, the results are consistent with 
the agency hypothesis.  
3. 4. 10. 2 Completion Year  
The announcement year is defined as the year 𝑡  in the analysis in previous 
sections. Since some M&As may take a longer time to complete, the completion 
year for these M&As can be different from the announcement year. Robustness 
checks are conducted about this issue. The completion year is defined as the 
year 𝑡 and examine how various sources of financing affect the changes in the 
operating performance around the M&As. This analysis uses the regression in 
Equation (3.2). 
Table 3.13 shows the results. Column 1 shows the regression whose dependent 
variable is the Change in ROA. Column 2 shows the regression whose dependent 
variable is the Net Change in ROA. In both columns, the coefficients of Bank 
Lines of Credit Dummy are positive and significant. Therefore, similar results as 
in Table 3.4C are found when the completion year is defined as the year 𝑡.  
3. 4. 10. 3 Alternative Windows 
CAR (-3, +3) is used as the announcement return in the analysis. Robustness 
checks are carried out by using alternative windows for the announcement return. 
The regression uses the same specification as Equation (3.1). Table 3.14 shows 
the results. The dependent variable in is Column 1 is CAR (0, 0).  The dependent 
variable in Column 2 is CAR (-1, +1). The coefficients of Bank Lines of Credit 
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Dummy for both columns are positive and significant. Therefore, similar results 
as in Table 3.3 are found that the announcement returns are higher for the M&As 
entirely financed by bank lines of credit.  
3. 4. 10. 4 Alternative Measure of Corporate Governance 
Block institutional ownership is used as the measure of corporate governance in 
the previous section. Robustness testing with alternative measures of corporate 
governance is conducted. The sample is divided into sub-groups based on the 
median of the institutional ownership. Acquirers with above median institutional 
ownership indicate a higher level of corporate governance, while acquirers with 
below median institutional ownership indicate a lower level of corporate 
governance.  
The results of announcement returns are reported in Table 3.15A. The analysis 
is based on Equation (3.1). The coefficient of Bank Lines of Credit Dummy is 
positive and significant when acquirers have lower institutional ownership and 
that is insignificant when acquirers have higher institutional ownership. The 
results of the changes in operating performance in Table 3.15B. The analysis is 
based on Equation (3.2). The coefficient of Bank Lines of Credit Dummy is 
positive and significant when acquirers have lower institutional ownership, and 
that is insignificant when acquirers have higher institutional ownership. Therefore, 
consistent results with Table 3.7A and Table 3.7B are found that firms with a 
lower level of corporate governance benefit from the monitoring of banks.  
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3. 4. 10. 5 The Public Status of Target Firms 
While the acquirers in the sample are public firms, the targets can be either public 
firms or private firms. The degree of agency problems and the degree of 
information asymmetry are different between public firms and private firms. 
Generally speaking, public firms have a lower degree of information asymmetry 
than private firms due to more disclosure requirements, but public firms have a 
higher degree of agency problems between shareholders and managers due to 
the separation of ownership and control. Further analysis is conducted to 
examine whether there is a difference in the impact of the sources of financing 
on the performance of M&As between the situation when the targets are public 
firms and the situation when the targets are private firms. A dummy variable 
called Public is conducted which equals one if a target firm is a public firm, and 
equals zero otherwise.  
Table 3.16A shows the results of announcement returns. The regression uses 
the same control variables as Equation (3.1). The coefficient of Bank Lines of 
Credit Dummy is positive and significant. Table 3.16B shows the results of the 
changes in operating performance. The regression uses the same control 
variables as Equation (3.2). The coefficients of Bank Lines of Credit Dummy are 
found to be positive and significant for both columns. Therefore, similar results 
as in Table 3.3 and Table 3.4C are found after the public status of target firms is 
included as an additional control variable in the regressions.  
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3. 4. 10. 6 Alternative Comparable Firms 
When a sample of comparable firms with propensity score matching is 
constructed, a comparable firm can occur more than once as long as it meets the 
requirement of a minimum difference in propensity score. This is called the “with 
replacement method” in the propensity score matching. Robustness checks by 
using the, “without replacement method”, in the propensity score are conducted. 
Namely, in the “without replacement method”, once a comparable firm is chosen, 
this firm is no longer available for consideration as a potential match for 
subsequent event firms.  
Table 3.17 shows the results. The regression uses the model in Equation 
(3.2).The dependent variable is the Net Change in ROA, which is the difference 
between the Change in ROA of the event firm and the Change in ROA of the 
comparable firm chosen based on the “without replacement method”. The 
coefficient of Bank Lines of Credit Dummy is positive and significant. Therefore, 
similar results are found after using the alternative comparable firms based on 
the “without replacement method” in the propensity score matching.  
3. 4. 10. 7 Institutional Ownership 
The findings in the previous tables reveal that a firm with higher institutional 
ownership is more likely to choose bank lines of credit than corporate cash 
holdings as the source of financing for M&As, and that there is a significantly 
positive relation between bank lines of credit as a source of financing and stock 
market performance as well as the operating performance in the sub-group of 
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firms that do not have a blockholder of institutional ownership. This raises a 
potential question about whether the results are driven by the situation that bank 
lines of credit are not available to some firms with lower institutional ownership. 
For example, if a firm with lower institutional ownership does not have access to 
bank lines of credit, then by extrapolation it will be observed that a firm with higher 
institutional ownership is more likely to use bank lines of credit than corporate 
cash holdings as the source of financing for M&As. However, this is driven by the 
availability of bank lines of credit, instead of driven by corporate governance, as 
have argued before.  
Robustness checks are conducted to explore this potential issue. Table 3.18 
shows the regressions based on the specification in Sufi (2009) and the variable 
Institutional Ownership is added as an additional independent variable.7 The 
regression is as follow: 
𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐿𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡
= 𝛽1𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴𝑡−1
+ 𝛽3𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑡ℎ𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝑀/𝐵𝑡−1
+ 𝛽7𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝛽8𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡−1
+ 𝛽9𝑁𝑜𝑡 𝑖𝑛 𝑎𝑛 𝑆&𝑃 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑡−1 + 𝛽10𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑡−1
+ 𝛽11𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑡−1 +  𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠
+ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                (3.6)    
                                            
7 Following Sufi (2009), the independent variables are one-year lagged variables. 
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Three measures of bank lines of credit have been used as the dependent 
variables. The results are shown in Table 3.18. Column 1 shows a probit 
regression on the likelihood that a firm has bank lines of credit. The dependent 
variable is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm has bank lines of credit, and 
equals zero otherwise. The coefficient of Institutional Ownership is 0.164 (p-value 
= 0.66). Column 2 and Column 3 show the regressions about the portion of bank 
lines of credit in the corporate liquidity. The dependent variable in Column 2 is 
Total Line / (Total Line + Cash), which is the ratio of total bank lines of credit to 
the sum of total bank lines of credit and corporate cash holdings. The coefficient 
of Institutional Ownership is -0.054 (p-value = 0.21). The dependent variable in 
Column 3 is Unused Line / (Unused Line + Cash), which is the ratio of unused 
bank lines of credit to the sum of unused bank lines of credit and corporate cash 
holdings. The coefficient of Institutional Ownership is -0.041 (p-value = 0.35).  
Therefore, the insignificant coefficients of Institutional Ownership support the 
interpretation that institutional ownership does not affect either the likelihood that 
a firm has bank lines of credit or the amount of bank lines of credit held by a firm.  
3. 4. 11 Discussion 
The empirical results above show that acquiring firms financed by bank lines of 
credit have higher performance than the acquiring firms financed by corporate 
cash holdings. The results are consistent with the free cash flow theory (Jensen, 
1986) that self-interested managers are likely to waste their resources in value-
destructive acquisitions. The results reveal that banks play an important role in 
corporate governance by imposing discipline to borrowers, thereby mitigate 
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agency problems. This is consistent with previous literature which shows the 
corporate governance role of bank lines of credit, such as Yun (2009) who find 
that firms with severe agency problems switch from bank lines of credit to cash 
holdings, and Nini et al. (2012) who find that the performance of borrower 
improved after violations of covenants.  
The results from sub-group analysis based on corporate governance are 
consistent with Bharadwaj and Shivdasani (2003) and Byers et al. (2008)  who 
find that the bank’s monitoring effect is mainly concentrated on poor performers. 
This can be interpreted as the acquirers with block institutional owners already 
subjected to monitoring from the blockholders, so the potentials for improvement 
are limited, while the performance of poorly governed firms improved due to 
banks’ involvement. Also, the results from sub-group analysis based on 
bankruptcy risk suggest that the monitoring effect does not benefit shareholders 
when there is substantial conflict of interest between shareholders and 
debtholders. This is consistent with Rajan (1992) who find that bank monitoring 
adversely affects firm’s shareholder wealth maximisation by interfering a firm’s 
investment decisions. 
 
3. 5 Conclusion 
I examine how sources of financing between corporate cash holdings and bank 
lines of credit affect the performance of M&As. I develop three hypotheses based 
on agency problems between shareholders and managers, agency problems 
between shareholders and debtholders and information asymmetry.  
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I find that the M&As entirely financed by bank lines of credit have higher 
performance than the M&As entirely financed by corporate cash holdings in both 
announcement returns and changes in operating performance. Firms with higher 
institutional ownership are more likely to use bank lines of credit than corporate 
cash holdings as the source of financing. Moreover, I find that lower acquisition 
premiums are consistently associated with the M&As entirely financed by bank 
lines of credit. The evidence from the sub-group analysis based on corporate 
governance shows acquirers with a lower level of corporate governance benefit 
from the choice of bank lines of credit. I conduct further analysis of the issues 
including the fraction of bank lines of credit in the mixed source of financing, the 
commitment fee and the predetermined interest rate associated with bank lines 
of credit, the sub-group analysis based on bankruptcy risk, as well as a batch of 
robustness checks.  
Overall, the results show strong evidence supporting the interpretation that the 
performance is higher for the M&As entirely financed by bank lines of credit. The 
positive effect of bank monitoring is pronounced for acquirers with lower level of 
corporate governance. This is consistent with the hypotheses based on the 
agency problems between shareholders and managers. 
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Chapter 4. Debt Issues, Bank Loans, Equity Issues and the 
Performance of M&As 
4. 1 Introduction 
Previous literature indicates for M&As paid with cash, a large proportion of the 
deals are financed by external sources of financing (Martynova and Renneboog, 
2008). The sources of financing between corporate cash holdings, different types 
of debt and equity issues may generate different performance for acquiring firms. 
Jensen (1986) shows that internally generated free cash flow can be used easily 
by managers on value-decreasing acquisitions, while debt financing limits such 
activities. Myers (1977) and Jensen and Meckling (1976) show that there is also 
agency cost of debt associated with leverage. The conflict of interest between 
shareholders and debtholders affect the value of the firm. Also, the pecking order 
theory (Myers and Majluf, 1984) shows that the cost of capital is different for 
internally generated cash, debt and equity. Given such differences among cash, 
debt and equity, the performance of M&As financed by different sources of 
financing is different.  
Previous empirical literature show evidence on sources of financing and the 
performance of M&As. Schlingemann (2004) shows that bidder returns are 
positively related to the cash raised from equity issuance and negatively relative 
to internally generated free cash flow. Martynova and Renneboog (2009) show 
that acquisitions financed by equity have negative returns. Moreover, acquisitions 
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financed by internally generated funds underperform debt. Bharadwaj and 
Shivdasani (2003) show that the acquirers of tender offers entirely financed by 
bank loans have significantly higher stock return performance than those 
financed by corporate cash holdings. Though the literature shows evidence of the 
impact of sources of financing and the performance of M&As, there remains the 
issue of whether different types of debt (bank debt and non-bank debt) affect the 
performance differently and how equity issues affect the performance of M&As.  
In order to link with the previous chapter, I further examine how the sources of 
financing between corporate cash holdings, other bank loans8, debt issues and 
equity issues affect the performance of M&As.  
I develop three hypotheses based on agency problems between shareholders 
and managers, agency problems between shareholders and debtholders and 
information asymmetry. First, entrenched managers may pursue their personal 
benefits with internally generated funds, while external financing reduces agency 
problems between managers and shareholders. Therefore, I expect the acquirers 
that subject to higher level of monitoring from external markets will generate 
higher performance in M&A. Second, the conflict of interest between 
shareholders and debtholders contributes to agency cost of debt. In the 
circumstance that substantial agency conflict exists between shareholders the 
debt claimants, debt financing is associated with debt-overhang and risk-shifting 
problems. Therefore, I expect that M&As financed by cash and equity have higher 
                                            
8 In Chapter Four, “other bank loans” is used to indicate the bank loans other than bank lines of 
credit. 
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performance than those financed by both bank debt and non-bank debt when 
there are higher agency problems between shareholders and debtholders. Third, 
with the presence of information asymmetry, the costs of capital for different 
sources of funds are influenced by the degree of information asymmetry. 
Therefore, I expect acquirers financed by the sources of financing with lower cost, 
will generate higher performance.  
I use a sample of 449 U.S. M&As with cash payment from 1985 to 2013. To link 
with the previous chapter, I use the M&As entirely financed by one of the following 
sources of financing: corporate cash holdings, other bank loans, debt issues and 
equity issues. I find that acquirers financed by other bank loans and debt issues 
are associated with higher performance in both announcement returns and 
changes in operating performance. I do not find that institutional ownership 
affects the choices between different sources of financing. Further, I find that 
acquirers financed by bank loans and debt issues pay lower premiums for the 
targets than those financed by corporate cash holdings. The evidence from the 
sub-group analysis based on corporate governance shows poorly-governed firms 
benefit from the use of debt financing. Also, the sub-group analysis based on 
agency conflicts between shareholders and debtholders implies that the positive 
effect of using bank financing and debt financing on M&As is only pronounced 
among firms with a lower level of bankruptcy risk. The results are consistent with 
the interpretation that the performance of M&As is higher for firms use other bank 
loans and debt issues as sources of financing. I conclude this is consistent with 
the hypothesis of agency problems between shareholders and managers.  
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This chapter contributes to the literature on the sources of financing of M&As in 
the following aspects:  
First, a limited number of papers examine the relation between sources of 
financing of cash-paid M&As and the performances. To my knowledge, these 
studies do not examine different types of debt separately. For example, 
Schlingemann (2004) and Martynova and Renneboog (2009) examine debt 
financing in general without differentiating bank debt and non-bank debt. 
Bharadwaj and Shivdasani (2003) examine bank financing without separating 
bank lines of credit and other bank loans. Moreover, Schlingemann (2004) 
and Martynova and Renneboog (2009) show different results in the 
performance of equity financed M&As, therefore, the effect of equity financing 
is unclear. My research extends the literature in that I distinguish between 
different types of debt among other bank loans and debt issues.  
Second, my research also contributes to the literature on the performance of 
M&As by providing a more comprehensive analysis. For example, my 
research extends Bharadwaj and Shivdasani (2003) by conducting analysis 
of general M&As instead of tender offers only. I also examine various 
performance measures such as operating performance and acquisition 
premiums, which have not been studied in Schlingemann (2004), Martynova 
and Renneboog (2009) and Bharadwaj and Shivdasani (2003).  
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The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 4. 2 develops the 
hypotheses. Section 4. 3 describes the data and the variables. Section 4. 4 
presents the results. Section 4. 5 concludes the chapter.  
4. 2 Hypotheses 
In this section, I develop hypotheses based on three different perspectives: (1) 
Agency problems between shareholders and managers, (2) Agency problems 
between shareholders and debtholders and (3) Information asymmetry.  
4. 2. 1 Agency Problems between Shareholders and Managers 
Agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) suggests that managers as the 
agent, may not act in the best interests of shareholders. Since there is an agency 
cost of managerial discretion, the performance of M&As financed by corporate 
cash holdings, equity and debt may be different.  
4. 2. 1. 1 Corporate Cash Holdings 
Corporate cash holdings avoid the monitoring from external markets, and thus 
provides flexibility for entrenched managers to derive private benefits at the 
expenses of shareholders (Jensen, 1986). From the agency perspective, 
entrenched managers are likely to use cash in value-destructive M&As to pursue 
their benefits, and thereby the performance of acquirers is lower than the those 
financed by external financing.  
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4. 2. 1. 2 Other Bank Loans 
Banks alleviate agency problems between shareholders and managers. Shleifer 
and Vishny (1997) show that banks have a whole range of controls and cash flow 
rights can interfere in the major decisions of the firm. Diamond (1984) mentions 
that banks can monitor much information of borrowers and thus are able to 
renegotiate the interest and contingent promises, forcing firms to comply with the 
covenants. Other literature including Byers, Fields and Fraser (2008) and Ahn 
and Choi (2009) also provides evidence of the positive effect of bank financing 
on corporate governance. Regarding the M&As literature, Bharadwaj and 
Shivdasani (2003) show tender offers entirely financed by banks are associated 
with larger and significant positive announcement returns. Since banks provide 
an incentive to avoid value-destructive M&As, I expect the performance is the 
higher for the M&As financed by bank loan than M&As financed by corporate 
cash holdings. I have the following hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 1A: The performance is higher for acquirers financed by other bank 
loans in M&As than those financed by corporate cash holdings in M&As. 
4. 2. 1. 3 Debt Issues 
The monitoring effect of debt has been studied by a number of papers. Grossman 
and Hart (1982) demonstrate that debt increases managers’ incentive to 
maximise shareholders’ value due to the threat of bankruptcy.  Jensen (1986) 
indicates that debt plays an important role in reducing the agency problems 
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associated with free cash flow. By promising to pay back the principal and 
interests, managers are monitored by debtholders. When acquirers financed by 
debt, they may receive higher performance than those financed by cash since 
debt limit the managerial discretion. Moreover, Stulz (1990) argues that debt 
issues can reduce the overinvestment problem stemmed from managerial 
discretion. D’Mello and Miranda (2010) empirically tested the effect of debt issues 
on unlevered firms, and find that overinvestment problems largely reduced after 
the introduction of debt issues among firms with poor investment opportunities. 
Chava and Roberts (2008) show that firms with severe agency problems 
significantly decline their capital investment after debt covenant violations, 
supporting the monitoring role of debt. The literature in M&As also shows that 
acquiring firms benefit from the monitoring effect of debt. Maloney, McCormick 
and Mitchell (1993) find that an acquirer’s preannouncement leverage is 
positively related to its abnormal returns at announcement, indicating debt 
enhances managerial decision making. Martynova and Renneboog (2009) find 
that acquisitions financed with internally generated funds underperform those 
financed with debt.  Since debt issues are associated with lower agency problems 
between shareholders and managers than corporate cash holdings, I expect that 
the performance of M&As is higher if debt issues are used as the source of 
financing. I have the following hypothesis:   
Hypothesis 1B:  The performance is higher for acquirers financed by debt issues 
in M&As than those financed by corporate cash holdings in M&As. 
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4. 2. 1. 4 Equity Issues 
On the one hand, Jensen (1986) indicates that raising equity decreases the 
leverage, and leverage-reducing transactions are associated with significant 
decreases in stock prices due to the increase of agency problems. Stulz (1990) 
argues equity issue increases the funds under the control of managers, leading 
to the increase in managerial discretion. Therefore, self-interested managers may 
use equity financing in M&As and external markets may provide limit monitoring. 
Jung, Kim and Stulz (1996) find the evidence that some firms issue equity to 
benefit managers instead of shareholders. Since equity issues not only bring 
additional resources available to managerial discretion but also reduce the 
leverage and its associated disciplinary effect on managers. This is more severe 
than the situation that corporate cash holdings are used as the source of financing 
where leverage is not affected. From this aspect, I have the following hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 1C:  The performance is lower for acquirers financed by equity 
issues in M&As than those financed by corporate cash holdings in M&As. 
On the other hand, equity issues allow the external capital markets to review a 
firm and its managers. Easterbrook (1984) argues that keeping access to external 
capital markets can result in the monitoring of the managers. Existing investors 
can influence manager’s actions only by voting and selling, but new investors can 
examine the behaviour of managers before investing. Thus, managers in capital 
market have the incentive to reduce agency problems between shareholders and 
managers. If a firm uses corporate cash holdings as the source of financing, it 
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will be less subject to the monitoring by the external capital markets. From this 
aspect, I expect that the performance of M&As is higher if equity issues are used 
as the source of financing. I have the following hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 1D:  The performance is higher for acquirers financed by equity 
issues in M&As than those financed by corporate cash holdings in M&As. 
From the agency perspective, the performance of M&As financed by equity 
depends on the trade-off between the negative effect of reduction in leverage and 
the positive effect of monitoring from the external markets.  
4. 2. 2 Agency Problems between Shareholders and Debtholders 
With the presence of agency problems between shareholders and debtholders, 
raising debt will be costly. When agency problems exist between shareholders 
and debtholders, using internally generated cash and debt in M&As, bring 
different performance to the firm.   
4. 2. 2. 1 Corporate Cash Holdings 
Firms have the incentive to holding cash to fund future investments. Corporate 
cash holdings are internally generated funds, which avoid underinvestment 
problems when firms have good investment opportunities (Opler et al., 1999). 
From this viewpoint, using internally generated funds to finance M&As does not 
destroy shareholder value.  
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4. 2. 2. 2 Other Bank Loans 
As I discussed in the previous section, bank financing mitigates agency problems 
between shareholders and managers. Diamond (1984) demonstrates that banks 
can monitor borrowers through delegated monitoring. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) 
show that banks can interfere borrowers’ decision making. Byers, Fields and 
Fraser (2008), Ahn and Choi (2009), and Bharadwaj and Shivdasani (2003) 
provide empirical evidence on the positive effect of bank monitoring on borrower’s 
corporate governance.  However, the use of bank loans is associated with hold-
up problems. A bank can use its informational advantage to pursue its own 
interest which does not benefit the shareholders of the firm. Previous findings 
including Rajan (1992), Houston and James (1996), and Santos and Winton 
(2008) show that the cost of using bank loans is higher for bank-dependent firms. 
Moreover, used bank lines of credit are debt obligations. Leverage increasing 
activities increase the agency cost of debt (Jensen, 1986), leading to the 
problems including debt-overhang and risk-shifting. Since bank financing 
increases the agency problems between shareholders and debtholders, I expect 
that the performance of M&As is lower when bank loans are used as the source 
of financing. I have the following hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 2A:  The performance is lower for acquirers financed by other bank 
loans in M&As than those financed by corporate cash holdings in M&As. 
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4. 2. 2. 3 Debt Issues 
As I mentioned in the previous section, debt issues reduce agency problems by 
limiting managerial discretion via the threat of bankruptcy  (Grossman and Hart, 
1982), reduction of resources under management control (Jensen, 1986) and 
debt covenants (Chava and Roberts, 2008). Debt issues reduce overinvestment 
problem (Stulz, 1990; D’Mello and Miranda, 2010) and create positive 
announcement effect in M&As (Maloney et al., 1993; Martynova and Renneboog, 
2009). On the other hand, the use of debt issues increases the leverage. Jensen 
and Meckling (1976) argue that the agency problems between shareholders and 
debtholders increase with the leverage. Debt-overhang and risk-shifting problems 
arise when cost of external financing increases, and thus force firms to forgo good 
investment projects. Since debt issues increase the agency problems between 
shareholders and debtholders, I expect that the performance of M&As is lower if 
debt issues are used as the source of financing. I have the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2B:  The performance is lower for acquirers financed by debt issues 
in M&As than those financed by corporate cash holdings in M&As. 
4. 2. 2. 4 Equity Issues 
Equity issues are at the opposite direction to the point mentioned above. Equity 
issues reduce a firm’s leverage, issuing equity can alleviate agency problems. 
Therefore, firms can finance valuable projects to avoid underinvestment 
problems. Since equity issues decrease the agency problems between 
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shareholders and debtholders, I expect that the performance of M&As is higher if 
equity issues are used as the source of financing. I have the following hypothesis:   
Hypothesis 2C:  The performance is higher for acquirers financed by equity 
issues in M&As than those financed by corporate cash holdings in M&As. 
4. 2. 3 Information Asymmetry 
4. 2. 3. 1 Corporate Cash Holdings 
Information asymmetry makes external financing more expensive than internal 
sources (Myers and Majluf, 1984). Given the assumption that different sources of 
financing have different costs, M&As financed by the source of funding with the 
lowest cost will receive the highest performance. Corporate cash holdings, as 
internally generated funds, are the least expensive source of funding.  
4. 2. 3. 2 Other Bank Loans  
The literature on financial intermediation shows the informational advantage of 
banks alleviating information asymmetry. For example, Leland and Pyle (1977) 
argue that financial intermediations provide a validation role for the credibility of 
information. Campbell and Kracaw (1980) show an information production role of 
financial intermediation. Myers and Majluf (1984) argue that informed bank debt 
can substitute for financial slack. Since bank financing mitigates information 
asymmetry and can substitute for financial slack such as corporate cash holdings, 
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I expect that bank financing and corporate cash holdings have a similar impact 
on the performance of M&As. I have the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3A:  The performance of the acquirers financed by other bank loans 
in M&As is NOT significantly different from those financed by corporate cash 
holdings in M&As. 
4. 2. 3. 3 Debt Issues 
In the pecking order theory proposed by Myers and Majluf (1984), debt issues 
are a more expensive source of financing than corporate cash holdings. Empirical 
findings reveal that the announcements of public bond issues are associated with 
zero or slightly negative equity returns (e.g., Eckbo, 1986; Jung et al., 1996). I 
expect that the performance of M&As is lower if debt issues are used as the 
source of financing because debt issues are a more expensive source of 
financing. I have the following hypothesis:   
Hypothesis 3B:  Acquirers financed by debt issues have lower performance than 
acquirers financed by corporate cash holdings in M&As..  
4. 2. 3. 4 Equity Issues 
In the pecking order theory proposed by Myers and Majluf (1984), equity issues 
are the most expensive source of financing. Empirical studies in the literature 
reveal that the seasoned equity offering is associated with significant negative 
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announcement returns (e.g., Asquith and Mullins, 1986).  I expect that the 
performance of M&As is lower if equity issues are used as the source of financing 
because equity issues are the most expensive source of financing. I have the 
following hypothesis:   
Hypothesis 3C: The performance is lower for acquirers financed by equity issues 
in M&As than those financed by corporate cash holdings in M&As. 
4. 2. 4 Summarising the Hypotheses 
The following table summarises the above hypotheses. "+” (“-”) indicates that the 
performance of M&As with a particular source of financing is higher (lower) than 
the benchmark situation when corporate cash holdings are used as the source of 
financing. “Not different” indicates that the performance of M&As with a particular 
source of financing is not significantly different from the benchmark situation 
when corporate cash holdings are used as the source of financing. I indicate the 
number of the hypotheses in the parentheses.  
Comparison between the performance of M&As with a particular source of financing; 
Corporate Cash Holdings is the benchmark.  
  
Agency Problems 
Between Shareholders 
and Managers 
Agency Problems 
between 
Shareholders and 
Debtholders 
Information 
Asymmetry 
Other Bank Loans + (H1A) - (H2A) Not different (H3A) 
Debt Issues + (H1B) - (H2B) - (H3B) 
Equity Issues - (H1C)/ +(H1D) + (H2C) - (H3C) 
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4. 3 Data and Variables 
4. 3. 1 Data 
A sample of U.S. M&As between 1985 and 2013 with cash payment is obtained 
from Thomson One database. Financial data are collected from Compustat 
database and stock return data are collected from CRSP. Institutional ownership 
data are collected from Thomson Financial/ Institutional database. Both the 
acquirers and targets are U.S. firms. All of the acquiring firms are publicly traded 
firms and the target firms can be either public or private firms.  
The sample fulfils the following requirements: (i) The source of funding of the 
M&As is identifiable from Thomson One database and the source of funding 
should be one of the following categories, “corporate funds”, “borrowings”, “debt 
issue”, and, “common stock issue”. Moreover, the descriptions for M&As financed 
by, “borrowings”, contains the information of, “bank loans”, and,“bank loans”, is 
the only source of borrowings (where bank loans are the loans apart from bank 
lines of credit),  (ii) The deal value is no less than 1 million US dollars,   (iii) Neither 
the acquirers nor the targets are financial service firms. With these procedures, 
a sample of 449 M&As with complete data is obtained. Among the 449 M&As, 
271 M&As are entirely financed by corporate cash holdings, 82 M&As are entirely 
financed by other bank loans, 56 M&As are entirely financed by debt issues and 
40 M&As are entirely financed by equity issues.  
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4. 3. 2 Variables 
4. 3. 2. 1 Source of Financing 
To link with the previous chapter, only the M&As with sources of funding which 
are 100% financed with other bank loans, debt issues and equity issues are 
considered in this sample. The source of funding data is available from Thomson 
One database. The variable, “source of funds," is identified. 
For example, the database records an acquisition made by, “Performance Food 
Group Co", with the announcement date on 04 November 1994. The source of 
funding is "Borrowings”, and its detailed description is, "The transaction was to 
be financed through a bank loan”. Thomson One database shows this is the only 
source of financing of the M&A.  
For another example, the database has a record that, “Republic Group Inc", 
announced an acquisition on 23 January 1995. The source of funding is, "Debt 
Issue", and the detail records as, “The transaction was to be financed through the 
issuance of debt”. Thomson One database shows this is the only source of 
financing of the M&A.  
For another example, the database records there is an acquisition made by, 
“Northland Cranberries Inc", on 20 May 1998, with the source of funding is 
"Common Stock Issue ". The detail information is, “The transaction was financed 
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through the issuance of 5 mil common shares, raising $65.3 mil”. Thomson One 
database shows this is the only source of financing of the M&A.  
Three dummy variables are used to identify the source of funding for M&As. Other 
Bank Loans Dummy equals one if an M&A is financed by bank loan, and zero 
otherwise. Debt Issues Dummy equals one if an M&A is financed by debt issue, 
and zero otherwise. Equity Issues Dummy equals one if an M&A is financed by 
common stock issue and zero otherwise.  
4. 3. 2. 2 Announcement Returns 
The announcement returns are measured by the cumulative abnormal return over 
days (–3, +3). The cumulative abnormal return is calculated using the market 
model with the CRSP equally weighted index as the market return. Acquirer’s 
daily return is used, together with the return on the CRSP equally weighted index 
over days -200 to -20, where day 0 is the event date.  
4. 3. 2. 3 Changes in Operating Performance 
In order to examine the effect of sources of financing to change in operating 
performance of M&As, the Change in ROA from year 𝑡 − 1 to 𝑡 + 1 is used as the 
measure. ROA is the ratio of earnings before interest and tax to non-cash total 
assets. Non-cash total assets is used to link with the previous chapter.  
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4. 3. 2. 4 Net Changes in Operating Performance 
Considering the time trend, the net change in operating performance is used to 
capture the net effect of an M&A. Each acquirer firm is matched with non-
acquiring peers without any M&As at the announcement year. The sample of 
acquirer-comparable pairs is constructed by propensity score matching with firms 
have the same 2-digit SIC code in Compustat. The propensity scores are 
calculated based on the estimates from the logistic regression using the data one 
year before the M&As for both acquiring firms and non-acquiring firms. The 
nearest neighbour of propensity scores is matched based on firm size, market-
to-book ratio, cash flow, leverage, tangibility, capital expenditure, R&D, dividends 
and cash flow volatility.  
“With replacement method” is used in the propensity score matching. For each 
acquiring firm, a comparable firm is selected if the firm has the nearest neighbour 
of propensity score. Suppose for another acquiring firm, the same comparable 
firm is chosen in this procedure, and this comparable firm will be used twice in 
the sample. The details about the propensity score matching are provided in 
Table 4.4A.  
Table 4.4B shows the univariate statistics about the differences in the propensity 
score between acquirer firms and their matched non-acquirer firms. The 
propensity scores are generated based on the data of both acquirers and non-
acquirers one year before the M&As. The mean of the difference is 0.050, and 
the median is 0.017. The small difference in the propensity score implies a 
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reasonable matching between acquirer firms and their matched non-acquirer 
firms.  
4. 3. 2. 5 Institutional Ownership 
The acquirer’s level of corporate governance is measured of Institutional 
Ownership. Institutional Ownership is the ratio of shares owned by institutional 
investors to the total shares outstanding at the end of a quarter before the 
announcement date. Block is a dummy variable that equals one if there exists a 
block institutional ownership which exceeds 5% of the total shares outstanding 
and equals zero otherwise.  
4. 3. 2. 6 Bankruptcy Risk 
Altman (1968) Z-score is used as the measure of a firm’s bankruptcy risk. 
Following Altman (1968), if a firm has a Z-score less than 1. 81, then the firm is 
considered to have high bankruptcy risk. If a firm has a Z-score greater than 1. 
81, then the firm is considered to have low bankruptcy risk.  
4. 3. 2. 7 Control Variables 
The following control variables are used: Relative Value is the ratio of deal value 
to the sum of the acquirer's market value of equity and deal value, Hostile is a 
dummy variable that equals one if an M&A is hostile and zero otherwise, Cash is 
the ratio of cash and marketable securities to non-cash assets, where non-cash 
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assets are total assets less corporate cash holdings, Size is the logarithm of non-
cash assets, Cash Flow is the ratio of income before extraordinary items to non-
cash assets, M/B is defined as the market value of equity plus non-cash assets 
minus book value of equity, divided by non-cash assets, Leverage is the ratio of 
long-term debts to non-cash assets, Tangibility is the ratio of plant, property and 
equipment to non-cash assets, Capital Expenditure is the ratio of capital 
expenditures to non-cash assets, R&D is the ratio of research and development 
expenses to non-cash assets, Dividends is the ratio of dividends to non-cash 
assets and Cash Flow Volatility is the standard deviation of Cash Flow in the prior 
five years. The above control variables such as size, market-to-book ratio, hostile 
dummy etc., have been widely used in a vast number of studies (e.g., Moeller et 
al., 2004; Servaes, 1991; Lang et al., 1991; Heron and Lie, 2002) as control 
variables to examine the performance of M&As.  
4. 4 Results 
This section reports the results. First, I report the summary statistics. Second, I 
report the univariate analysis based on announcement returns. Next, I examine 
how do the sources of financing affect the acquiring firm’s stock return 
performance and operating performance. Then I investigate the determinants of 
an acquirer’s choice of sources of financing. Further, I analyse the results of 
acquisition premiums. In addition, I report the results of sub-group analysis based 
on corporate governance, and sub-group analysis based on bankruptcy risk. 
Finally, I report the result of robustness checks. 
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4. 4. 1 Summary Statistics 
Table 4.1A shows the summary statistics. The mean of CAR (-3, +3) for all M&As 
in the sample is 0.0138, and the median is 0.0055. Therefore, on average the 
announcement returns of M&As are slightly greater than zero. Moreover, the 
mean of changes in operating performance for all M&As in the sample is -0.0181 
and the median of changes in operating performance is -0.0116. Net Change in 
ROA is calculated based on propensity score matching with peers. The mean of 
Net Change in ROA of the sample is 0.0135 and the median is 0.0149. This 
suggests that compared with their peers who do not have acquisitions, the 
acquiring firms generate higher operating performance.  
Table 4.1B shows the summary of the number of deals. In this sample, U.S. M&As 
with cash payment are chosen. The M&As in the sample are entirely financed by 
one of the following sources: corporate cash holdings, bank loans, debt issues 
and equity issues. The sample is to link with the previous chapter which compares 
the performance of M&As financed by bank lines of credit with corporate cash 
holdings. In this sample, 271 M&As are entirely financed by corporate cash 
holdings, 82 M&As are entirely financed by other bank loans, 56 M&As are 
entirely financed by debt issues, and 40 M&As are entirely financed by equity 
issues.  
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4. 4. 2 Univariate Analysis of Announcement Returns 
Table 4.2 reports the univariate analysis on acquirers’ announcement returns. 
CAR (-3, +3) is the cumulative abnormal return over days (-3, +3) around 
announcement date based on the market model with the equally weighted index. 
A mean test and a Wilcoxon median test based on three groups are reported.  
The first row compares the CAR (-3, +3) for acquirers financed by other bank 
loans and corporate cash holdings. The mean of CAR (-3, +3) for acquirers 
financed by bank loans (corporate cash holdings) is 0.031 (0.002). The difference 
is 0.029, and the t-test shows the difference in mean is significant at 0.01. The 
median of CAR (-3, +3) for acquirers financed by bank loans (corporate cash 
holdings) is 0.022 (0.002), and the median test shows a p-value of 0.04. The 
results indicate that the M&As financed by other bank loans have higher 
announcement shareholder returns than the M&As financed by corporate cash 
holdings. The evidence is consistent with prior findings. For example, Bharadwaj 
and Shivdasani (2003) find that the acquirers financed by banks have higher 
abnormal returns in tender offers. The second row compares the CAR (-3, +3) for 
acquirers financed by debt issues and corporate cash holdings. The mean of CAR 
for acquirers financed by debt issues (corporate cash holdings) is 0.049 (0.002). 
The t-test shows the difference is statistically significant at 0.01 between the 
sample mean. Moreover, the median of CAR (-3, +3) for acquirers financed by 
debt issues (corporate cash holdings) is 0.030 (0.002) and also significant at 0.01. 
This is consistent with Martynova and Renneboog (2009) in that acquisitions 
financed by debt have higher performance than those financed by internally 
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generated funds. The third row compares the CAR (-3, +3) for acquirers financed 
by equity and acquirers financed by corporate cash holdings. Both the mean and 
median of CAR for the acquirers with the two sources of funding are close to zero 
and the difference is not statistically significant.  
4. 4. 3 Regression on Announcement Returns 
Table 4.3 shows the regression on the sources of financing between equity issue, 
debt issue, bank loans and corporate cash holdings on acquirers’ announcement 
returns. The estimate is based on the following equation: 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝛽2 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒𝑠 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦
+ 𝛽3𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒𝑠 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝛽4𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 + 𝛽5𝐻𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑒
+ 𝛽6𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡−1 + 𝛽7𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑡−1 + 𝛽8𝑀/𝐵𝑡−1 + 𝛽9𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑡−1
+ 𝛽10𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝛽11𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑡−1 + 𝛽12𝑅&𝐷𝑡−1
+ 𝛽13𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠𝑡−1 + 𝛽14𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡−1
+ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠
+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                                                                         (4.1) 
The results show that the M&As financed by debt (other bank loans and debt 
issues) outperform the M&As financed by corporate cash holdings, while the 
performance of M&As financed by equity issues is insignificant.  Specifically, the 
coefficient of Other Bank Loans Dummy is 0.021 (p-value = 0.08), suggesting 
acquirers financed by bank loans also have higher performance than acquirers 
financed by internally generated cash. The results of bank loans are consistent 
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with previous findings (e.g., Bharadwaj and Shivdasani, 2003). In addition, the 
coefficient of Debt Issues Dummy is 0.028 (p-value = 0.05). The results indicate 
that the performance of M&As with all cash payment are different when firms use 
different sources of funding and acquirers financed by other bank loans and debt 
issues receive significantly higher stock return performance around 
announcement period than acquirers financed by corporate cash holdings. The 
results are consistent with the hypothesis based on agency problems between 
shareholders and managers in that acquirers benefit from the monitoring of debt 
in M&As.  
4. 4. 4 Changes in Operating Performance 
Table 4.4C shows the effect of sources of financing on the changes in operating 
performance.9  The estimate is based on the following equation: 
∆𝑅𝑂𝐴(𝑜𝑟 𝑁𝑒𝑡 ∆𝑅𝑂𝐴)
= 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝛽2 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒𝑠 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦
+ 𝛽3𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒𝑠 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝛽4𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 + 𝛽5𝐻𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑒
+ 𝛽6𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡−1 + 𝛽7𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡−1 + 𝛽8𝑀/𝐵𝑡−1 + 𝛽9𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑡−1
+ 𝛽10𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝛽11𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑡−1 + 𝛽12𝑅&𝐷𝑡−1
+ 𝛽13𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠𝑡−1 + 𝛽14𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡−1
+ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠
+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                                                                                (4.2) 
                                            
9 Since the dependent variable requires the availability of the data from t-1 to year t+1, the sample 
size is reduced to 425 M&As in this regression. 
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The results are consistent with the stock return performance, showing a similar 
pattern. The M&As financed by debt outperform the M&As financed by internally 
generated funds, and the M&As financed by equity does not show a significant 
effect.  
In Column 1, the dependent variable is Change in ROA from one year before the 
M&As and one year after the M&As. The coefficient for Other Bank Loans Dummy 
is 0.043 (p-value = 0.01), and the coefficient for Debt Issues Dummy is 0.027 (p-
value = 0.06). This implies the operating performance is positively related to other 
bank loans and debt issues. Moreover, Equity Issues Dummy is not significant in 
this column. In Column 2, the dependent variable is Net Change in ROA 
compared with matched non-acquiring peers. This is to isolate the effect of the 
M&As. The coefficient of Debt Issues Dummy is 0.051(p-value = 0.08), and the 
coefficient of Bank Loans Dummy is 0.043, showing a significant positive effect 
(p-value = 0.06). The coefficient of Equity Issues Dummy is not significant. Overall, 
the results in Table 4.4C show the M&As financed by both debts from financial 
intermediaries and directly placed debt have the higher operating performance 
than the M&As financed by internally generated funds. The results are consistent 
with the hypothesis based on shareholder-debtholder conflict.  
4. 4. 5 The Choice of Sources of Financing 
Multinomial logistic regression is used to investigate the determinants of the 
choices between different sources of financing between corporate cash holdings, 
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other bank loans, debt issues and equity issues. The model is based on the 
following equation: 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 + 𝛽2 𝐻𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑒 + 𝛽3𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑡−1
+ 𝛽4𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑡−1
+ 𝛽7 𝑀 𝐵⁄ 𝑡−1 + 𝛽8𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑡−1 + 𝛽9𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡−1
+ 𝛽10𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑡−1 + 𝛽11𝑅&𝐷𝑡−1 + 𝛽12𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠𝑡−1
+ 𝛽13𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠
+ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                   (4.3) 
The model assumes the choices of the source of funding are mutually exclusive. 
The dependent variable is sources of financing. It equals zero if an M&A is entirely 
financed by corporate cash holdings, equals one if an M&A is entirely financed 
by other bank loans, equals two if an M&A is entirely financed by debt issues, 
and equals three if an M&A is entirely financed by equity issues.  
Table 4.5 displays the results. Column 1 shows the likelihood of acquirers' choice 
between other bank loans and corporate cash holdings, Column 2 indicates the 
choice between debt issues and corporate cash holdings, and Column 3 shows 
the choice between equity issues and corporate cash holdings. When firms have 
the higher level of cash, they are less likely to use other bank loans and debt 
issues than corporate cash holdings. No evidence as to the effect of institutional 
ownership on the choice of sources of funding is found, although the choice 
affects the performance of M&As.   
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4. 4. 6 Acquisition Premiums 
The sources of funding and acquisition premiums are examined. The estimate is 
based on the same specification in Equation (4.1). Three intervals are used to 
measure acquisition premiums: the ratios of the offer price to the target share 
price one day, one week, or four weeks before the announcement of M&As. 
Acquirers with greater agency problems between shareholders and managers 
may tend to overpay the target firms. From this viewpoint, acquirers financed by 
cash pay higher premiums, while acquirers financed by debt pay lower premiums.  
Table 4.6 reports the results.10  In Column 1, coefficient of Other Bank Loan 
Dummy is -0.206 (p-value = 0.04) and the coefficient of Debt Issues Dummy is -
0.196 (p-value = 0.07). This implies that the acquirers financed by other bank 
loans and debt issues pay a lower premium for the acquisition than the acquirers 
financed by corporate cash holdings. Column 2 and Column 3 show a similar 
pattern. Concerning the equity issues, the coefficient is not significant. This is 
consistent with the interpretation that entrenched managers waste their 
resources in value-destructive acquisitions, and acquiring firms benefit from the 
monitoring of debtholders thus pay a lower premium. The evidence as to 
acquisition premiums is consistent with the agency hypothesis that M&As 
financed by other bank loans and M&As financed by debt issues have higher 
performance than those financed by corporate cash holdings.  
                                            
10 There are 125 M&As in the sample whose data of acquisition premiums are available at 
Thomson One. 
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4. 4. 7 Sub-Group Analysis on Corporate Governance 
Sub-group analysis based on block institutional ownership is conducted. 
Acquirers with a blockholder indicate a higher level of corporate governance, 
while acquirers do not have a blockholder indicate a lower level of corporate 
governance.  
Table 4.7A displays the results of announcement returns. The model is based on 
Equation (4.1). As shown in Column 1, in the sub-group of acquirers without a 
blockholder, the coefficient of Other Bank Loans Dummy is 0.033 (P-value = 0.07), 
and the coefficient of Debt Issues Dummy is 0.038 (p-value = 0.05). In Column 2, 
the sub-group of acquirers with a blockholder, both Other Bank Loans Dummy 
and Debt Issues Dummy are insignificant. In addition, the coefficients of Equity 
Issues Dummy are not significant in any of the groups. Table 4.7B displays the 
results of the changes in operating performance. The model is based on Equation 
(4.2). For the sub-group of acquirers without a blockholder, the coefficient of 
Other Bank Loans Dummy is 0.110 (p-value = 0.02) and the coefficient of Debt 
Issues Dummy is 0.179 (p-value = 0.01). For the sub-group of acquirers with a 
blockholder, the coefficient of both Other Bank Loans Dummy and Debt Issues 
Dummy are insignificant. The coefficients of Equity Issues Dummy are not 
significant in both groups. Table 4.7C reports the results of acquisition premiums. 
The model uses the same independent variables in Equation (4.1). Similar to the 
stock return performance and changes in operating performance, M&As financed 
by other bank loans and debt issues have higher performance for the sub-group 
of acquirers without a blockholder. In Column 1, the coefficient of Other Bank 
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Loans Dummy is -0.292 (p-value = 0.06) and the coefficient of Debt Issues 
Dummy is -0.480 (p-value = 0.01). In Column 2, both Other Bank Loans Dummy 
and Debt Issues Dummy are not significant. Similar results for premiums with 
other intervals are found.  
The evidence of the performance of sub-group analysis indicates that the positive 
effects of debt financing on the performance M&As are only significant among 
weaker-governed firms. This indicate for firms already have good corporate 
governance, there is little potential for them to improve the performance with debt 
financing. Poorly governed firms benefit more from the monitoring from 
debtholders. Thus, M&As financed by other bank loans and debt issues have 
higher performance than those financed by corporate cash holdings in such group. 
The results support the hypothesis based on agency problems between 
shareholders and managers.  
4. 4. 8 Heckman Two-Stage Estimation 
Heckman (1979) two-stage selection model is used to tackle self-selection 
problems. In the first stage, Inverse Mills Ratios 1 is from the prediction of logistic 
regression in Table 4.4A and Inverse Mills Ratio 2 is from the multinomial logistic 
regression in Table 4.5. In the second stage, Inverse Mills Ratios 1 and Inverse 
Mills Ratio 2 are included in the regressions. The extended Heckman two-stage 
selection model has been used in previous literature. Wu and Shen (2013) and 
Grace and Phillips (2008) adopt the multinomial logistic model in the first stage 
of the selection model. Also, a number of papers (e.g., Rutherford et al., 2005; 
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Muller III and Riedl, 2002; Huang and Rutherford, 2007; Daniels et al., 2009; 
Grace and Phillips, 2008) include two or more Inverse Mills Ratios generate from 
several first stage models in the second stage of this analysis. 
The second stage regression of acquiring firms’ announcement effect is based 
on the following equation: 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡
= 𝛼
+ 𝛽1𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 (𝛽1𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒𝑠 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦, 𝑜𝑟 𝛽1𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒𝑠 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦)
+ 𝛽2𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 + 𝛽3𝐻𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑒 + 𝛽4𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑡−1 + 𝛽6 𝑀 𝐵⁄ 𝑡−1
+ 𝛽7𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑡−1 + 𝛽8𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝛽9𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑡−1 + 𝛽10𝑅&𝐷𝑡−1
+ 𝛽11𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠𝑡−1 + 𝛽12𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝛽13𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒 𝑀𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑠 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 1
+ 𝛽14𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒 𝑀𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑠 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 2 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠
+ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                                               (4.4) 
Table 4.8A shows the results of announcement returns. The coefficient of Other 
Bank Loans Dummy is 0.029 (p-value = 0.08) and the coefficient of Debt Issues 
Dummy is 0.039 (p-value = 0.07). The coefficient of Equity Issues Dummy is not 
significant.  
The second stage regression of operating performance is based on the equation: 
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𝑁𝑒𝑡 ∆𝑅𝑂𝐴
= 𝛼
+ 𝛽1𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 (𝛽1𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒𝑠 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦, 𝑜𝑟 𝛽1𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒𝑠 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦)
+ 𝛽2𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 + 𝛽3𝐻𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑒 + 𝛽4𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡−1 + 𝛽6 𝑀 𝐵⁄ 𝑡−1
+ 𝛽7𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑡−1 + 𝛽8𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝛽9𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑡−1 + 𝛽10𝑅&𝐷𝑡−1
+ 𝛽11𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠𝑡−1 + 𝛽12𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝛽13𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒 𝑀𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑠 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 1
+ 𝛽14𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒 𝑀𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑠 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 2 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠
+ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                                             (4.5) 
Table 4.8B shows the results of changes in operating Performance. The 
coefficient of Other Bank Loans Dummy is 0.078 (p-value = 0.06) and the 
coefficient of Debt Issues Dummy is 0,085 (p-value = 0.07). The coefficient of 
Equity Issues Dummy is not significant. Overall, after controlling for self-selection 
problems, the evidence is consistent with the findings in Table 4.3 and Table 4.4C 
that M&As financed by other bank loans and debt issues receive higher 
performance than those financed by corporate cash holdings. The results support 
the hypothesis of agency problems between shareholders and managers.  
4. 4. 9 Sub-Group Analysis on Bankruptcy Risk 
The sample is divided into sub-groups by the level of agency conflict between 
shareholders and debtholders. Altman’s Z-score (Altman, 1968) is taken as the 
measure of bankruptcy risk. An Altman Z-score less than 1.81 indicates a high 
bankruptcy risk, while an Altman Z-score greater than 1.81 indicates a low 
bankruptcy risk. The hypothesis based on agency problems between 
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shareholders and debtholders predicts that when there is a higher level of conflict 
of interest between them, using debt to finance M&As will not generate high 
performance to acquirers.  
The results of announcement returns are reported in Table 4.9A. The model is 
based on Equation (4.1). Column 1 shows the results for acquirers with lower 
bankruptcy risk. The coefficient of Other Bank Loans Dummy is at 0.031 (p-value 
= 0.04), and the coefficient of Debt Issues Dummy is 0.027 (p-value = 0.08). 
Column 2 shows the results for acquirers with higher bankruptcy risk. In this 
column, I do not find the coefficients of any dummy variables are significant. The 
results of operating performance are reported in Table 4.9B. The model is based 
on Equation (4.2). The results show a similar pattern with the stock return 
performance. In Column 1, for firms with lower bankruptcy risk, the coefficient for 
Other Bank Loans Dummy is 0.055 (p-value = 0.06) and the coefficient for Debt 
Issues Dummy is 0.066 (p-value = 0.05). When firms have higher bankruptcy risk, 
the coefficients for Other Bank Loans Dummy and Debt Issues Dummy are 
insignificant.  
The evidence from Table 4.9A and Table 4.9B implies that there are positive 
effects associated with bank financing and debt financing due to the corporate 
governance role of debtholders, however, when agency problems between 
shareholders and debtholders are severe, the positive effect of bank financing 
and debt financing are eliminated by the negative effect of leverage. Overall, the 
findings support both the hypothesis of agency problems between shareholders 
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and debtholders and the agency problems between shareholders and 
debtholders.    
4. 4. 10 Robustness Testing 
This section reports robustness testing. 
4. 4. 10. 1 Acquiring Firms with Multiple M&As 
Since an acquirer may make multiple M&As during one year, and each M&A may 
bring to different effects to the firm. In order to avoid the possible inaccuracy, a 
sample is constructed by including only one deal for each acquirer during one 
fiscal year.  
Table 4.10A shows the results of announcement returns. The model is based on 
Equation (4.1). The coefficient of Other Bank Loans Dummy and the coefficient 
of Debt Issue Dummy are positive and significant. Table 4.10B shows the results 
of changes in operating performance. The model is based on Equation (4.2). 
Column1 reports the Change in ROA and Column 2 reports Net Change in ROA. 
The coefficients of Other Bank Loans Dummy and the coefficient of Debt Issues 
Dummy are both positive and significant in the two columns. The results in Table 
4.10A and Table 4.10B show the performance of M&As are positively related to 
other bank loans and debt issues. After excluding firms with more than one M&As, 
the results are consistent with the hypothesis based on agency problems 
between shareholders and managers.  
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4. 4. 10. 2 Completion Year 
In the previous analysis, announcement year is taken as the year 𝑡 in the analysis 
of changes in operating performance. Since the completion year may be later 
than the announcement year, robustness testing is conducted on the changes in 
operating performance with the completion year as the year 𝑡.  
The results are displayed in Table 4.11. The model is based on Equation (4.2). 
The dependent variable in Column 1 is the Change in ROA. The dependent 
variable in Column 2 is the Net Change in ROA. The coefficients of Other Bank 
Loans Dummy and Debt Issues Dummy are positive and significant in the two 
columns, consistent with Table 4.4C. This supports the hypothesis based on 
agency problems between shareholders and managers.  
4. 4. 10. 3 Alternative Windows 
CAR (0, 0) and CAR (-1, +1) are used as alternative event windows to conduct 
robustness check and report the results in Table 4.12. The model is based on 
Equation (4.1). In both columns, the coefficients of Other Bank Loans Dummy 
and Debt Issues Dummy are positive and significant. This is consistent with the 
results in Table 4.3 that the announcement returns are higher for the M&As 
financed by other bank loans and debt issues.  
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4. 4. 10. 4 Alternative Measure of Corporate Governance 
Institutional ownership is used as an alternative measure of corporate 
governance. The sample is divided into sub-groups based on the median of the 
ratio of institutional ownership, where above median institutional ownership 
indicates a higher level of corporate governance and below median institutional 
ownership indicates a lower level of corporate governance.  
Table 4.13A shows the results of announcement returns. The model is based on 
Equation (4.1). For firms with below median institutional ownership, the 
coefficient of Other Bank Loans Dummy and the coefficient of Debt Issues 
Dummy are positive and significant, and those are not significant for firms with 
above median institutional ownership. Table 4.13B shows the results of the 
changes in operating performance. The model is based on Equation (4.2). For 
firms with below median institutional ownership, the coefficient of Other Bank 
Loans Dummy and the coefficient of Debt Issues Dummy are positive and 
significant, and those are not significant for firms with above median institutional 
ownership. The results are consistent with the agency hypothesis based on 
shareholder-debtholder conflict.  
4. 4. 10. 5 The Public Status of Target Firms 
Robustness testing is conducted by considering the public status of target firms 
to test if the performance is different for M&As with public and private targets. The 
public status of targets shows differences in the degree of agency problems and 
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the degree of information asymmetry. Public firms show a lower degree of 
information asymmetry and a higher degree of agency problems comparing with 
private firms. A dummy variable Public is used as an additional control variable. 
It equals one if a target firm is a public firm, and equals zero otherwise.  
The results of announcement returns are reported in Table 4.14A. The control 
variables are the same as Equation (4.1). The coefficient of Other Bank Loans 
Dummy and the coefficient of Debt Issues Dummy are positive and significant. 
The results of changes in operating performance are reported in Table 4.14B. 
The control variables are the same as Equation (4.2). The coefficient of Other 
Bank Loans Dummy and the coefficient of Debt Issues Dummy are positive and 
significant in both columns. The results are consistent with the agency hypothesis 
after including the public status of target firms as an additional control variable.  
4. 4. 10. 6 Alternative Comparable Firms 
In the previous analysis, the comparable firms are matched based on propensity 
score matching “with replacement method”. In this section, “without replacement 
method” is used as an alternative method for robustness checks. 
The results are displayed in Table 4.15. The dependent variable is the Net 
Change in ROA. The estimate is based on Equation (4.2). The coefficient of Other 
Bank Loans Dummy and the coefficient of Debt Issues Dummy are positive and 
significant. Consistent results are found after using, “without replacement 
method”, as an alternative matching method for the propensity score matching.  
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4. 4. 11 Discussion 
The empirical results above show that acquiring firms financed by other bank 
loans and acquiring firms financed by debt issues have higher performance than 
those financed by corporate cash holdings. This is consistent with the free cash 
flow theory (Jensen, 1986) that internally generated cash is more flexible for 
managers to peruse their own agenda through acquisitions than debt financing. 
The effect of bank loans is consistent with the literature in bank monitoring effect, 
such as the corporate governance role as mentioned by Byers et al. (2008) and 
Ahn and Choi (2009), and the information transmitter role as demonstrated by 
Fama (1985),James (1987), and Lummer and McConnell (1989). The effect of 
debt issues is consistent with the literature of debt monitoring effect, such as Stulz 
(1990), D’Mello and Miranda (2010), Chava and Roberts (2008), Maloney et al. 
(1993), and etc.. The results are also consistent with Bharadwaj and Shivdasani 
(2003) and Martynova and Renneboog (2009) who show that acquirers with bank 
financing and debt financing, respectively, have higher announcement effect than 
those financed internally. 
The sub-group analysis based on corporate governance show that bank financing 
and debt financing benefit the poorly governed firm. This is consistent with 
Bharadwaj and Shivdasani (2003) and Byers et al. (2008) that bank monitoring 
improves the performance of poor performers. Moreover, the sub-group analysis 
based on bankruptcy risk show that when bankruptcy risk is high, using bank 
loans and debt issues in M&As does not increase firm value. This supports the 
argument of Jensen and Meckling (1976) that leverage increases the agency cost 
121 
 
of debt. The results of bank loans are also consistent with the findings of Rajan 
(1992), Houston and James (1996) and Santos and Winton (2008) who indicate 
that banks can use their advantages to benefit themselves instead of 
shareholders of the borrowers.  
4. 5 Conclusion 
I examine how sources of financing between corporate cash holdings, bank loans, 
equity issues, and debt issues and affect the performance of M&As. I develop 
three hypotheses based on agency problems between shareholders and 
managers, agency problems between shareholders and debtholders and 
information asymmetry.  
I find that acquirers financed by other bank loans and debt issues have higher 
performance than acquirers financed by corporate cash holdings in both 
announcement returns and changes in operating performance. I do not find that 
significant effect of equity financing on the performance of M&As. Moreover, I find 
acquirers financed by bank loans and debt issue pay lower premiums to the 
targets. The evidence from the sub-group analysis based on corporate 
governance shows acquirers with a lower level of corporate governance benefit 
from the choice of debt financing. The results are consistent with the agency 
hypothesis associated with shareholder-debtholder conflict. I also find some 
evidence supports the hypothesis of conflict of interest between shareholders and 
debtholders. The positive effect of using debt on the performance of M&As is only 
significant when acquirers have lower of bankruptcy risk.  
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Overall, the results imply that acquirers benefit from the monitoring of debt in 
M&As. The positive effect of debt financing is pronounced for acquirers with a 
lower level of corporate governance, suggesting the monitoring of debt improves 
the corporate governance for weaker-governed firms. However, when there is 
substantial conflict of interest between shareholders and debtholders, using debt 
financing may not able to generate higher performance than those financed by 
corporate cash holdings. I conclude that agency problems play an important role 
in determining the performance of M&As when acquirers use different sources of 
financing with all cash payment.
123 
 
Chapter 5. Corporate Cash Holdings, Bank Lines of Credit and 
the Value of Firm Diversification in M&As 
5. 1 Introduction 
Previous literature shows mixed views on the value associated with firm 
diversification. Lang and Stulz (1994) and Berger and Ofek (1995) find that there 
is a significant discount associated with diversification. A vast number of papers 
(e.g., Servaes, 1996; Denis et al., 1997; Aggarwal and Samwick, 2003; Hoechle 
et al., 2012) show that diversification discount is due to agency problems. Shin 
and Stulz (1998), Rajan et al. (2000) and Scharfstein and Stein (2000) argue that 
diversified firms suffer from misallocation of internal capital. While other literature 
argues that diversification does not destroy value and that the discount of 
diversified firms is due to endogeneity problems (e.g., Campa and Kedia, 2002), 
acquisitions to already discounted firms (e.g., Graham et al., 2002), 
measurement bias (e.g., Custodio, 2014) and the result of risk reduction effects 
of diversification (e.g., Mansi and Reeb, 2002; Glaser and Müller, 2010).  
Though there is a debate regarding the value of firm diversification, event studies 
(e.g., Moeller and Schlingemann, 2005; Dos Santos et al., 2008), which link 
diversification and M&As, show that diversifying M&As have lower performance 
and firms have a significant decrease in excess value. The literature on M&As 
shows that different sources of financing affect the performance of the M&As 
differently (Schlingemann, 2004; Martynova and Renneboog, 2009). Since 
different sources of financing represent different degree of agency problems, and 
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agency problems are associated with the value of firm diversification, thus, the 
value of firm diversification may be affected by the sources of financing of M&As. 
Therefore, it is important to examine the impact of sources of financing of M&As 
on the value of firm diversification. 
Corporate cash holdings and bank lines of credit are two important forms of 
corporate liquidity, both account for a large proportion of total assets. Corporate 
cash holdings are more flexible for managers to peruse their own agenda through 
value-destructive acquisitions than debt financing (Jensen, 1986). Firms with 
excess cash are more likely to make diversifying acquisitions to unattractive 
targets Harford (1999), while bank lines of credit, as substitutes for corporate 
cash holdings, are monitored by banks (Sufi, 2009; Yun, 2009; Nini et al., 2009). 
The acquiring firms may use different forms of corporate liquidity to pursue 
different diversification strategies, leading to changes in the value of firm 
diversification.  
In this chapter, I examine how the sources of financing between bank lines of 
credit and corporate cash holdings in M&As affect the value of firm diversification. 
I develop two hypotheses based on agency problems between shareholders and 
managers, and agency problems between shareholders and debtholders. First, 
self-interested managers are able to derive their personal benefits through value-
destructive diversification strategy, while bank lines of credit limit managerial 
discretion. Therefore, I expect that firms financed by bank lines of credit in M&As 
have a higher value of firm diversification than the firms financed by corporate 
cash holdings. Second, bank lenders prefer lower default risks via diversification. 
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They have the incentive and power to interfere in firms’ decisions on investment, 
enhancing debtholder value while reducing shareholder value. Therefore, I 
expect that firms financed by bank lines of credit in M&As have a lower value of 
firm diversification than the firms financed by corporate cash holdings.  
I construct a sample of 623 U.S. M&As paid by cash from 1985 to 2013. I find 
that the firms entirely financed by bank lines of credit in M&As have a smaller 
reduction in excess value than the firms financed by corporate cash holdings. I 
also find that the firms financed by bank lines of credit are associated with  more 
efficient internal resources transfers and a higher value added by allocation than 
those financed by corporate cash holdings. I find that firms with higher institutional 
ownership are more likely to use bank lines of credit in M&As. Consistent results 
are found after controlling self-selection problems with Heckman (1979) two-
stage selection model. I conduct sub-group analysis based on corporate 
governance and find in the sub-group of firms with a lower degree of corporate 
governance the firms have a smaller reduction in excess value, more efficient 
internal resources transfers and a higher value added by allocation. Moreover, 
bank lines of credit are associated with a higher value of firm diversification when 
firms have a lower level of corporate governance and a lower level of bankruptcy 
risk. I conclude that this is consistent with the hypothesis of agency problems 
between shareholders and managers.  
This chapter contributes to the literature in the following ways:    
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First, my research contributes to the literature on how the source of financing 
affect the value of firm diversification. To my knowledge, only a few papers 
examine the source of funding of cash M&As (e.g., Bharadwaj and Shivdasani, 
2003; Martynova and Renneboog, 2009). Previous papers do not differentiate 
between bank lines of credit and other bank loans, bank financing and non-
bank financing. Given a large magnitude of bank lines of credit, I believe that 
it is important to examine bank lines of credit as a source of financing 
separately. Moreover, these papers focus on the stock return performance of 
the M&As, and I extend both papers in that I conduct analysis that links 
sources of financing in M&As and the changes in the value of firm 
diversification.  
Second, my research contributes to the literature on corporate diversification 
in M&As settings. Previous literature in corporate diversification focuses on 
how agency problems affect the value of firm diversification (e.g., Servaes, 
1996; Denis et al., 1997). Other papers such as Moeller and Schlingemann 
(2005) and Dos Santos et al. (2008) examine the effect of diversification on 
the performance of M&As and the changes in excess value. While these 
studies do not examine how sources of financing in M&As affect the value of 
diversification differently, I complement the literature by investigating how 
sources of financing in M&As affect the changes in the value of firm 
diversification.  
Third, my research contributes to the literature on the agency perspective 
about bank lines of credit. Previous literature focuses on how agency 
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problems affect a firm's choice between bank lines of credit and corporate 
cash holdings. Both Sufi (2009) and Yun (2009) show that poorly governed 
firms are less likely to hold bank lines of credit. My research differs from 
existing literature in that I conduct analysis on how bank lines of credit affect 
the value of firm diversification.  
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 5. 2 develops the hypotheses. 
Section 5. 3 describes the data and the variables. Section 5. 4 presents the 
results. Section 5. 5 concludes the chapter.  
5. 2 Hypotheses 
I develop the hypothesis in this section. I discuss the relation of sources of 
financing between corporate cash holdings and bank lines of credit and value of 
firm diversification from the two perspectives: (1) Agency problems between 
shareholders and managers and (2) Agency problems between shareholders and 
debtholders.  
5. 2. 1 Agency Problems between Shareholders and Managers 
The agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) shows that there is the conflict 
of interest between shareholders and managers. Managers will engage in the 
activities which benefit themselves instead of shareholder value maximisation. 
Shleifer and Vishny (1989) show that managers are likely to entrench themselves 
through diversifying acquisitions.  
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Corporate cash holdings can be used in a discretionary way and thus they are 
more flexible for managers to pursue their own agenda than external sources of 
financing. The free cash flow theory (Jensen, 1986) indicates entrenched 
managers will spend their cash on value-decreasing M&As instead of paying out 
to shareholders. Other studies including Lang et al. (1991), Myers and Rajan 
(1998) and Harford (1999) also show evidence that supports the agency 
problems associated with corporate cash holdings.  
The literature on firm diversification shows that diversification discount in virtue 
of agency problems. Servaes (1996) and Denis et al. (1997) show that firms with 
higher insider ownership and outside blockholders are associating to a lower 
diversification discount. Aggarwal and Samwick (2003) address that managers 
choose to diversify for their private benefits instead of reducing risks. Shin and 
Stulz (1998), Rajan et al. (2000) and Scharfstein and Stein (2000) find that 
diversified firms engage in cross-subsidisation. Hoechle et al. (2012) argue that 
corporate governance variables can mostly explain diversification discount.  
Previous literature shows the use of bank lines of credit mitigates agency 
problems between managers and shareholders. In the literature of financial 
intermediation, extensive papers include Diamond (1984), James (1987), Byers 
et al. (2008) and Ahn and Choi (2009) which show that borrowers benefit from 
the monitoring of banks, improving borrowers’ corporate governance. Moreover, 
the literature on bank lines of credit including Sufi (2009) and Yun (2009) also 
shows that the covenants of bank lines of credit restrict the use of bank lines of 
credit, and weaker-governed firms are likely to hold more cash relative to bank 
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lines of credit. When firms use different sources of financing between corporate 
cash holdings and bank lines of credit in M&As, they may have different value 
consequences to the firm.  
Since bank financing reduces the agency problems between shareholders and 
managers, it limits the reduction of value losses in M&As. Therefore, I have the 
following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: The value of firm diversification is higher for firms financed by 
bank lines of credit in M&As than those financed by corporate cash holdings in 
M&As. 
5. 2. 2 Agency Problems between Shareholders and Debtholders 
Conflict of interest exists between shareholders and debtholders. Managers may 
engage in shareholder value maximisation by investing in risky projects while 
debtholders may prefer lower firm risks through diversification.  
The use of corporate cash holdings does not affect the capital structure. As 
mentioned by Opler et al. (1999), using internally generated funds avoids 
underinvestment problems when firms have good investment opportunities. In 
this case, corporate cash holdings enable firms to invest in M&As that maximise 
shareholder value.  
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However, bank lenders can control firms’ investment decisions to benefit the 
lenders that may not benefit the shareholders of the firms. There are risk-reducing 
effects associated with firm diversification, Amihud and Lev (1981) show that 
diversified firms have lower firm risks than single segment firms because they 
generate imperfectly correlated cash flows with multiple lines of business. Mansi 
and Reeb (2002) and Glaser and Müller (2010) argue that such risk-reducing 
function of diversification enhances debtholder value and decreases shareholder 
value due to lower default risk. Mansi and Reeb (2002) find that the diversification 
discount is pronounced for firms with a higher debt level, while all equity firms do 
not exhibit significant diversification discount. In addition, the studies in financial 
intermediations also show that bank-dependent firms are facing potential hold-up 
problems. Rajan (1992) shows that banks are able to control firms’ decisions on 
investment projects by informational monopoly. Houston and James (1996) argue 
the potential hold-up problems are particularly severe for firms with substantial 
growth opportunities. Therefore, I have the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: The value of firm diversification is lower for firms financed by bank 
lines of credit in M&As than those financed by corporate cash holdings in M&As. 
5. 3 Data and Variables 
5. 3. 1 Data 
The data on U.S. M&As with cash payment is collected from Thomson One 
database. Firm-level data is collected from Compustat Annual database and 
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segment-level is collected from Compustat Segment database. Data of bank lines 
of credit is collected from 10-K annual reports. Institutional ownership data is 
collected from Thomson Financial/Institutional database and insider ownership 
data is from the proxy statements. Both acquirers and targets are U.S. firms.   
The sample period is from 1985 to 2013. The following screening procedures are 
conducted. First, the U.S. M&As with their source of financing are described as, 
“Line of Credit”, “Corporate Funds”, and, “Line of Credit, Corporate Funds”, are 
identified in the database. Financial services firms and firms with financial 
services segments (SIC codes between 6000 and 6999) are excluded. Diversified 
firms are defined as firms with at least two segments having different SIC codes. 
Firms with same segment SIC codes are treated as single-segment firms. The 
M&As whose deal values are less than one million dollars are excluded. And 
observations with incomplete data are also excluded. After the screening 
procedures, a final sample of 623 M&A events is obtained. Among them, 233 
M&As are entirely financed by corporate cash holdings, 265 M&As are entirely 
financed by bank lines of credit and 125 M&As are financed by a mixed source 
of bank lines of credit and corporate cash holdings.  
5. 3. 2 Variables 
5. 3. 2. 1 Sources of Financing  
The sources of financing for M&As are identified in Thomson One database. For 
example, the database records an M&A made by, “Playtex Products Inc”, with the 
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announcement date on 19 April 2007. The source of financing is recorded as, 
“Line of Credit”, with the description that, “The transaction was financed by 
Playtex Products Inc th(r)ough the use of its revolving credit agreement”.  For 
another example, the database records an M&A made by, “Five Star Quality Care 
Inc”, with the announcement date on 2 July 2008. The source of financing is 
recorded as “Corporate Funds”, with the description that, “The transaction was 
financed through the use of Five Star Quality Care Inc's available cash on hand”.  
Two dummy variables are constructed to measure the sources of financing for 
M&As. Bank Lines of Credit Dummy equals one if an M&A is entirely financed by 
bank lines of credit, and equals zero otherwise. Mixed Lines & Cash Dummy 
equals one if an M&A is financed by mixed sources of bank lines of credit and 
corporate cash holdings, and equals zero otherwise.  
5. 3. 2. 2 Diversification 
Diversified firms are defined as firms have segments with at least two different 
SIC codes. The dummy variable Firm Diversification is used to distinguish 
between diversified firms and single-segment firms. Firm Diversification equals 
one for diversified firms and equals zero for single-segment firms.   
5. 3. 2. 3 Changes in Excess Value 
The difference of an acquirer’s excess value one year after the M&As and one 
year before the M&As is used as the measure of change in the value of firm 
133 
 
diversification. The measure is originally developed by Berger and Ofek (1995), 
defined as the logarithm of the ratio of a firm's total value and the sum of imputed 
values for its segments as a stand-alone business. The imputed value is 
calculated based on the industry median sales ratio based on two-digit SIC code. 
Excess Value is defined as, 
                                                  𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 = 𝐿𝑛(𝑉 𝐼(𝑉)⁄ )                                              (1) 
                                                   𝐼𝑉 = ∑ 𝐴𝐼𝑖 ∗ (𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖(𝑉 𝐴𝐼⁄ )𝑚𝑓)                                        (2) 
𝑛
𝑖=1                   
 
Where 𝑉 is firm’s total capital (market value of common equity plus book value 
of debt), 
𝑛 is total number of segment 𝑖’s firm,  
𝐼(𝑉) is imputed value of the sum of a firm’s segments as stand-alone firms, 
𝐴𝐼𝑖 is segment 𝑖’s value of accounting item used in the valuation multiple, 
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖(𝑉 𝐴𝐼⁄ )𝑚𝑓 is multiple of total capital to an accounting item for the median 
single-segment firm in the in segment 𝑖’s industry.  
 
A positive excess value implies the firm trades at a premium, and negative excess 
value implies a discount.  
5. 3. 2. 4 Changes in Internal Resources Transfers 
The difference of an acquirer’s adjusted investment ratio one year after the M&As 
and one year before the M&As is used as the measure of the change in value 
transfer from/to a division. Adjusted Investment Ratio, developed by Rajan et al. 
(2000), is the industry-adjusted investment in a segment less the weighted 
average industry-adjusted investment across all the segments of a firm. This is 
defined as, 
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−
𝐼𝑗
𝑠𝑠
𝐵𝐴𝑗
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𝑛
𝑗=1
(
𝐼𝑗
𝐵𝐴𝑗
−
𝐼𝑗
𝑠𝑠
𝐵𝐴𝑗
𝑠𝑠)                                       (3) 
 
Where ss refers to single segment firms,  
𝐼𝑗 is capital expenditure of segment 𝑗, 
𝐵𝐴𝑗 is the book value of assets of segment 𝑗, 
( 𝐼𝑗
𝑠𝑠 𝐵𝐴𝑗
𝑠𝑠⁄ ) is the asset-weighted average capital expenditure to assets ratio 
for the single segment firms in the corresponding industry, 
𝑤𝑗 is the ratio of segment assets to firm assets.  
 
Following Rajan et al. (2000), the adjusted investments are divided into four 
groups depending on the segments’ investment opportunities and resource-
weighted opportunities.  
5. 3. 2. 5 Changes in Value Added by Allocation 
The difference of an acquirer’s Relative Value Added one year after the M&As 
and one year before the M&As is used to capture of overall efficiency of transfers. 
Relative Value Added is developed by Rajan et al. (2000), is the sum of the 
weighted transfers across all segments. This is defined as, 
                       
∑ 𝐵𝐴𝑗(𝑞𝑗 − ?̅?) (
𝐼𝑗
𝐵𝐴𝑗
−
𝐼𝑗
𝑠𝑠
𝐵𝐴𝑗
𝑠𝑠 − ∑ 𝑤𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1 (
𝐼𝑗
𝐵𝐴𝑗
−
𝐼𝑗
𝑠𝑠
𝐵𝐴𝑗
𝑠𝑠))
𝑛
𝑗=1
𝐵𝐴
                  (4) 
Where ss refers to single segment firms,  
?̅? is the asset-weighted average of segment 𝑞’s for the firm.  
𝐼𝑗 is capital expenditure of segment 𝑗.  
𝐵𝐴j is the book value of assets of segment j.  
( 𝐼𝑗
𝑠𝑠 𝐵𝐴𝑗
𝑠𝑠⁄ ) is the asset-weighted average capital expenditure to assets ratio 
for the single segment firms in the corresponding industry.  
 𝑤𝑗 is the ratio of segment assets to firm assets.  
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5. 3. 2. 6 Control Variables 
Following Berger and Ofek (1995) and Campa and Kedia (2002), the following 
control variables are used when estimating the changes in excess value: Size is 
the logarithm of total assets. Profit is the ratio of earnings before interest and tax 
to sales, Growth is the ratio of capital expenditure to sales, LEV is the ratio of 
long-term debts to total assets, Size2 is the square of the logarithm of total assets. 
These variables are used to control firm size, profitability, growth opportunities 
and leverage. Relative Value, which is the ratio of deal value to the sum of the 
acquirer’s market value of equity and deal value is also included as a control 
variable.  
Following Rajan et al. (2000), the following control variables are used when 
estimating the changes of internal resources transfers and changes in relative 
value added by allocation: Inverse of Average 𝑞 equals 1/𝑞𝑒, where 𝑞𝑒 is the 
equally weighted average 𝑞 across segment in the firm,  Diversity is the standard 
deviation of a firm’s asset-weighted 𝑞 divided by equally weighted 𝑞, Firm Size is 
logarithm of total sales, Herfindahl Index of Segment Size is based on segment’s 
share of total assets of the firm, Coefficient of Variation of Segment 𝑞s is the 
standard deviation of segment 𝑞s divided by the mean of segment 𝑞s, Coefficient 
of Variation of Segment Size is the standard deviation of segment’s share of total 
firm assets divided by the average segment share. Relative Value is also included 
as a control variable.  
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5. 3. 2. 7 Institutional Ownership 
Institutional Ownership is the ratio of shares owned by institutional investors to 
the total shares outstanding at the end of a quarter before the announcement 
date. Block is a dummy variable that equals one if there exists a block institutional 
ownership which exceeds 5% of the total shares outstanding and equals zero 
otherwise.  
5. 3. 2. 8 Bankruptcy Risk 
Altman (1968) Z-score is used as the measure a firm’s bankruptcy risk. Following 
Altman (1968), if a firm has a Z-score less than 1.81, then the firm is considered 
to have high bankruptcy risk. If a firm has a Z-score greater than 1.81, then the 
firm is considered to have low bankruptcy risk.  
5. 4 Results 
The results are reported in this section. I first show the summary statistics. And 
then I report the univariate analysis of changes in excess value. Next, I examine 
the relationship between sources of financing and the acquiring firm’s change in 
excess value. I further investigate the changes in internal resources transfers and 
the overall efficiency of transfers. I also analyse the likelihood of an acquirer’s 
choice between bank lines of credit and corporate cash holdings in M&As. I then 
report the Heckman two-stage estimation for controlling self-selection problems. 
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Further, I report sub-group analysis based on block institutional ownership and 
bankruptcy risk. Finally, I conduct robustness testing. 
5. 4. 1 Summary Statistics 
Table 5.1 reports the summary statistics. Among the sample, the mean of 
changes in excess value for all firms is -0.0916, and the median is -0.1214. This 
implies that the value of firm diversification decreases after the M&As.  
5. 4. 2 Univariate Analysis of Excess Value 
Table 5.2 reports the univariate analysis on the changes in excess value between 
year 𝑡 + 1 and year 𝑡 − 1 for acquirers. The first row compares the change of 
excess value between M&As financed by bank lines of credit and corporate cash 
holdings. The mean of changes in excess value for firms entirely financed by 
bank lines of credit (corporate cash holdings) is -0.086 (-0.0172) and the median 
of that for firms entirely financed by bank lines of credit (corporate cash holdings) 
is -0.075 (-0.135). I conduct the mean test and the Wilcoxon Signed Rank median 
test and find that the differences are significant. The second row shows that the 
difference of changes in excess value is not significant between firms financed 
by mixed sources and firms entirely financed by corporate cash holdings. The 
third row suggests that the changes in excess value is not significantly different 
for firms entirely financed by bank lines of credit and firms financed by a mixed 
source of bank lines of credit and corporate cash holdings. The results are 
consistent with the interpretation that there is larger reduction in excess value for 
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the firms entirely financed by corporate cash holdings in M&As than those entirely 
financed by bank lines of credit. This is consistent with the hypothesis based on 
agency problems, suggesting that using corporate cash holdings in M&As 
decreases the value of firm diversification through agency problems between 
shareholders and managers.  
5. 4. 3 Regression on Changes in Excess Value 
The regression on the relation between sources of financing and changes in 
excess value is based on the following equation: 
∆𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒
=  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐿𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦
+ 𝛽2 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐿𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠 & 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝛽3𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡−1
+ 𝛽4𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 + 𝛽5𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽7𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑡−1
+ 𝛽8𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡−2 + 𝛽9𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑡−2 + 𝛽10𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑡−2 + 𝛽11𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡−3
+ 𝛽12𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑡−3 + 𝛽13𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑡−3 + 𝛽14𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑡−1 + 𝛽15𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒2𝑡−1
+  𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠
+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                                                                                (5.1) 
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The dependent variable is the Change in Excess Value measures by sales 
multiples between year 𝑡 + 1 and year 𝑡 − 1. Table 5.3 displays the results.11  The 
coefficient of Bank Lines of Credit Dummy is 0.090 (p-value= 0.06), implying that 
the use of bank lines of credit in M&As is positively associated with the changes 
in excess value. The coefficient of Mixed Lines & Cash Dummy is 0.053 (p-value 
= 0.32). The result shows that there is a smaller reduction of excess value for 
acquiring firms entirely financed by bank lines of credit than the acquiring firms 
entirely financed corporate cash holdings. This implies that agency problems are 
associated with corporate cash holdings, leading to value losses in diversified 
firms. While bank lines of credit mitigate agency problems between shareholders 
and managers when conducting M&As. The results are consistent with the 
hypothesis based on agency problems between shareholders.   
5. 4. 4 Changes in Internal Resources Transfers 
The regression on the changes in internal resources transfers and sources of 
financing is based on the following equation:  
 
                                            
11 Since the independent variables require the data from year t-1 to t-3, the sample size is reduced 
to 592 M&As in this regression. 
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∆ 𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 
=  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐿𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦
+ 𝛽2 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐿𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠 & 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝛽3𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒
+ 𝛽4𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑞𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡−1
+  𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠
+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                                                                           (5.2) 
The dependent variable is Change in Adjusted Investment from year 𝑡 − 1 to year 
𝑡 + 1. The results are shown Table 5.4. Table 5.4A shows the basic specification 
developed by Rajan et al. (2000). Column 1 shows internal resources transfer to 
segments with high investment opportunities (𝑞 > ?̅?) and high resource-weighted 
investment opportunities (𝜆𝑞 > 𝜆𝑞̅̅ ̅), indicating resources transfer to segments 
with good investment opportunities. The coefficient of Bank Lines of Credit 
Dummy is 0.005 (p-value = 0.01) which shows that firms entirely financed by bank 
lines of credit in M&As have more internal resources transfer to well-performing 
segments than firms entirely financed by corporate cash holdings. Column 2 
shows that the coefficient of Bank Lines of Credit Dummy is 0.001 (p-value = 0. 
85) for segments with high investment opportunities and low resource-weighted 
investment opportunities. Column 3 shows that the coefficient of Bank Lines of 
Credit Dummy is -0.001 (p-value = 0. 21) for segments with low investment 
opportunities and high resource-weighted investment opportunities. Column 4 
shows low investment opportunities ( 𝑞 < ?̅? ) and low resource-weighted 
investment opportunities (𝜆𝑞 < 𝜆𝑞̅̅ ̅), indicating resources transfer to segments 
with poorly-performing investment opportunities. The coefficient of Bank Lines of 
Credit Dummy is -0.009 (p-value = 0.01), suggesting a decrease of inefficient 
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internal resources transfers. The results imply that firms entirely financed by bank 
lines of credit in M&As are associated with more efficient internal resources 
transfers among segments than firms entirely financed by corporate cash 
holdings. This is consistent with the hypothesis based on agency problems 
between shareholders and managers.  
Following Rajan et al. (2000), the effect of focus, the effect of coefficient of 
variation of Segment 𝑞 and the effect of coefficient of variation of segment size 
are examined and reported in Table 5.4B, Table 5.4C and Table 5.4D 
respectively. The results show a similar pattern after including these additional 
control variables. This is consistent with the hypothesis based on agency 
problems between shareholders and managers.  
5. 4. 5 Changes in Overall Efficiency of Transfers 
The effect of sources of financing on the changes in overall efficiency of transfers 
are based on the estimate in Equation (5.2). Table 5.5 reports the changes in 
overall efficiency of transfers. The dependent variable is the Change in Relative 
Value Added by Allocation from year 𝑡 − 1 to 𝑡 + 1. Following Rajan et al. (2000), 
Relative Value Added by Allocation is defined as the sum of the weighted 
transfers across all segments, which measures the overall value consequences. 
The coefficient of Bank Lines of Credit Dummy is 0.001 (p-value = 0.03), 
suggesting that using bank lines of credit in M&As increases the Relative Value 
Added by Allocation. This implies that when firms are entirely financed by bank 
lines of credit in M&As, there are more resources transfer to the segments with 
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good investment opportunities than the firms financed by corporate cash holdings. 
This is consistent with the hypothesis based on agency problems between 
shareholders and managers.  
5. 4. 6 The Choice of Sources of Financing 
In this section, multinomial logistic regression is used to investigate the likelihood 
of an acquirer's choice between bank lines of credit and corporate cash holdings 
as sources of financing. The following model is used in this analysis: 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑡−1
+ 𝛽4𝑈𝑛𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝐿𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑡−1
+ 𝛽6𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡−1 + 𝛽7𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑡−1 + 𝛽8𝑀/𝐵𝑡−1 + 𝛽9𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑡−1
+ 𝛽10𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝛽11𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑡−1 + 𝛽12𝑅&𝐷𝑡−1
+ 𝛽13𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠𝑡−1 + 𝛽14𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡−1
+ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠
+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                                                                          (5.3) 
The dependent variable is the sources of financing. It equals zero if an M&A is 
entirely financed corporate cash holdings, equals one if an M&A is entirely 
financed by bank lines of credit, and equals two if an M&A is by financed a mixed 
source of bank lines of credit and corporate cash holdings. The independent 
variables are 1-year lagged variables. The dummy variable Firm Diversification 
is used to capture the difference between diversified firms and single-segment 
firms. Cash and Unused Lines of Credit are used to measure the level of different 
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forms of corporate liquidity available to the firm. Institutional Ownership is the 
measure of corporate governance. Higher Institutional Ownership indicates a 
better level of corporate governance. Other control variables such as Size, Cash 
Flow and so on are also included.  
As displayed in Table 5.612, Column 1 shows the likelihood of an acquirer’s choice 
of source of financing between bank lines of credit and corporate cash holdings. 
I find that the coefficient of the dummy variable. The coefficient of Cash is -13.010 
(p-value = 0.01), showing that firms with a higher level of corporate cash holdings 
are less likely to use bank lines of credit as sources of financing. The coefficient 
of Unused Lines of Credit is 7.559 (p-value= 0.01), showing that firms with higher 
level of bank lines of credit are more likely to use bank lines of credit as sources 
of financing.13  Moreover, the coefficient of Institutional Ownership is 1.511 (p-
value= 0.03), suggesting that firms with higher level of corporate governance are 
more likely to choose bank lines of credit than corporate cash holdings as the 
sources of financing in M&As. In Column 2, the coefficient of Institutional 
Ownership is 2.380 (p-value = 0.01), suggesting that acquirers with a higher level 
of institutional ownership are more likely to use a mixed source of bank lines of 
credit and corporate cash holdings than use corporate cash holdings as the only 
source of financing. The results support the interpretation that firms with higher 
level of corporate governance are more likely to choose bank lines of credit than 
                                            
12 Since the data of Unused Lines of Credit starts from 1995 when 10-K fillings are available online, 
the sample size reduced to 431 M&As. Among them, 167 M&As are entirely financed by corporate 
cash holdings, 81 M&As are entirely financed by bank lines of credit and 183 are financed by a 
mixed source of corporate cash holdings and bank lines of credit. 
13 Similar results are found when Total Lines of Credit is used in the regression. 
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corporate cash holdings as sources of financing in M&As, which is consistent with 
the hypothesis based on agency problems between shareholders and managers.  
5. 4. 7 Heckman Two-Stage Estimation 
An extended Heckman (1979) two-stage estimation is adopted to control for self-
selection problem. The first stage is based on the estimates from the multinomial 
logistic regression reported in Table 5.6. A number of papers use the multinomial 
logistic model as the first stage regression, such as Wu and Shen (2013) and 
Grace and Phillips (2008). In the second stage, Inverse Mills Ratio calculated 
based on the estimates in the multinomial logistic regression is included as an 
additional control variable. 
The second stage regression for the changes in excess value is based on the 
following model: 
∆𝐸𝑉 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑀𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑝𝑙𝑒
=  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐿𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦(𝑜𝑟 𝛽1 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐿𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠 & 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦)
+ 𝛽2𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 + 𝛽4𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑡−1
+ 𝛽6𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑡−1 + 𝛽7𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡−2 + 𝛽8𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑡−2 + 𝛽9𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑡−2 + 𝛽10𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡−3
+ 𝛽11𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑡−3 + 𝛽12𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑡−3 + 𝛽13𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑡−1 + 𝛽14𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒2𝑡−1
+ 𝛽15𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒 𝑀𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑠 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 +  𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠
+ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                                              (5.4) 
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Table 5.7A shows the results of the changes in excess value. As shown in 
Column 1, the coefficient of Bank Lines of Credit Dummy is 0.181 (p-value = 0.02). 
After controlling self-selection problems, this is still consistent with the findings in 
Table 5.3, showing that there is a smaller reduction in excess value for the firms 
financed by bank lines of credit than those financed by corporate cash holdings.  
The second stage regression for the changes in internal resources transfers is 
based on the following model: 
∆ 𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 
=  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐿𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦(𝑜𝑟 𝛽1 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐿𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠 & 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦)
+ 𝛽2𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑞𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡−1
+ 𝛽5𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒 𝑀𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑠 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 +  𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠
+ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                                               (5.5) 
Table 5.7B shows the results of the changes in internal resources transfers. In 
Column 1, the coefficient of Bank Lines of Credit Dummy is 0.004 (p-value = 0.08), 
and in Column 4, the coefficient of Bank Lines of Credit Dummy is -0.012 (p-
value= 0.01). This is consistent with the findings in Table 5.4, suggesting firms 
entirely financed by bank lines of credit in M&As have an increase in resources 
transfer to segments with good investment opportunities and a decrease in 
resources transfer to segments with poor investment opportunities.  
The second stage regression for the changes in overall efficiency of transfers is 
based on the same specification in Equation (5.5). Table 5.7C shows the results 
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of the changes in overall efficiency of transfers. As displayed in Column 1, the 
coefficient for Bank Lines of Credit Dummy is 0.002 (p-value = 0.08). This is 
consistent with the findings in Table 5.5, showing that firms entirely financed by 
bank lines of credit in M&As are associated with a higher value added by 
allocation. Overall, after controlling self-selection problems, the evidence from 
Table 5.7A, Table 5.7B and Table 5.7C support the hypothesis based on agency 
problems between shareholders and managers.  
5. 4. 8 Sub-Group Analysis on Corporate Governance 
The sample is divided into sub-groups to examine the effect of different sources 
of financing in M&As on the value of firm diversification when firms have a 
different level of corporate governance. Block institutional ownership is used as 
the measure of corporate governance. Acquirers with a blockholder indicate a 
higher level of corporate governance, while acquirers do not have a blockholder 
indicate a lower level of corporate governance. The hypothesis based on agency 
problems between shareholders and managers predicts that in the sub-group of 
firms with a lower level of corporate governance, firms entirely financed by bank 
lines of credit in M&As will have a smaller reduction in excess value than the firms 
financed by corporate cash holdings.  
Table 5.8A reports the results of the changes in excess value. The model is based 
on Equation (5.1). Column 1 shows the sub-group of acquirers without block 
institutional ownership. The coefficient of Bank Lines of Credit Dummy is 0.134 
(p-value = 0.008). Column 2 shows the sub-group of acquirers with block 
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institutional ownership. The coefficient of Bank Lines of Credit Dummy is 
insignificant. The result implies that only for firms with lower corporate 
governance, using bank lines of credit as the only source of financing in M&As, 
acquirers have a smaller reduction of excess value than the acquirers financed 
by corporate cash holdings.  
Table 5.8B reports the results of the changes in internal resources transfers. The 
model is based on Equation (5.2). Column 1 and Column 2 show the results of 
the changes in adjusted investment in segments with high investment 
opportunities and high resource-weighted investment opportunities. For acquirers 
without block institutional ownership, the coefficient of Bank Lines of Credit 
Dummy is 0.005 (p-value = 0.04) and the coefficient of Mixed Lines & Cash 
Dummy is 0.005 (p-value = 0.08). For acquirers with block institutional ownership, 
the coefficient of Bank Lines of Credit Dummy is insignificant. Column 3 and 
Column 4 show the results of the changes in adjusted investment in segments 
with low investment opportunities and low resource-weighted opportunities. For 
acquirers without block institutional ownership, the coefficient of Bank Lines of 
Credit Dummy is -0.015 (p-value = 0.03). Moreover, for acquirers with block 
institutional ownership, the coefficient of Bank Lines of Credit Dummy is 
insignificant. The result implies that only for firms with a lower level of corporate 
governance, using bank lines of credit in M&As is positively related to the 
increase in efficient internal resources transfers.  
Table 5.8C reports the results of the changes in overall efficiency of transfers. 
The model uses the same control variables as Equation (5.2). Column 1 shows 
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the results for acquirers without block institutional ownership. The coefficient of 
Bank Lines of Credit Dummy is 0.001 (p-value = 0.06). Column 2 shows the 
results for acquirers with block institutional ownership. The coefficient of Bank 
Lines of Credit Dummy is insignificant. The result implies that only for firms with 
a lower level of corporate governance, financed by bank lines of credit associated 
with a higher overall efficiency of transfers.  
The evidence from Table 5.8A, Table 5.8B and Table 5.8C supports the 
interpretation that poorly governed firms benefit from the monitoring of banks 
when they use bank lines of credit as the source of financing. This leads to a 
smaller reduction in excess value, more efficient internal resources transfers 
among segments and a higher overall efficiency of transfers than those financed 
by corporate cash holdings. The effect of sources of financing between bank lines 
of credit and corporate cash holdings are not significant in firms with higher level 
of corporate governance because these firms already have good corporate 
governance and thus have less potential to improve. This is consistent with the 
hypothesis based on agency problems between shareholders and managers.  
5. 4. 9 Sub-Group Analysis on Bankruptcy Risk 
In order to further investigate the hypothesis based on agency problems between 
shareholders and debtholders, the sample is divided into two sub-groups based 
on the degree of bankruptcy risk. Following the literature (Altman, 1968), a firm 
is classified into the sub-group with higher (lower) bankruptcy risk if the firm’s 
Altman Z-score is below (above) 1.81. A higher bankruptcy risk indicates that the 
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conflict of interest between shareholders and debtholders is more severe. Since 
banks prefer low default risks, they can interfere in firms’ decisions on M&As. If 
firms have high bankruptcy risk, acquiring firms financed by bank lines of credit 
in M&As may not generate higher value consequence than those financed by 
corporate cash holdings.  
Table 5.9A displays the results of the changes in excess value. The model is 
based on Equation (5.1). As shown in Column 1, among the firms with lower 
bankruptcy risk, the coefficient for Bank Lines of Credit Dummy is 0.094 (p-value 
= 0.06). In Column 2, among the firms with high bankruptcy risk, the coefficient 
of Bank Lines of Credit is insignificant. This implies that when the acquiring firms 
have lower bankruptcy risk, there is a smaller reduction in excess value for the 
M&As financed by bank lines of credit than those financed by corporate cash 
holdings, and when the acquiring firms have higher bankruptcy risk, the effect of 
sources of financing between bank lines of credit and corporate cash holdings 
are not significantly different.  
Table 5.9B displays the results of the changes in internal resources transfers. 
The model is based on Equation (5.2). Column 1 and Column 2 show the result 
of internal resources transfer to segments with high investment opportunities and 
high resource-weighted investment opportunities. For the sub-group with lower 
bankruptcy risk, the coefficient of Bank Lines of Credit Dummy is 0.004 (p-value 
= 0.07) and for the sub-group with higher bankruptcy risk the coefficient of Bank 
Lines of Credit Dummy is insignificant. Column 3 and Column 4 show the result 
of internal resources transfer to segments with low investment opportunities and 
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low resource-weighted investment opportunities. For the sub-group with lower 
bankruptcy risk, the coefficient of Bank Lines of Credit Dummy is -0.008 (p-value 
= 0.02), and for the sub-group with higher bankruptcy risk the coefficient of Bank 
Lines of Credit Dummy is insignificant. The results show the interpretation that 
when the acquiring firms have lower bankruptcy risk, there is more efficient 
internal resources transfers among segments for the firms financed by bank lines 
of credit.  While when the acquiring firms have higher bankruptcy risk, the effect 
of sources of financing between bank lines of credit and corporate cash holdings 
are not significantly different.  
Table 5.9C displays the results of the changes in overall efficiency of transfers. 
The model uses the same control variables as Equation (5.2).  For the sub-group 
of firms with lower bankruptcy risk, the coefficient of Bank Line of Credit Dummy 
is 0.001 (p-value = 0.06). For the sub-group of firms with higher bankruptcy risk, 
the coefficient of Bank Lines of Credit Dummy is -0.004 (p-value = 0.01). This 
shows that when acquiring firms have lower bankruptcy risk, the use of bank lines 
of credit is positively associated with the value added by allocation. While when 
acquiring firms have higher bankruptcy risk, the use of bank lines of credit is 
negatively associated with the value added by allocation. This supports the 
interpretation that bank lenders adversely affect the overall efficiency of internal 
resources transfer for firms with higher bankruptcy risk.  
Overall, the evidence from Table 5.9A, Table 5.9B and Table 5.9C supports both 
the hypothesis based on agency problems between shareholders and managers 
and the hypothesis based on agency problems between shareholders and 
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debtholders. The results reveal that banks play an important role in corporate 
governance and thereby positively affect the value of firm diversification when the 
degree of conflict of interest between shareholders and debtholders is low. When 
there are substantial agency problems between shareholders and debtholders, 
the positive effect of monitoring is diminished.  
5. 4. 10 Robustness Testing 
This section reports the results of robustness checks. 
5. 4. 10. 1 Acquiring Firms with Multiple M&As 
Since some acquirers may conduct several M&As in one fiscal year, the value of 
firm diversification may be affected by each event differently when different 
sources of financing are used in the M&As. Robustness testing is conducted by 
only keeping the first M&A in the sample to tackle this issue.  
Table 5.10A reports the results of the changes in excess value. The model is the 
same as Equation (5.1). The coefficient of Bank Lines of Credit Dummy is positive 
and significant. This is similar to the results in Table 5.3. Table 5.10B reports the 
results as to the changes in internal resources transfers. The model is the same 
as Equation (5.2).  The coefficient of Bank Lines of Credit Dummy is positive and 
significant for efficient internal resources transfers and is negative and significant 
for inefficient internal resources transfers. This is similar to the results in Table 
5.4. Table 5.10C reports the results of the changes in overall efficiency of 
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transfers. The independent variables are the same as Equation (5.2). The 
coefficient of Bank Lines of Credit Dummy is positive and significant. This is 
consistent with the result in Table 5.5. Therefore, the results in Table 5.10A, Table 
5.10B and Table 5.10C are consistent with the hypothesis based on agency 
problems between shareholders and managers.  
5. 4. 10. 2 Completion Year 
The announcement year is used as year 𝑡 in the previous analysis. Since some 
M&As may take a longer time to complete, to avoid possible inaccuracy, the 
completion year is used as year 𝑡 regarding this issue for robustness testing.  
Table 5.11A reports the results of the changes in excess value. The model is the 
same as Equation (5.1). The coefficient of Bank Lines of Credit Dummy is positive 
and significant. Table 5.11B reports the results of the changes in internal 
resources transfers. The model is the same as Equation (5.2). Bank Lines of 
Credit Dummy shows a positive relationship with the increase in efficient internal 
resources transfers and a negative relationship with the decrease in inefficient 
internal resources transfers. Table 5.11C reports the results of the changes in 
overall efficiency of transfers. The independent variables are the same as 
Equation (5.2).  Bank Lines of Credit Dummy is positively associated with the 
relative value added by allocation. Therefore, the results in Table 5.11A, Table 
5.11B and Table 5.11C are consistent with the results in Table 5.3, Table 5.4 and 
Table 5.5. The results support the hypothesis based on agency problems 
between shareholders and managers.  
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5. 4. 10. 3 Alternative Measure of Excess Value 
In Table 5.3 the excess value is calculated based on sales multiple. Robustness 
check by using the calculation based on assets multiple as an alternative 
measure of the value of firm diversification is reported in this section. The 
regression uses the same specification as Equation (5.1). 
Table 5.12 reports the results. The coefficient of Bank Lines of Credit Dummy is 
positive and significant. This is consistent with the result in Table 5.3, supporting 
the hypothesis based on agency problems between shareholders and managers.  
5. 4. 10. 4 Alternative Measure of Corporate Governance 
In the previous analysis, block institutional ownership is adopted as a measure of 
corporate governance. Robustness check by sub-sample analysis based on the 
median of institutional ownership of the firms is reported in this section. A firm 
with above (below) median institutional ownership indicates a higher (lower) level 
of corporate governance.  
Table 5.13A shows the results of the changes in excess value. The model is 
based on Equation (5.1). The coefficient of Bank Lines of Credit Dummy is 
positive and significant for the sub-group of firms with below-median institutional 
ownership and insignificant for the sub-group of firms with above-median 
institutional ownership. Table 5.13B shows the results of the changes in internal 
resources transfers. The model is based on Equation (5.2). Bank Lines of Credit 
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Dummy shows a positive relationship with efficient internal resources transfers 
and negative relationship with inefficient internal resources transfers among the 
sub-group of firms with below-median institutional ownership. The model used 
the same specification in Equation (5.2). Table 5.13C shows the results of the 
changes in overall efficiency of transfers. The coefficient of Bank Lines of Credit 
Dummy is positive and significant for the sub-group of firms with below-median 
institutional ownership and insignificant for the sub-group of firms with above-
median institutional ownership.  
Therefore, the results are consistent with the result in Table 5.8A, Table 5.8B and 
Table 5.8C that banks improve the corporate governance in poorly governed 
firms. This is consistent with the hypothesis based on agency problems between 
shareholders and managers.  
5. 4. 11 Discussion 
The empirical results above show that acquiring firms financed by bank lines of 
credit have higher a value of firm diversification than acquiring firms financed by 
corporate cash holdings. The results support the agency problems associated 
with corporate cash holdings, which have been addressed in a vast number of 
papers such as Jensen (1986), Lang et al. (1991), Myers and Rajan (1998) and 
etc.. The results are also consistent with Shleifer and Vishny (1989) who 
demonstrate that managers entrench themselves via diversifying acquisitions, 
and Aggarwal and Samwick (2003) who argue that managers choose to diversify 
to benefit themselves. The results are also related to the literature such as Shin 
and Stulz (1998), Rajan et al. (2000), and Scharfstein and Stein (2000) which 
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reveal that firm diversification is associated with cross-subsidisation. My results 
show that compared with those financed by corporate cash holdings, the cross-
subsidisation problem is less severe for acquiring firms financed by bank lines 
credit, indicating banks mitigate agency problems.  
The sub-group analysis based on block institutional ownership implies that when 
banks are involved, the firms with severe agency problems suffer from less value 
loss in M&As. This is consistent with Bharadwaj and Shivdasani (2003) who find 
that acquirers with poor performance prior the acquisitions benefit from bank 
financing. Nevertheless, the results from the sub-group analysis on bankruptcy 
risk show that when conflicts of interest between shareholders and debtholders 
are intense, acquiring firms financed by bank lines of credit do not generate a 
higher value of firm diversification than those financed by corporate cash holdings. 
The results are consistent with the argument of Amihud and Lev (1981), Mansi 
and Reeb (2002), and Glaser and Müller (2010) that diversification reduces firm 
risk, and thereby increases debtholder value at the expense of shareholder value.  
 
5. 5 Conclusion 
I examine the relation between sources of financing in different forms of corporate 
liquidity and value of firm diversification in the setting of M&As. I find that the 
M&As entirely financed by bank lines of credit have a smaller reduction in excess 
value than M&As entirely financed by corporate cash holdings. The firms financed 
by bank lines of credit have more efficient internal resources transfers than the 
firms financed by corporate cash holdings. Moreover, the overall efficiency of 
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transfers is higher for M&As entirely financed by bank lines of credit. The results 
from multinomial logistic regression show that firms with higher institutional 
ownership are more likely to use bank lines of credit as the source of financing in 
M&As. The evidence from the sub-group analysis based on corporate 
governance shows that acquirers with a lower level of corporate governance have 
a smaller reduction in the value of firm diversification if they are financed by bank 
lines of credit. In addition, some evidence from the sub-group analysis based on 
bankruptcy risk shows the positive effects of bank financing are eliminated when 
there are substantial agency problems between shareholders and debtholders.  
Overall, my findings show that banks play an important role in corporate 
governance, mitigating agency problems, thereby reduce the discount associated 
with firm diversification. The results support the hypothesis based on agency 
problems between shareholders and managers. 
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Chapter 6. Conclusion 
6. 1 Conclusion of Findings 
This thesis examines how sources of financing affect the performance of the 
M&As and the changes in the value of firm diversification. I show that agency 
problems associated with corporate cash holdings lead to poor performance in 
M&As, while other sources of financing, including bank lines of credit, other bank 
loans and debt issues, mitigate agency problems between shareholders and 
managers. Moreover, the M&As financed by bank lines of credit have a smaller 
reduction in value of firm diversification and more efficient internal resources 
allocation than those financed by corporate cash holdings, highlighting that banks 
play an important role in corporate governance.  
In Chapter Three, I analyse how the performance of M&As is affected by the 
sources of financing between corporate cash holdings and bank lines of credit. I 
examine the performance with the measures of stock return performance, 
changes in operating performance. I find that the M&As financed by bank lines of 
credit outperform the M&As financed by corporate cash holdings. I also find that 
firms with higher institutional ownership are more likely to use bank lines of credit 
in M&As. The M&As financed by bank lines of credit is associated with lower 
acquisition premiums. Moreover, the outperformance of M&As financed by bank 
lines of credit is only significant for acquirers with weaker-corporate governance. 
Also, the fraction of bank lines of credit is used is positively related to the 
performance of M&As when the M&As is financed by a mixed source of corporate 
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cash holdings and bank lines of credit, and the costs associated with bank lines 
of credit are negatively related to the performance of M&As. I provide additional 
evidence on the agency perspective of bank lines of credit and find that the 
performance of M&As financed by bank lines of credit is higher than the M&As 
financed by corporate cash holdings only when firms have a lower degree of 
bankruptcy risk. I conclude that the findings support the hypothesis based on 
agency problems between shareholders and managers. 
In Chapter Four, I analyse how the performance of M&As is affected by the 
sources of financing between corporate cash holdings, other bank loans, debt 
issues and equity issues. I find that the M&As financed by other bank loans and 
debt issues have higher announcement returns and operating performance than 
the M&As financed by corporate cash holdings. I also find that the M&As financed 
by other bank loans and debt issues have lower acquisition premiums. The 
results also show that the performance of M&As financed by equity issue is not 
significant. I find that the performance of M&As financed by other bank loans and 
debt issues are higher than the M&As financed by corporate cash holdings only 
among firms with a lower level of corporate governance. Moreover, the positive 
effect of other bank loans and debt issues are only significant among firms with 
a lower degree of bankruptcy risk. The finding supports the agency hypothesis 
related to the shareholder-manager conflict. 
In Chapter Five, I analyse how the value of firm diversification is affected by the 
sources of financing between bank lines of credit and corporate cash holdings in 
M&As. I use changes in excess value, changes in internal resources transfers 
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and changes in relative value added by allocation as the measure of the changes 
in the value of firm diversification. I find that the M&As financed by bank lines of 
credit are associated with a lower reduction in excess value and more efficient 
internal resources allocation among segments than those financed by corporate 
cash holdings. Moreover, the sub-group analysis on corporate governance shows 
the positive effect of bank lines of credit on the value of firm diversification is only 
significant for firms with a lower level of corporate governance. The positive effect 
of bank lines of credit is eliminated when firms have a higher level of bankruptcy 
risk. The results support the agency hypothesis based on shareholder-manager 
conflict. 
Overall, the findings in this thesis shed light on the corporate governance role of 
banks and other debtholders in M&As. The results reveal that banks and other 
debtholders impose discipline on acquiring firms thereby improve the corporate 
governance of these firms.  
6. 2 Limitations 
There are several limitations to this research: 
First, due to the availability of the data, I only collect the data about bank lines 
of credit from the year 1995 onwards. Therefore, for the period before 1995, 
the likelihood of use bank lines of credit and alternative source of financing 
are not measured by our regression. Moreover, there are various restrictions 
in the financial covenants of bank lines of credit, which may affect the choice 
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of using bank lines of credit, are not analysed in this thesis. For example, a 
bank line of credit may have covenants which may do not allow funds to be 
used in M&As. The details of such restrictions are not studied in this thesis.  
Second, there is a large proportion of M&As financed by a mixed source of 
more than two sources of financing, which are not analysed in this thesis. I 
only consider the M&As financed by 100% of bank lines of credit, other bank 
loans, debt issues, equity issues and corporate cash holdings. Moreover, 
these M&As may not represent the vast majority of the M&As.  
Third, there are various measures of the performance of M&As. In terms of 
the shareholders’ wealth effects, I only consider short event windows around 
the announcement period. Regarding the operating performance measure, 
Martynova and Renneboog (2008) argue that the post-merger operating 
performance studies suffer from measurement errors, statistical problems as 
well as the change in accounting standards. In this thesis, I use Change in 
ROA and Net Change in ROA based on comparable firms with similar firm 
characteristics as the measure of operating performance. One may argue for 
alternative performance measures and alternative event windows which may 
come to different conclusions.   
Fourth, some studies (e.g., Mansi and Reeb, 2002; Glaser and Müller, 2010; 
Custodio, 2014) argue that there is bias with the valuation methodology 
developed by Berger and Ofek (1995) and develop alternative measures for 
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the value of firm diversification. In this thesis, I do not consider the alternative 
measures based on the studies mentioned above.  
6. 3 Future Research 
There are several directions for the future research: 
First, in this thesis, I use a sample of U.S. M&As to examine the effect of 
different sources of financing on the performance and value of firm 
diversification. Since there are possible differences in the legislation and 
lending standards of bank lines of credit, the effect of using bank financing in 
different countries may vary. For instance, Campello, Giambona, Graham 
and Harvey (2011a) show that the commitment fees and interest rates 
increased dramatically in market-based economies during the financial crisis, 
while this is not significant in bank-based economies. According to Campello, 
Graham and Harvey (2010), the inability to access to bank lines leads to 
significant cut of investments for financially constraint firms. Since the 
country-level differences affect the availability of bank lines of credit, such 
differences may also affect the performance and the value of firm 
diversifications of the acquiring firms. One possible extension is the analysis 
of international and cross-border M&As.   
Second, I examine the performance of M&As based on the performance of 
the merged firm and the value creation to acquiring firm's shareholders. The 
effect of bank lines of credit on target firms is not examined in this thesis. 
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Existing literature shows that there is a takeover-deterrence effect of 
corporate liquidity. Harford (1999) and Faleye (2004) show that firms with 
excess cash are less likely to become a target in acquisitions. Regarding bank 
lines of credit, Yun (2009) finds that firms decrease the level of bank lines of 
credit relative to corporate cash holdings after an antitakeover legislation. 
Therefore, bank liquidity may have a defensive function for potential target 
firms. Future research can be made to explore the effect of bank liquidity from 
the perspective of potential target firms.  
Third, I compare the performance of M&As financed by corporate cash 
holdings and bank lines of credit in Chapter Three and the performance of 
M&As financed by corporate cash holdings, other bank loans, debt issues and 
equity issues in Chapter Four. However, there is no direct comparison 
between different types of debt. Another possible extension is to directly 
compare different types of debt and the performance of M&As. Further 
research can be made on the analysis of the costs associated with different 
types of debt and covenants of different loan agreements.  
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Table 3.1A Summary Statistics: Firm Characteristics 
 
The table reports summary statistics. I use a sample of 723 U.S. M&As with cash payment from 
1985 to 2013. CAR (-3, +3) is the cumulative abnormal return over days (-3, +3) around the 
announcement date (see text for details). Relative Value is the ratio of deal value to the sum of 
the acquirer’s market value of equity and deal value. Total Lines of Credit is the ratio of bank lines 
of credit to assets. Unused Lines of Credit is the ratio of unused lines of credit to assets. Cash is 
the ratio of cash and marketable securities to non-cash assets. ROA is the ratio of EBIT to non-
cash assets. ΔROA is the change in ROA from year t-1 to t+1. Net ΔROA is the difference 
between an acquirer’s change in ROA and its matched comparable firm’s change in ROA from 
year t-1 to t+1. The comparable firms are matched by propensity score matching based on size, 
cash flow, market-to-book ratio, leverage, tangibility, capital expenditure, R&D, dividends and 
cash flow volatility (see text for details). Premiums 1 is the offer price to the target share price 
premiums one day prior to the acquisition announcement. Premiums 2 is the offer price to the 
target share price premiums one week prior to the acquisition announcement. Premiums 3 is the 
offer price to the target share price premiums four weeks prior to the acquisition announcement. 
Institutional Ownership is the ratio of shares owned by institutional investors to the total shares 
outstanding. Size is the logarithm of non-cash assets. Cash Flow is income before extraordinary 
items divided by non-cash assets. M/B is market value of equity plus non-cash assets minus book 
value of equity, divided by non-cash assets. Leverage is the ratio of long-term debt to non-cash 
assets. Tangibility is the ratio of plant, property and equipment to non-cash assets. Capital 
Expenditure is the ratio of capital expenditure to non-cash assets. R&D is the ratio of R&D to non-
cash assets. Dividends is the ratio of dividends to non-cash assets. Cash Flow Volatility is the 
standard deviation of cash flow to non-cash assets in the prior five years. 
 
Variable Mean 
25th 
Percentile 
Median 
75th 
Percentile 
Std Dev 
CAR (-3,+3) 0.0161 -0.0271 0.0091 0.0571 0.0827 
Relative Value 0.1398 0.0371 0.0911 0.1915 0.1450 
Total Lines of Credit 0.2095 0.0774 0.1693 0.3229 0.1619 
Unused Lines of Credit 0.1475 0.0622 0.1246 0.2192 0.1119 
Cash 0.1859 0.0213 0.0692 0.2422 0.2554 
ROA 0.1237 0.0679 0.1121 0.1672 0.0833 
∆ROA -0.0279 -0.0612 -0.0135 0.0166 0.0785 
Net ∆ROA 0.0111 -0.0593 0.0120 0.0724 0.1285 
Premiums 1 0.3645 0.1600 0.3200 0.5800 0.3249 
Premiums 2 0.4442 0.2400 0.4100 0.6700 0.3524 
Premiums 3 0.5171 0.2700 0.4600 0.7100 0.4126 
Institutional Ownership 0.4722 0.1353 0.5184 0.7736 0.3342 
Size 19.9808 18.7648 19.9660 21.1084 1.8806 
Cash Flow 0.0679 0.0331 0.0618 0.1042 0.0753 
M/B 2.1360 1.2670 1.6582 2.3138 1.3702 
Leverage 0.2318 0.0607 0.2069 0.3474 0.1957 
Tangibility 0.3607 0.1377 0.2823 0.5460 0.2682 
Capital Expenditure 0.0834 0.0263 0.0484 0.0979 0.0916 
R&D 0.0256 0.0000 0.0000 0.0264 0.0544 
Dividends 0.0125 0.0000 0.0000 0.0174 0.0195 
Cash Flow Volatility 0.1090 0.0206 0.0426 0.0988 0.1808 
 
Table 3.1B Univariate Statistics 
 
 Number of Deals 
Corporate Cash Holdings 271 
Bank Lines of Credit 308 
Mixed Lines & Cash 144 
Total 723 
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Table 3.2 Univariate Analysis of Announcement Returns 
 
The table reports the univariate analysis on announcement returns. CAR (-3, +3) is the cumulative 
abnormal return over days (-3, +3) around the announcement date (see text for details). Corporate 
Cash Holdings indicates the M&As entirely financed by corporate cash holdings. Bank Lines of 
Credit indicates the M&As entirely financed by bank lines of credit. Mixed Lines & Cash indicates 
the M&As financed by a mixed source of bank lines of credit and corporate cash holdings. I report 
the mean test and the Wilcoxon Signed Rank median test in the table. *, **, and *** represent 
significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
  
Bank Lines of 
Credit 
Corporate Cash 
Holdings 
Difference 
 Mean Median Mean Median Mean p-value Median p-value 
CAR (-3, +3)  0.031 0.022 0.002 0.002 0.029*** (0.01) 0.020*** (0.01) 
  
Mixed Lines & 
Cash 
Corporate Cash 
Holdings 
Difference 
 Mean Median Mean Median Mean p-value Median p-value 
CAR (-3, +3)  0.011 0.008 0.002 0.002 0.009 (0.28) 0.006 (0.45) 
  
Bank Lines of 
Credit 
Mixed Lines & Cash Difference 
 Mean Median Mean Median Mean p-value Median p-value 
CAR (-3, +3)  0.031 0.022 0.011 0.008 0.020** (0.02) 0.014** (0.02) 
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Table 3.3 Sources of Financing and Announcement Returns 
  
The table shows the relation between sources of financing and announcement returns. CAR (-3, 
+3) is the cumulative abnormal return over days (-3, +3) around the announcement date (see text 
for details). Bank Lines of Credit Dummy equals one if an M&A is entirely financed by bank lines 
of credit, and equals zero otherwise. Mixed Lines & Cash Dummy equals one if an M&A is 
financed by a mix of bank lines of credit and corporate cash holdings, and equals zero otherwise. 
Relative Value is the ratio of deal value to the sum of the acquirer’s market value of equity and 
deal value. Hostile equals one if an M&A is hostile, and zero otherwise. Size is the logarithm of 
non-cash assets. Cash Flow is income before extraordinary items divided by non-cash assets. 
M/B is market value of equity plus non-cash assets minus book value of equity, divided by non-
cash assets. Leverage is the ratio of long-term debt to non-cash assets. Tangibility is the ratio of 
plant, property and equipment to non-cash assets. Capital Expenditure is the ratio of capital 
expenditure to non-cash assets. R&D is the ratio of R&D to non-cash assets. Dividends is the 
ratio of dividends to non-cash assets. Cash Flow Volatility is the standard deviation of cash flow 
to non-cash assets in the prior five years. Year Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for 
the years in the sample and not reported in the table. Industry Dummy Variables are the dummy 
variables for the industries defined by two-digit SIC codes and not reported in the table. The p-
value is calculated based on the Heteroscedasticity-Consistent standard errors, and is noted in 
the parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
 CAR (-3, +3) 
Intercept  0.153* 
 (0.06) 
Bank Lines of Credit Dummy     0.020*** 
 (0.01) 
Mixed Lines & Cash Dummy 0.004 
 (0.60) 
Relative Value 0.049 
 (0.10) 
Hostile   -0.051** 
 (0.04) 
Size t-1   -0.004** 
 (0.04) 
Cash Flow t-1 0.067 
 (0.21) 
M/B t-1 -0.004 
 (0.20) 
Leverage t-1 0.002 
 (0.91) 
Tangibility t-1 -0.009 
 (0.68) 
Capital Expenditure t-1 -0.042 
 (0.48) 
R&D t-1 -0.076 
 (0.24) 
Dividends t-1    -0.337** 
 (0.02) 
Cash Flow Volatility t-1 -0.019 
 (0.27) 
Year Dummy Variables Yes 
Industry Dummy Variables Yes 
Number of Observations 723 
Adjusted R-Square 0.09 
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Table 3.4A Propensity Score Matching  
 
The table shows the results for the propensity score matching based on the estimates from a 
logistic regression. There are 723 observations of acquirers and 14322 observations of non-
acquirers from the Compustat database. I match each acquirer firm with a non-acquirer firm by 
propensity score matching. I define non-acquirers as the firms that do not have any M&As in the 
same fiscal year as the acquirers. Matched firms are selected based on nearest propensity score 
and the same industry defined by the 2-digit SIC code.  
 
The dependent variable is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm is an acquirer, and equals 
zero otherwise. Size is the logarithm of non-cash assets. M/B is non-cash assets minus value of 
equity plus market value of equity, divided by non-cash assets. Cash Flow is income before 
extraordinary items divided by non-cash assets. Leverage is the ratio of long-term debt to non-
cash assets. Tangibility is the ratio of plant, property and equipment to non-cash assets. Capital 
Expenditure is the ratio of capital expenditure to non-cash assets. R&D is the ratio of R&D to non-
cash assets. Dividends is the ratio of dividends to non-cash assets. Cash Flow Volatility is the 
standard deviation of cash flow to non-cash assets in the prior five years. The p-value is noted in 
the parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
  Acquirer=1, Non-acquirer=0 
Intercept    10.676*** 
 (0.01) 
Size t-1    -0.457*** 
 (0.01) 
M/B t-1     0.076*** 
 (0.01) 
Cash Flow t-1    -4.334*** 
 (0.01) 
Leverage t-1   -0.505** 
 (0.03) 
Tangibility t-1     0.611*** 
 (0.01) 
Capital Expenditure t-1     1.371*** 
 (0.01) 
R&D t-1 0.165 
 (0.79) 
Dividends t-1     7.292*** 
 (0.01) 
Cash Flow Volatility t-1     1.707*** 
 (0.01) 
Number of Observations 15045 
Pseudo R-Square 0.09 
 
Table 3.4B Differences in Propensity Score Matching 
 
The table shows the univariate statistics about the difference in propensity score between 
acquiring firms and their matched non-acquiring firm. 
 
 
 
Difference in the propensity score between acquirer firms and their 
matched non-acquiring firms 
 Mean 
25th 
Percentile 
Median 
75th 
Percentile 
Std Dev 
Propensity Score 0.056 0.005 0.022 0.071 0.080 
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Table 3.4C Sources of Financing and Changes in Operating Performance 
 
The table shows the relation between sources of financing and the changes in operating 
performance. ROA is the ratio of EBIT to non-cash assets. ∆ROA is the change in ROA from year 
t-1 to t+1. Net ∆ROA is the difference between an acquirer’s change in ROA and its matched 
comparable firm’s change in ROA from year t-1 to t+1. The comparable firms are matched by 
propensity score matching based on size, cash flow, market-to-book ratio, leverage, tangibility, 
capital expenditure, R&D, dividends and cash flow volatility (see text for details). Bank Lines of 
Credit Dummy equals one if an M&A is entirely financed by bank lines of credit, and equals zero 
otherwise.  Mixed Lines & Cash Dummy equals one if an M&A is financed by a mix of bank lines 
of credit and corporate cash holdings, and equals zero otherwise. Relative Value is the ratio of 
deal value to the sum of the acquirer’s market value of equity and deal value. Hostile equals one 
if an M&A is hostile, and zero otherwise. Size is the logarithm of non-cash assets. M/B is market 
value of equity plus non-cash assets minus book value of equity, divided by non-cash assets. 
Leverage is the ratio of long-term debt to non-cash assets. Tangibility is the ratio of plant, property 
and equipment to non-cash assets. Capital Expenditure is the ratio of capital expenditure to non-
cash assets. R&D is the ratio of R&D to non-cash assets. Dividends is the ratio of dividends to 
non-cash assets. Cash Flow Volatility is the standard deviation of cash flow to non-cash assets 
in the prior five years. Year Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for the years in the sample 
and not reported in the table. Industry Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for the 
industries defined by two-digit SIC codes and not reported in the table. The p-value is calculated 
based on the Heteroscedasticity-Consistent standard errors, and is noted in the parentheses. *, 
**, and *** represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
  ∆ROA Net ∆ROA 
Intercept   -0.261** 0.167 
 (0.02) (0.33) 
Bank Lines of Credit Dummy 0.022*    0.048** 
 (0.06) (0.02) 
Mixed Lines & Cash Dummy 0.012 0.010 
 (0.25) (0.62) 
Relative Value 0.001 -0.056 
 (0.99) (0.33) 
Hostile -0.013 -0.002 
 (0.59) (0.96) 
Size t-1     0.012*** 0.005 
 (0.01) (0.43) 
ROA t-1    -0.536***    -0.529*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
M/B t-1 0.008 0.003 
 (0.20) (0.76) 
Leverage t-1     0.050*** 0.048 
 (0.01) (0.23) 
Tangibility t-1 -0.003 -0.077 
 (0.92) (0.14) 
Capital Expenditure t-1 -0.092 -0.039 
 (0.12) (0.72) 
R&D t-1 0.065 0.184 
 (0.64) (0.48) 
Dividends t-1 0.359 0.330 
 (0.15) (0.46) 
Cash Flow Volatility t-1 -0.040 -0.080 
 (0.11) (0.12) 
Year Dummy Variables Yes Yes 
Industry Dummy Variables Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 676 676 
Adjusted R-Square 0.35 0.29 
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Table 3.5 The Choice of Sources of Financing 
 
The table reports the multinomial logistic regression. The dependent variable is categorical. It 
equals zero if an M&A is entirely financed by corporate cash holdings, equals one if an M&A is 
entirely financed by bank lines of credit, and equals two if an M&A is financed by a mixed source 
of bank lines of credit and corporate cash holdings. Relative Value is the ratio of deal value to the 
sum of the acquirer’s market value of equity and deal value. Hostile equals one if an M&A is 
hostile, and zero otherwise. Cash is the ratio of cash and marketable securities to non-cash assets. 
Unused Lines of Credit is the ratio of unused lines of credit to non-cash assets. Institutional 
Ownership is the ratio of shares owned by institutional investors to the total shares outstanding. 
Size is the logarithm of non-cash assets. Cash Flow is income before extraordinary items divided 
by non-cash assets. M/B is market value of equity plus non-cash assets minus book value of 
equity, divided by non-cash assets. Leverage is the ratio of long-term debt to non-cash assets. 
Tangibility is the ratio of plant, property and equipment to non-cash assets. Capital Expenditure 
is the ratio of capital expenditure to non-cash assets. R&D is the ratio of R&D to non-cash assets. 
Dividends is the ratio of dividends to non-cash assets. Cash Flow Volatility is the standard 
deviation of cash flow to non-cash assets in the prior five years. Year Dummy Variables are the 
dummy variables for the years in the sample and not reported in the table. Industry Dummy 
Variables are the dummy variables for the industries defined by two-digit SIC codes and not 
reported in the table. The p-value is noted in the parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance 
levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
  Cash=0, Line=1, Mixed Line & Cash= 2 
  1 2 
Intercept     13.136*** 0.884 
 (0.01) (0.79) 
Relative Value     9.874***      11.128*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Hostile -13.702 -13.739 
 (0.99) (1.00) 
Cash t-1     -11.221***     -4.826*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Unused Lines of Credit t-1     5.845***    3.880** 
 (0.01) (0.05) 
Institutional Ownership t-1   1.017*     1.880*** 
 (0.08) (0.01) 
Size t-1     -0.614*** -0.104 
 (0.01) (0.45) 
Cash Flow t-1 -0.310 2.160 
 (0.92) (0.45) 
M/B t-1    0.432** 0.274 
 (0.04) (0.17) 
Leverage t-1 0.843 -0.301 
 (0.43) (0.78) 
Tangibility t-1 -2.189 -1.262 
 (0.11) (0.36) 
Capital Expenditure t-1 4.203 0.068 
 (0.23) (0.98) 
R&D t-1 -2.220 -3.350 
 (0.72) (0.49) 
Dividends t-1 8.449 7.365 
 (0.40) (0.45) 
Cash Flow Volatility t-1 -0.915 0.177 
 (0.45) (0.89) 
Year Dummy Variables Yes Yes 
Industry Dummy Variables Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 411 286 
Pseudo R-Square 0.59 0.59 
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Table 3.6 Acquisition Premiums 
 
The table reports the impact of source of financing on acquisition premiums. Premiums 1 is the 
offer price to the target share price premiums one day prior to the acquisition announcement. 
Premiums 2 is the offer price to the target share price premiums one week prior to the acquisition 
announcement. Premiums 3 is the offer price to the target share price premiums four weeks prior 
to the acquisition announcement. Bank Lines of Credit Dummy equals one if an M&A is entirely 
financed by bank lines of credit, and equals zero otherwise. Mixed Lines & Cash Dummy equals 
one if an M&A is financed by a mix of bank lines of credit and corporate cash holdings, and equals 
zero otherwise. Relative Value is the ratio of deal value to the sum of the acquirer’s market value 
of equity and deal value. Hostile equals one if an M&A is hostile, and zero otherwise. Size is the 
logarithm of non-cash assets. Cash Flow is income before extraordinary items divided by non-
cash assets. M/B is market value of equity plus non-cash assets minus book value of equity, 
divided by non-cash assets. Leverage is the ratio of long-term debt to non-cash assets. Tangibility 
is the ratio of plant, property and equipment to non-cash assets. Capital Expenditure is the ratio 
of capital expenditure to non-cash assets. R&D is the ratio of R&D to non-cash assets. Dividends 
is the ratio of dividends to non-cash assets. Cash Flow Volatility is the standard deviation of cash 
flow to non-cash assets in the prior five years. Year Dummy Variables are the dummy variables 
for the years in the sample and not reported in the table. Industry Dummy Variables are the 
dummy variables for the industries defined by two-digit SIC codes and not reported in the table. 
The p-value is calculated based on Heteroscedasticity-Consistent standard errors, and is noted 
in the parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
  Premiums 1 Premiums 2 Premiums 3 
Intercept 0.971 0.915 1.442* 
 (0.16) (0.13) (0.06) 
Bank Lines of Credit Dummy    -0.154**    -0.186**    -0.210** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) 
Mixed Lines & Cash Dummy 0.094 0.040 -0.022 
 (0.25) (0.60) (0.79) 
Relative Value -0.391 -0.460    -0.776** 
 (0.24) (0.11) (0.02) 
Hostile 0.115 0.194 0.056 
 (0.51) (0.13) (0.72) 
Size t-1 -0.023 -0.002 -0.035 
 (0.38) (0.92) (0.24) 
Cash Flow t-1 -0.548 -0.344 0.267 
 (0.24) (0.44) (0.68) 
M/B t-1     0.045***    0.032** 0.023 
 (0.01) (0.04) (0.27) 
Leverage t-1 -0.269 -0.173 -0.155 
 (0.27) (0.39) (0.59) 
Tangibility t-1    0.504**    0.713** 0.462 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.23) 
Capital Expenditure t-1     -1.467***     -2.092*** -1.381 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.10) 
R&D t-1 -0.751 -0.589 0.313 
 (0.27) (0.37) (0.68) 
Dividends t-1 -1.677 -0.539 -1.887 
 (0.41) (0.79) (0.48) 
Cash Flow Volatility t-1 -0.883* -0.779 -0.326 
 (0.07) (0.10) (0.59) 
Year Dummy Variables Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummy Variables Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 157 157 157 
Adjusted R-Square 0.05 0.07 0.08 
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Table 3.7A Sub-Group Analysis Based on Block Institutional Ownership — 
Announcement Returns 
The table shows the sub-group analysis on the relation between sources of financing and 
announcement returns. CAR (-3, +3) is the cumulative abnormal return over days (-3, +3) around 
the announcement date (see text for details). Block equals one if there exists a block institutional 
ownership which exceeds 5% of the total shares outstanding, and equals zero otherwise. Bank 
Lines of Credit Dummy equals one if an M&A is entirely financed by bank lines of credit, and 
equals zero otherwise. Mixed Lines & Cash Dummy equals one if an M&A is financed by a mix of 
bank lines of credit and corporate cash holdings, and equals zero otherwise. Relative Value is the 
ratio of deal value to the sum of the acquirer’s market value of equity and deal value. Hostile 
equals one if an M&A is hostile, and zero otherwise. Size is the logarithm of non-cash assets. 
Cash Flow is income before extraordinary items divided by non-cash assets. M/B is market value 
of equity plus non-cash assets minus book value of equity, divided by non-cash assets. Leverage 
is the ratio of long-term debt to non-cash assets. Tangibility is the ratio of plant, property and 
equipment to non-cash assets. Capital Expenditure is the ratio of capital expenditure to non-cash 
assets. R&D is the ratio of R&D to non-cash assets. Dividends is the ratio of dividends to non-
cash assets. Cash Flow Volatility is the standard deviation of cash flow to non-cash assets in the 
prior five years. Year Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for the years in the sample and 
not reported in the table. Industry Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for the industries 
defined by two-digit SIC codes and not reported in the table. The p-value is calculated based on 
Heteroscedasticity-Consistent standard errors, and is noted in the parentheses. *, **, and *** 
represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.   
 CAR (-3,+3) 
  Block=0 Block=1 
Intercept 0.043 0.064 
 (0.60) (0.31) 
Bank Lines of Credit Dummy   0.025* 0.012 
 (0.06) (0.20) 
Mixed Lines & Cash Dummy 0.006 0.007 
 (0.72) (0.52) 
Relative Value 0.052 0.049 
 (0.27) (0.22) 
Hostile 0.031     -0.082*** 
 (0.15) (0.01) 
Size t-1    -0.006** -0.003 
 (0.05) (0.36) 
Cash Flow t-1 0.003 0.019 
 (0.85) (0.58) 
M/B t-1 0.001 -0.002 
 (0.24) (0.37) 
Leverage t-1 0.018 -0.010 
 (0.49) (0.63) 
Tangibility t-1 -0.013 -0.012 
 (0.70) (0.60) 
Capital Expenditure t-1 0.060 -0.027 
 (0.32) (0.67) 
R&D t-1 -0.110 -0.013 
 (0.21) (0.83) 
Dividends t-1     -0.140*** 0.009 
 (0.01) (0.88) 
Cash Flow Volatility t-1   -0.050*  -0.013 
 (0.06) (0.60) 
Year Dummy Variables Yes Yes 
Industry Dummy Variables Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 258 465 
Adjusted R-Square 0.12 0.08 
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Table 3.7B Sub-Group Analysis Based on Block Institutional Ownership — 
Net Changes in Operating Performance 
The table shows the sub-group analysis on the relation between sources of financing and the net 
changes in operating performance. Net ∆ROA is the difference between an acquirer’s change in 
ROA and its matched comparable firm’s change in ROA from year t-1 to t+1, where ROA is the 
ratio of EBIT to non-cash assets. The comparable firms are matched by propensity score 
matching based on size, cash flow, market-to-book ratio, leverage, tangibility, capital expenditure, 
R&D, dividends and cash flow volatility (see text for details). Block equals one if there exists a 
block institutional ownership which exceeds 5% of the total shares outstanding, and equals zero 
otherwise. Bank Lines of Credit Dummy equals one if an M&A is entirely financed by bank lines 
of credit, and equals zero otherwise. Mixed Lines & Cash Dummy equals one if an M&A is 
financed by a mix of bank lines of credit and corporate cash holdings, and equals zero otherwise. 
Relative Value is the ratio of deal value to the sum of the acquirer’s market value of equity and 
deal value. Hostile equals one if an M&A is hostile, and zero otherwise. Size is the logarithm of 
non-cash assets. M/B is market value of equity plus non-cash assets minus book value of equity, 
divided by non-cash assets. Leverage is the ratio of long-term debt to non-cash assets. Tangibility 
is the ratio of plant, property and equipment to non-cash assets. Capital Expenditure is the ratio 
of capital expenditure to non-cash assets. R&D is the ratio of R&D to non-cash assets. Dividends 
is the ratio of dividends to non-cash assets. Cash Flow Volatility is the standard deviation of cash 
flow to non-cash assets in the prior five years. Year Dummy Variables are the dummy variables 
for the years in the sample and not reported in the table. Industry Dummy Variables are the 
dummy variables for the industries defined by two-digit SIC codes and not reported in the table. 
The p-value is calculated based on Heteroscedasticity-Consistent standard errors, and is noted 
in the parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  
  Net ∆ROA 
  Block=0 Block=1 
Intercept    -0.458** 0.096 
 (0.03) (0.45) 
Bank Lines of Credit Dummy     0.076*** 0.007 
 (0.01) (0.66) 
Mixed Lines & Cash Dummy 0.015 0.015 
 (0.62) (0.42) 
Relative Value -0.016 -0.030 
 (0.86) (0.55) 
Hostile    -0.136** 0.050 
 (0.02) (0.21) 
Size t-1     0.021*** 0.002 
 (0.01) (0.76) 
ROA t-1    -0.254***    -0.369*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
M/B t-1 0.005 -0.003 
 (0.68) (0.74) 
Leverage t-1 0.069 0.020 
 (0.24) (0.56) 
Tangibility t-1 -0.111  -0.069* 
 (0.18) (0.08) 
Capital Expenditure t-1 0.026 -0.019 
 (0.88) (0.85) 
R&D t-1 -0.184 -0.024 
 (0.55) (0.88) 
Dividends t-1 -0.566 0.554 
 (0.30) (0.14) 
Cash Flow Volatility t-1    -0.154** -0.032 
 (0.05) (0.46) 
Year Dummy Variables Yes Yes 
Industry Dummy Variables Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 246 430 
Adjusted R-Square 0.17 0.22 
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Table 3.7C Sub-Group Analysis Based on Block Institutional Ownership — 
Acquisition Premiums 
The table shows the sub-group analysis on the sources of financing and acquisition premiums. 
Premiums 1 is the offer price to the target share price premiums one day prior to the acquisition 
announcement. Premiums 2 is the offer price to the target share price premiums one week prior 
to the acquisition announcement. Premiums 3 is the offer price to the target share price premiums 
four weeks prior to the acquisition announcement. Block equals one if there exists a block 
institutional ownership which exceeds 5% of the total shares outstanding, and equals zero 
otherwise. Bank Lines of Credit Dummy equals one if an M&A is entirely financed by bank lines 
of credit, and equals zero otherwise. Mixed Lines & Cash Dummy equals one if an M&A is 
financed by a mix of bank lines of credit and corporate cash holdings, and equals zero otherwise. 
Relative Value is the ratio of deal value to the sum of the acquirer’s market value of equity and 
deal value. Hostile equals one if an M&A is hostile, and zero otherwise. Size is the logarithm of 
non-cash assets. Cash Flow is income before extraordinary items divided by non-cash assets. 
M/B is market value of equity plus non-cash assets minus book value of equity, divided by non-
cash assets. Leverage is the ratio of long-term debt to non-cash assets. Tangibility is the ratio of 
plant, property and equipment to non-cash assets. Capital Expenditure is the ratio of capital 
expenditure to non-cash assets. R&D is the ratio of R&D to non-cash assets. Dividends is the 
ratio of dividends to non-cash assets. Cash Flow Volatility is the standard deviation of cash flow 
to non-cash assets in the prior five years. Year Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for 
the years in the sample and not reported in the table. Industry Dummy Variables are the dummy 
variables for the industries defined by two-digit SIC codes and not reported in the table. The p-
value is calculated based on the Heteroscedasticity-Consistent standard errors, and is noted in 
the parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
  Premiums 1 Premiums 2 Premiums 3 
  Block=0 Block=1 Block=0 Block=1 Block=0 Block=1 
Intercept 0.300 0.504 0.341 -0.290 1.112 0.547 
 (0.60) (0.42) (0.57) (0.69) (0.11) (0.50) 
Bank Lines of Credit Dummy   -0.191** -0.050  -0.162* -0.057   -0.132** -0.151 
 (0.03) (0.66) (0.08) (0.63) (0.05) (0.29) 
Mixed Lines & Cash Dummy 0.097 0.162 0.084 0.115 0.013 -0.062 
 (0.26) (0.20) (0.39) (0.20) (0.92) (0.55) 
Relative Value -0.443 -0.575  -0.701* -0.469   -1.267** -0.646 
 (0.15) (0.13) (0.07) (0.20) (0.02) (0.10) 
Hostile 0.205 0.152 0.332* 0.132   0.340* -0.038 
 (0.12) (0.23) (0.06) (0.40) (0.07) (0.79) 
Size t-1 0.002 0.017 0.009 0.053* -0.033 0.001 
 (0.95) (0.57) (0.76) (0.06) (0.30) (0.96) 
Cash Flow t-1 -0.609 0.375 -0.616 1.132* -0.180  1.105* 
 (0.48) (0.46) (0.46) (0.06) (0.86) (0.06) 
M/B t-1 0.062 0.007   0.066** -0.030 0.070 -0.068 
 (0.17) (0.76) (0.03) (0.54) (0.17) (0.16) 
Leverage t-1 0.062 0.366 0.195 0.106   0.359** 0.409 
 (0.78) (0.17) (0.51) (0.70) (0.05) (0.17) 
Tangibility t-1 0.295 0.608 0.258 0.459 0.503   1.060** 
 (0.21) (0.23) (0.30) (0.36) (0.19) (0.04) 
Capital Expenditure t-1 -0.982 -0.976  -1.689* -2.705***  -2.058* -4.809*** 
 (0.29) (0.25) (0.06) (0.01) (0.09) (0.01) 
R&D t-1 -0.853 0.881 -0.763 1.246 0.165 3.169*** 
 (0.35) (0.15) (0.39) (0.17) (0.87) (0.01) 
Dividends t-1 -0.326 0.042 1.514 -1.179 -1.901 -0.763 
 (0.85) (0.99) (0.39) (0.73) (0.54) (0.82) 
Cash Flow Volatility t-1 -0.257 -0.190 -0.926 0.062 0.311 -0.305 
 (0.67) (0.77) (0.17) (0.88) (0.70) (0.38) 
Year Dummy Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummy Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 73 84 73 84 73 84 
Adjusted R-Square 0.06 0.14 0.05 0.09 0.07 0.24 
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Table 3.8A Heckman Two-Stage Estimation — Second Stage: 
Announcement Returns 
The table shows the second stage of Heckman two-stage estimation. CAR (-3, +3) is the 
cumulative abnormal return over days (-3, +3) around the announcement date (see text for 
details). Bank Lines of Credit Dummy equals one if an M&A is entirely financed by bank lines of 
credit, and equals zero otherwise. Mixed Lines & Cash Dummy equals one if an M&A is financed 
by a mix of bank lines of credit and corporate cash holdings, and equals zero otherwise.  Relative 
Value is the ratio of deal value to the sum of the acquirer’s market value of equity and deal value. 
Hostile equals one if an M&A is hostile, and zero otherwise. Size is the logarithm of non-cash 
assets. Cash Flow is income before extraordinary items divided by non-cash assets. M/B is 
market value of equity plus non-cash assets minus book value of equity, divided by non-cash 
assets. Leverage is the ratio of long-term debt to non-cash assets. Tangibility is the ratio of plant, 
property and equipment to non-cash assets. Capital Expenditure is the ratio of capital expenditure 
to non-cash assets. R&D is the ratio of R&D to non-cash assets. Dividends is the ratio of dividends 
to non-cash assets. Cash Flow Volatility is the standard deviation of cash flow to non-cash assets 
in the prior five years. Inverse Mills Ratio1 is calculated based on the estimates in the logistic 
regression as reported in Table 3.4A. Inverse Mills Ratio 2 is calculated based on the estimates 
in the multinomial logistic regression as reported in Table 3.5. Year Dummy Variables are the 
dummy variables for the years in the sample and not reported in the table. Industry Dummy 
Variables are the dummy variables for the industries defined by two-digit SIC codes and not 
reported in the table. The p-value is calculated based on Heteroscedasticity-Consistent standard 
errors, and is noted in the parentheses.  *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, 
and 1%, respectively. 
  CAR (-3, +3) 
Intercept 0.031 -0.147 
 (0.77) (0.15) 
Bank Lines of Credit Dummy     0.041***  
 (0.01)  
Mixed Lines & Cash Dummy  -0.003 
  (0.89) 
Relative Value 0.021 0.062 
 (0.64) (0.37) 
Hostile    0.061** 0.016 
 (0.04) (0.53) 
Size t-1 -0.004 0.007 
 (0.45) (0.19) 
Cash Flow t-1 0.084     0.170*** 
 (0.12) (0.01) 
M/B t-1 -0.001 -0.002 
 (0.49) (0.64) 
Leverage t-1 0.010 0.030 
 (0.67) (0.28) 
Tangibility t-1 0.001 -0.063* 
 (0.99) (0.06) 
Capital Expenditure t-1 -0.105 -0.056 
 (0.18) (0.54) 
R&D t-1 -0.065 0.010 
 (0.43) (0.88) 
Dividends t-1 -0.230    -0.690*** 
 (0.19) (0.01) 
Cash Flow Volatility t-1 0.008    -0.104*** 
 (0.70) (0.01) 
Inverse Mills Ratio 1 0.035  -0.071* 
 (0.40) (0.07) 
Inverse Mills Ratio 2    -0.019*** -0.008 
 (0.01) (0.58) 
Year Dummy Variables Yes Yes 
Industry Dummy Variables Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 411 286 
Adjusted R-Square 0.06 0.09 
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Table 3.8B Heckman Two-Stage Estimation — Second Stage: Net Changes 
in Operating Performance 
The table shows the second stage of Heckman two-stage estimation. Net ∆ROA is the difference 
between an acquirer’s change in ROA and its matched comparable firm’s change in ROA from 
year t-1 to t+1, where ROA is the ratio of EBIT to non-cash assets. The comparable firms are 
matched by propensity score matching based on size, cash flow, market-to-book ratio, leverage, 
tangibility, capital expenditure, R&D, dividends and cash flow volatility (see text for details). Bank 
Lines of Credit Dummy equals one if an M&A is entirely financed by bank lines of credit, and 
equals zero otherwise. Mixed Lines & Cash Dummy equals one if an M&A is financed by a mix of 
bank lines of credit and corporate cash holdings, and equals zero otherwise. Relative Value is the 
ratio of deal value to the sum of the acquirer’s market value of equity and deal value. Hostile 
equals one if an M&A is hostile, and zero otherwise. Size is the logarithm of non-cash assets. 
M/B is market value of equity plus non-cash assets minus book value of equity, divided by non-
cash assets. Leverage is the ratio of long-term debt to non-cash assets. Tangibility is the ratio of 
plant, property and equipment to non-cash assets. Capital Expenditure is the ratio of capital 
expenditure to non-cash assets. R&D is the ratio of R&D to non-cash assets. Dividends is the 
ratio of dividends to non-cash assets. Cash Flow Volatility is the standard deviation of cash flow 
to non-cash assets in the prior five years. Inverse Mills Ratio1 is calculated based on the 
estimates in the logistic regression as reported in Table 3.4A. Inverse Mills Ratio 2 is calculated 
based on the estimates in the multinomial logistic regression as reported in Table 3.5. Year 
Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for the years in the sample and not reported in the 
table. Industry Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for the industries defined by two-digit 
SIC codes and not reported in the table. The p-value is calculated based on Heteroscedasticity-
Consistent standard errors, and is noted in the parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance 
levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  
  Net ∆ROA 
Intercept 0.247 0.983 
 (0.39) (0.30) 
Bank Lines of Credit Dummy   0.051*  
 (0.06)  
Mixed Lines & Cash Dummy  -0.065 
  (0.43) 
Relative Value -0.090 -0.194 
 (0.32) (0.43) 
Hostile -0.069 0.145 
 (0.18) (0.37) 
Size t-1 0.001 -0.019 
 (0.97) (0.69) 
ROA t-1    -0.759***    -0.905*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
M/B t-1 0.016 0.003 
 (0.18) (0.87) 
Leverage t-1 0.028 -0.010 
 (0.47) (0.92) 
Tangibility t-1  -0.083* -0.031 
 (0.08) (0.75) 
Capital Expenditure t-1 0.067 -0.376 
 (0.41) (0.22) 
R&D t-1 0.264 0.685 
 (0.19) (0.27) 
Dividends t-1 0.654 1.854 
 (0.28) (0.16) 
Cash Flow Volatility t-1 -0.070 0.084 
 (0.22) (0.55) 
Inverse Mills Ratio 1 0.027 0.177 
 (0.75) (0.51) 
Inverse Mills Ratio 2 0.002 0.024 
 (0.93) (0.50) 
Year Dummy Variables Yes Yes 
Industry Dummy Variables Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 379 268 
Adjusted R-Square 0.32 0.25 
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Table 3.9A Fractions of Bank Lines of Credit — Announcement Returns 
 
The table reports the fraction of bank lines of credit used in M&As and announcement returns. 
CAR (-3, +3) is the cumulative abnormal return over days (-3, +3) around the announcement date 
(see text for details). Fraction of Lines of Credit is the fraction of bank lines of credit used for the 
transaction when an M&A is financed by a mix of bank lines of credit and corporate cash holdings. 
Relative Value is the ratio of deal value to the sum of the acquirer’s market value of equity and 
deal value. Hostile equals one if an M&A is hostile, and zero otherwise. Size is the logarithm of 
non-cash assets. Cash Flow is income before extraordinary items divided by non-cash assets. 
M/B is market value of equity plus non-cash assets minus book value of equity, divided by non-
cash assets. Leverage is the ratio of long-term debt to non-cash assets. Tangibility is the ratio of 
plant, property and equipment to non-cash assets. Capital Expenditure is the ratio of capital 
expenditure to non-cash assets. R&D is the ratio of R&D to non-cash assets. Dividends is the 
ratio of dividends to non-cash assets. Cash Flow Volatility is the standard deviation of cash flow 
to non-cash assets in the prior five years. Year Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for 
the years in the sample and not reported in the table. Industry Dummy Variables are the dummy 
variables for the industries defined by one-digit SIC codes and not reported in the table. The p-
value is calculated based on Heteroscedasticity-Consistent standard errors, and is noted in the 
parentheses.  *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
  CAR (-3, +3) 
Intercept    -1.594*** 
 (0.01) 
Fraction of Lines of Credit    0.301** 
 (0.04) 
Relative Value     0.356*** 
 (0.01) 
Hostile 0.033 
 (0.37) 
Size t-1     0.056*** 
 (0.01) 
Cash Flow t-1   -0.274** 
 (0.05) 
M/B t-1  -0.027* 
 (0.08) 
Leverage t-1   -1.254** 
 (0.02) 
Tangibility t-1    0.761** 
 (0.02) 
Capital Expenditure t-1    -1.393*** 
 (0.01) 
R&D t-1     2.796*** 
 (0.01) 
Dividends t-1   -12.173*** 
 (0.01) 
Cash Flow Volatility t-1     2.728*** 
 (0.01) 
Year Dummy Variables Yes 
Industry Dummy Variables Yes 
Number of Observations 42 
Adjusted R-Square 0.89 
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Table 3.9B Fractions of Bank Lines of Credit — Net Changes in Operating 
Performance 
 
The table reports the fraction of bank lines of credit used in M&As and the changes in operating 
performance. Net ∆ROA is the difference between an acquirer’s change in ROA and its matched 
comparable firm’s change in ROA from year t-1 to t+1, where ROA is ROA is the ratio of EBIT to 
non-cash assets. The comparable firms are matched by propensity score matching based on size, 
cash flow, market-to-book ratio, leverage, tangibility, capital expenditure, R&D, dividends and 
cash flow volatility (see text for details). Fraction of Lines of Credit is the fraction of bank lines of 
credit used for the transaction when an M&A is financed by a mix of bank lines of credit and 
corporate cash holdings. Relative Value is the ratio of deal value to the sum of the acquirer’s 
market value of equity and deal value. Hostile equals one if an M&A is hostile, and zero otherwise. 
Size is the logarithm of non-cash assets. Cash Flow is income before extraordinary items divided 
by non-cash assets. M/B is market value of equity plus non-cash assets minus book value of 
equity, divided by non-cash assets. Leverage is the ratio of long-term debt to non-cash assets. 
Tangibility is the ratio of plant, property and equipment to non-cash assets. Capital Expenditure 
is the ratio of capital expenditure to non-cash assets. R&D is the ratio of R&D to non-cash assets. 
Dividends is the ratio of dividends to non-cash assets. Cash Flow Volatility is the standard 
deviation of cash flow to non-cash assets in the prior five years. Year Dummy Variables are the 
dummy variables for the years in the sample and not reported in the table. Industry Dummy 
Variables are the dummy variables for the industries defined by one-digit SIC codes and not 
reported in the table. The p-value is calculated based on Heteroscedasticity-Consistent standard 
errors, and is noted in the parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, 
and 1%, respectively.  
 
  Net ∆ROA 
Intercept  -0.618* 
 (0.08) 
Fraction of Lines of Credit    0.350** 
 (0.02) 
Relative Value     1.513*** 
 (0.01) 
Hostile    -0.426*** 
 (0.01) 
Size t-1   0.033* 
 (0.08) 
ROA t-1     -2.730*** 
 (0.01) 
M/B t-1    0.058** 
 (0.02) 
Leverage t-1 0.119 
 (0.28) 
Tangibility t-1     -1.097*** 
 (0.01) 
Capital Expenditure t-1     5.317*** 
 (0.01) 
R&D t-1     3.428*** 
 (0.01) 
Dividends t-1    -5.954*** 
 (0.01) 
Cash Flow Volatility t-1 0.300 
 (0.24) 
Year Dummy Variables Yes 
Industry Dummy Variables Yes 
Number of Observations 41 
Adjusted R-Square 0.49 
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Table 3.10A Commitment Fee and Predetermined Interest Rate — 
Univariate Statistics 
The table reports the univariate statistics of Commitment Fee and Predetermined Interest Rate of 
bank lines of credit. Commitment Fee is the weighted average commitment fee of each bank line 
of credit a firm has. Predetermined Interest Rate is the weighted average interest rate of each 
bank line of credit that a firm has. 
  Mean 
25th 
Percentile 
Median 
75th 
Percentile 
Std Dev 
Commitment Fee 0.0036 0.0023 0.0038 0.0044 0.0026 
Predetermined Interest Rate 0.0518 0.0337 0.0572 0.0659 0.0199 
Table 3.10B Commitment Fee and Predetermined Interest Rate — 
Announcement Returns 
The table reports the regression on commitment fee and interest rates of bank lines of credit, and 
the performance of M&As. CAR (-3, +3) is the cumulative abnormal return over days (-3, +3) 
around the announcement date (see text for details). Relative Value is the ratio of deal value to 
the sum of the acquirer’s market value of equity and deal value. Hostile equals one if an M&A is 
hostile, and zero otherwise. Size is the logarithm of non-cash assets. Cash Flow is income before 
extraordinary items divided by non-cash assets. M/B is market value of equity plus non-cash 
assets minus book value of equity, divided by non-cash assets. Leverage is the ratio of long-term 
debt to non-cash assets. Tangibility is the ratio of plant, property and equipment to non-cash 
assets. Capital Expenditure is the ratio of capital expenditure to non-cash assets. R&D is the ratio 
of R&D to non-cash assets. Dividends is the ratio of dividends to non-cash assets. Cash Flow 
Volatility is the standard deviation of cash flow to non-cash assets in the prior five years. Year 
Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for the years in the sample and not reported in the 
table. Industry Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for the industries defined by two-digit 
SIC codes and not reported in the table. The p-value is calculated based on Heteroscedasticity-
Consistent standard errors, and is noted in the parentheses.  *, **, and *** represent significance 
levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
  CAR (-3, +3) 
Intercept     0.317** 0.229 
 (0.05) (0.16) 
Commitment Fee t-1   -18.991** 
 
 (0.03) 
 
Predetermined Interest Rate t-1 
 
 -0.775* 
 
 
(0.08) 
Relative Value    0.162** -0.019 
 (0.05) (0.74) 
Hostile     0.206***      0.241*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Size t-1 -0.011 -0.008 
 (0.12) (0.28) 
Cash Flow t-1 -0.060 0.047 
 (0.69) (0.70) 
M/B t-1 -0.006 -0.006 
 (0.63) (0.36) 
Leverage t-1   -0.105** 0.022 
 (0.05) (0.56) 
Tangibility t-1 -0.055 -0.036 
 (0.33) (0.35) 
Capital Expenditure t-1 -0.177 -0.190 
 (0.20) (0.12) 
R&D t-1    -1.456***   -1.194** 
 (0.01) (0.03) 
Dividends t-1 0.287 -0.030 
 (0.50) (0.93) 
Cash Flow Volatility t-1  0.063* 0.020 
 (0.08) (0.44) 
Year Dummy Variables Yes Yes 
Industry Dummy Variables Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 101 171 
Adjusted R-Square 0.26 0.11 
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Table 3.10C Commitment Fee and Predetermined Interest Rate — Net 
Changes in Operating Performance 
The table reports the regression on commitment fee and interest rates of bank lines of credit, and 
the performance of M&As. Net ∆ROA is the difference between an acquirer’s change in ROA and 
its matched comparable firm’s change in ROA from year t-1 to t+1, where ROA is the ratio of EBIT 
to non-cash assets. The comparable firms are matched by propensity score matching based on 
size, cash flow, market-to-book ratio, leverage, tangibility, capital expenditure, R&D, dividends 
and cash flow volatility (see text for details). Commitment Fee is the weighted average 
commitment fee of each bank line of credit a firm has. Predetermined Interest Rate is the weighted 
average interest rate of each bank line of credit that a firm has. Relative Value is the ratio of deal 
value to the sum of the acquirer’s market value of equity and deal value. Hostile equals one if an 
M&A is hostile, and zero otherwise. ROA is the ratio of EBIT to non-cash assets. Size is the 
logarithm of non-cash assets. Cash Flow is income before extraordinary items divided by non-
cash assets. M/B is market value of equity plus non-cash assets minus book value of equity, 
divided by non-cash assets. Leverage is the ratio of long-term debt to non-cash assets. Tangibility 
is the ratio of plant, property and equipment to non-cash assets. Capital Expenditure is the ratio 
of capital expenditure to non-cash assets. R&D is the ratio of R&D to non-cash assets. Dividends 
is the ratio of dividends to non-cash assets. Cash Flow Volatility is the standard deviation of cash 
flow to non-cash assets in the prior five years. Year Dummy Variables are the dummy variables 
for the years in the sample and not reported in the table. Industry Dummy Variables are the 
dummy variables for the industries defined by two-digit SIC codes and not reported in the table. 
The p-value is calculated based on Heteroscedasticity-Consistent standard errors, and is noted 
in the parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  
 
  Net ∆ROA 
Intercept 0.335 0.213 
 (0.10) (0.32) 
Commitment Fees t-1   -12.238** 
 
 (0.05) 
 
Predetermined Interest Rate t-1 
 
 -1.049* 
 
 
(0.08) 
Relative Value -0.091 -0.033 
 (0.30) (0.69) 
Hostile 0.024     0.113*** 
 (0.73) (0.01) 
Size t-1 -0.008 -0.003 
 (0.34) (0.78) 
ROA t-1   -0.630**    -0.852*** 
 (0.02) (0.01) 
M/B t-1 -0.012 0.003 
 (0.62) (0.87) 
Leverage t-1   0.103*    0.127** 
 (0.07) (0.05) 
Tangibility t-1 -0.036   -0.112* 
 (0.65) (0.08) 
Capital Expenditure t-1 0.196   0.202* 
 (0.29) (0.08) 
R&D t-1     0.964***   1.417* 
 (0.01) (0.09) 
Dividends t-1 0.097 -0.324 
 (0.13) (0.57) 
Cash Flow Volatility t-1 -0.073   -0.151** 
 (0.18) (0.03) 
Year Dummy Variables Yes Yes 
Industry Dummy Variables Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 90 158 
Adjusted R-Square 0.44 0.21 
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Table 3.11A Sub-Group Analysis Based on Bankruptcy Risk — 
Announcement Returns 
 
The table shows the sub-group analysis on the relation between sources of financing and 
announcement returns. CAR (-3, +3) is the cumulative abnormal return over days (-3, +3) around 
the announcement date (see text for details). Low (High) Bankruptcy risk indicates a firm’s Altman 
Z-Score is equal or greater (less) than 1.81. Bank Lines of Credit Dummy equals one if an M&A 
is entirely financed by bank lines of credit, and equals zero otherwise. Mixed Lines & Cash 
Dummy equals one if an M&A is financed by a mix of bank lines of credit and corporate cash 
holdings, and equals zero otherwise. Relative Value is the ratio of deal value to the sum of the 
acquirer’s market value of equity and deal value. Hostile equals one if an M&A is hostile, and zero 
otherwise. Size is the logarithm of non-cash assets. Cash Flow is income before extraordinary 
items divided by non-cash assets. M/B is market value of equity plus non-cash assets minus book 
value of equity, divided by non-cash assets. Leverage is the ratio of long-term debt to non-cash 
assets. Tangibility is the ratio of plant, property and equipment to non-cash assets. Capital 
Expenditure is the ratio of capital expenditure to non-cash assets. R&D is the ratio of R&D to non-
cash assets. Dividends is the ratio of dividends to non-cash assets. Cash Flow Volatility is the 
standard deviation of cash flow to non-cash assets in the prior five years. Year Dummy Variables 
are the dummy variables for the years in the sample and not reported in the table. Industry Dummy 
Variables are the dummy variables for the industries defined by two-digit SIC codes and not 
reported in the table. The p-value is calculated based on Heteroscedasticity-Consistent standard 
errors, and is noted in the parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, 
and 1%, respectively. 
 
  CAR (-3,+3) 
  Low Bankruptcy Risk High Bankruptcy Risk 
Intercept   0.134* 0.001 
 (0.06) (1.00) 
Bank Lines of Credit Dummy     0.021*** -0.011 
 (0.01) (0.57) 
Mixed Lines & Cash Dummy 0.006 0.002 
 (0.55) (0.92) 
Relative Value 0.052 0.044 
 (0.16) (0.45) 
Hostile   -0.055** 0.029 
 (0.02) (0.48) 
Size t-1 -0.004 0.001 
 (0.13) (0.84) 
Cash Flow t-1 0.027 0.171 
 (0.64) (0.26) 
M/B t-1 -0.004  -0.027* 
 (0.26) (0.09) 
Leverage t-1 0.002 0.004 
 (0.94) (0.92) 
Tangibility t-1 0.018    -0.134*** 
 (0.54) (0.01) 
Capital Expenditure t-1 -0.077 0.043 
 (0.37) (0.63) 
R&D t-1 -0.099 0.048 
 (0.14) (0.82) 
Dividends t-1  -0.289*    -1.256*** 
 (0.07) (0.01) 
Cash Flow Volatility t-1 -0.012 0.040 
 (0.57) (0.32) 
Year Dummy Variables Yes Yes 
Industry Dummy Variables Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 605 118 
Adjusted R-Square 0.06 0.15 
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Table 3.11B Sub-Group Analysis Based on Bankruptcy Risk — Net 
Changes in Operating Performance 
The table shows the sub-group analysis on the relation between sources of financing and the net 
changes in operating performance. Net ΔROA is as the difference between an acquirer’s change 
in ROA and its matched comparable firm’s change in ROA from year t-1 to t+1, where ROA is the 
ratio of EBIT to non-cash assets. The comparable firms are matched by propensity score 
matching based on size, cash flow, market-to-book ratio, leverage, tangibility, capital expenditure, 
R&D, dividends and cash flow volatility (see text for details). Low (High) Bankruptcy risk indicates 
a firm’s Altman Z-Score is equal or greater (less) than 1.81. Bank Lines of Credit Dummy equals 
one if an M&A is entirely financed by bank lines of credit, and equals zero otherwise. Mixed Lines 
& Cash Dummy equals one if an M&A is financed by a mix of bank lines of credit and corporate 
cash holdings, and equals zero otherwise. Relative Value is the ratio of deal value to the sum of 
the acquirer’s market value of equity and deal value. Hostile equals one if an M&A is hostile, and 
zero otherwise. Size is the logarithm of non-cash assets. M/B is market value of equity plus non-
cash assets minus book value of equity, divided by non-cash assets. Leverage is the ratio of long-
term debt to non-cash assets. Tangibility is the ratio of plant, property and equipment to non-cash 
assets. Capital Expenditure is the ratio of capital expenditure to non-cash assets. R&D is the ratio 
of R&D to non-cash assets. Dividends is the ratio of dividends to non-cash assets. Cash Flow 
Volatility is the standard deviation of cash flow to non-cash assets in the prior five years. Year 
Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for the years in the sample and not reported in the 
table. Industry Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for the industries defined by two-digit 
SIC codes and not reported in the table. The p-value is calculated based on the 
Heteroscedasticity-Consistent standard errors, and is noted in the parentheses. *, **, and *** 
represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
  Net ∆ROA 
  Low Bankruptcy Risk High Bankruptcy Risk 
Intercept   0.345* 0.079 
 (0.07) (0.64) 
Bank Lines of Credit Dummy   0.047* 0.023 
 (0.06) (0.36) 
Mixed Lines & Cash Dummy 0.013 0.014 
 (0.55) (0.56) 
Relative Value  -0.110* -0.154 
 (0.09) (0.12) 
Hostile 0.058   -0.237** 
 (0.20) (0.02) 
Size t-1 -0.002 0.003 
 (0.75) (0.67) 
ROA t-1    -0.666***    -0.508*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
M/B t-1 0.003 -0.008 
 (0.84) (0.75) 
Leverage t-1 0.037 -0.087 
 (0.52) (0.13) 
Tangibility t-1   -0.123**   0.133* 
 (0.05) (0.09) 
Capital Expenditure t-1 -0.069 -0.118 
 (0.62) (0.47) 
R&D t-1    0.535** -0.270 
 (0.02) (0.20) 
Dividends t-1 0.751    -0.831*** 
 (0.12) (0.01) 
Cash Flow Volatility t-1   -0.153** 0.037 
 (0.03) (0.66) 
Year Dummy Variables Yes Yes 
Industry Dummy Variables Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 568 108 
Adjusted R-Square 0.24 0.44 
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Table 3.12A Acquirers with Multiple M&As — Announcement Returns 
 
The table shows the relation between sources of financing and announcement returns. CAR (-3, 
+3) is the cumulative abnormal return over days (-3, +3) around the announcement date (see text 
for details). Bank Lines of Credit Dummy equals one if an M&A is entirely financed by bank lines 
of credit, and equals zero otherwise. Mixed Lines & Cash Dummy equals one if an M&A is 
financed by a mix of bank lines of credit and corporate cash holdings, and equals zero otherwise. 
Relative Value is the ratio of deal value to the sum of the acquirer’s market value of equity and 
deal value. Hostile equals one if an M&A is hostile, and zero otherwise. Size is the logarithm of 
non-cash assets. Cash Flow is income before extraordinary items divided by non-cash assets. 
M/B is market value of equity plus non-cash assets minus book value of equity, divided by non-
cash assets. Leverage is the ratio of long-term debt to non-cash assets. Tangibility is the ratio of 
plant, property and equipment to non-cash assets. Capital Expenditure is the ratio of capital 
expenditure to non-cash assets. R&D is the ratio of R&D to non-cash assets. Dividends is the 
ratio of dividends to non-cash assets. Cash Flow Volatility is the standard deviation of cash flow 
to non-cash assets in the prior five years. Year Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for 
the years in the sample and not reported in the table. Industry Dummy Variables are the dummy 
variables for the industries defined by two-digit SIC codes and not reported in the table. The p-
value is calculated based on the Heteroscedasticity-Consistent standard errors, and is noted in 
the parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
  
 
  CAR (-3, +3) 
Intercept    0.158** 
 (0.05) 
Bank Lines of Credit Dummy     0.020*** 
 (0.01) 
Mixed Lines & Cash Dummy 0.005 
 (0.54) 
Relative Value   0.052* 
 (0.09) 
Hostile  -0.048* 
 (0.06) 
Size t-1   -0.004** 
 (0.05) 
Cash Flow t-1 0.043 
 (0.44) 
M/B t-1 -0.003 
 (0.38) 
Leverage t-1 -0.008 
 (0.65) 
Tangibility t-1 -0.008 
 (0.74) 
Capital Expenditure t-1 -0.021 
 (0.73) 
R&D t-1 -0.091 
 (0.16) 
Dividends t-1   -0.355** 
 (0.02) 
Cash Flow Volatility t-1 -0.021 
 (0.23) 
Year Dummy Variables Yes 
Industry Dummy Variables Yes 
Number of Observations 680 
Adjusted R-Square 0.09 
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Table 3.12B Acquirers with Multiple M&As — Net Changes in Operating 
Performance 
 
The table shows the relation between sources of financing and the changes in operating 
performance. ROA is the ratio of EBIT to non-cash assets. ∆ROA is the change in ROA from year 
t-1 to t+1. Net ∆ROA is the difference between an acquirer’s change in ROA and its matched 
comparable firm’s change in ROA from year t-1 to t+1. The comparable firms are matched by 
propensity score matching based on size, cash flow, market-to-book ratio, leverage, tangibility, 
capital expenditure, R&D, dividends and cash flow volatility (see text for details). Bank Lines of 
Credit Dummy equals one if an M&A is entirely financed by bank lines of credit, and equals zero 
otherwise.  Mixed Lines & Cash Dummy equals one if an M&A is financed by a mix of bank lines 
of credit and corporate cash holdings, and equals zero otherwise. Relative Value is the ratio of 
deal value to the sum of the acquirer’s market value of equity and deal value. Hostile equals one 
if an M&A is hostile, and zero otherwise. Size is the logarithm of non-cash assets. M/B is market 
value of equity plus non-cash assets minus book value of equity, divided by non-cash assets. 
Leverage is the ratio of long-term debt to non-cash assets. Tangibility is the ratio of plant, property 
and equipment to non-cash assets. Capital Expenditure is the ratio of capital expenditure to non-
cash assets. R&D is the ratio of R&D to non-cash assets. Dividends is the ratio of dividends to 
non-cash assets. Cash Flow Volatility is the standard deviation of cash flow to non-cash assets 
in the prior five years. Year Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for the years in the sample 
and not reported in the table. Industry Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for the 
industries defined by two-digit SIC codes and not reported in the table. The p-value is calculated 
based on the Heteroscedasticity-Consistent standard errors, and is noted in the parentheses. *, 
**, and *** represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
  ∆ROA Net ∆ROA 
Intercept    -0.350*** 0.173 
 (0.01) (0.33) 
Bank Lines of Credit Dummy   0.023*    0.045** 
 (0.06) (0.04) 
Mixed Lines & Cash Dummy 0.014 0.009 
 (0.20) (0.65) 
Relative Value -0.012 -0.065 
 (0.72) (0.28) 
Hostile -0.011 -0.001 
 (0.65) (0.99) 
Size t-1     0.012*** 0.005 
 (0.01) (0.45) 
ROA t-1    -0.520***    -0.521*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
M/B t-1 0.006 0.002 
 (0.22) (0.81) 
Leverage t-1     0.045*** 0.056 
 (0.01) (0.19) 
Tangibility t-1 -0.015 -0.094 
 (0.61) (0.10) 
Capital Expenditure t-1 -0.086 -0.057 
 (0.14) (0.62) 
R&D t-1 0.086 0.169 
 (0.36) (0.53) 
Dividends t-1 0.393 0.383 
 (0.13) (0.41) 
Cash Flow Volatility t-1 -0.041 -0.067 
 (0.13) (0.23) 
Year Dummy Variables Yes Yes 
Industry Dummy Variables Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 634 634 
Adjusted R-Square 0.33 0.28 
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Table 3.13 Completion Year 
 
The table shows the relation between sources of financing and the changes in operating 
performance. ∆ROA is the change in ROA from year t-1 to t+1, where ROA is the ratio of EBIT to 
non-cash assets. Net ∆ROA is the difference between an acquirer’s change in ROA and its 
matched comparable firm’s change in ROA from year t-1 to t+1 (t defines as the year of completion 
of an M&A), where ROA is the ratio of EBIT to non-cash assets. The comparable firms are 
matched by propensity score matching based on size, cash flow, market-to-book ratio, leverage, 
tangibility, capital expenditure, R&D, dividends and cash flow volatility (see text for details). ROA 
is the ratio of EBIT to non-cash assets. Bank Lines of Credit Dummy equals one if an M&A is 
entirely financed by bank lines of credit, and equals zero otherwise. Mixed Lines & Cash Dummy 
equals one if an M&A is financed by a mix of bank lines of credit and corporate cash holdings, 
and equals zero otherwise. Relative Value is the ratio of deal value to the sum of the acquirer’s 
market value of equity and deal value. Hostile equals one if an M&A is hostile, and zero otherwise. 
Size is the logarithm of non-cash assets. M/B is market value of equity plus non-cash assets 
minus book value of equity, divided by non-cash assets. Leverage is the ratio of long-term debt 
to non-cash assets. Tangibility is the ratio of plant, property and equipment to non-cash assets. 
Capital Expenditure is the ratio of capital expenditure to non-cash assets. R&D is the ratio of R&D 
to non-cash assets. Dividends is the ratio of dividends to non-cash assets. Cash Flow Volatility is 
the standard deviation of cash flow to non-cash assets in the prior five years. Year Dummy 
Variables are the dummy variables for the years in the sample and not reported in the table. 
Industry Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for the industries defined by two-digit SIC 
codes and not reported in the table. The p-value is calculated based on Heteroscedasticity-
Consistent standard errors, and is noted in the parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance 
levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  
 
  ∆ROA Net ∆ROA 
Intercept    -0.255*** -0.091 
 (0.01) (0.35) 
Bank Lines of Credit Dummy    0.021**   0.022* 
 (0.04) (0.08) 
Mixed Lines & Cash Dummy 0.011 0.005 
 (0.27) (0.70) 
Relative Value -0.018 0.010 
 (0.55) (0.80) 
Hostile -0.023 0.007 
 (0.37) (0.84) 
Size t-1     0.010*** 0.006 
 (0.01) (0.20) 
ROA t-1    -0.537***    -0.402*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
M/B t-1 0.007 -0.003 
 (0.29) (0.17) 
Leverage t-1     0.083***     0.101*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Tangibility t-1 -0.002 -0.007 
 (0.93) (0.82) 
Capital Expenditure t-1  -0.104*    -0.200*** 
 (0.07) (0.01) 
R&D t-1 0.124 0.082 
 (0.34) (0.55) 
Dividends t-1 0.255   0.329* 
 (0.11) (0.09) 
Cash Flow Volatility t-1 0.001 -0.010 
 (0.99) (0.79) 
Year Dummy Variables Yes Yes 
Industry Dummy Variables Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 670 670 
Adjusted R-Square 0.37 0.18 
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Table 3.14 Alternative Event Windows 
 
The table shows the relation between sources of financing and announcement returns. de are the 
cumulative abnormal returns over days (0, 0) and (-1, +1) around the announcement date. Bank 
Lines of Credit Dummy equals one if an M&A is entirely financed by bank lines of credit, and 
equals zero otherwise. Mixed Lines & Cash Dummy equals one if an M&A is financed by a mix of 
bank lines of credit and corporate cash holdings, and equals zero otherwise. Relative Value is the 
ratio of deal value to the sum of the acquirer’s market value of equity and deal value. Hostile 
equals one if an M&A is hostile, and zero otherwise. Size is the logarithm of non-cash assets. 
Cash Flow is income before extraordinary items divided by non-cash assets. M/B is market value 
of equity plus non-cash assets minus book value of equity, divided by non-cash assets. Leverage 
is the ratio of long-term debt to non-cash assets. Tangibility is the ratio of plant, property and 
equipment to non-cash assets. Capital Expenditure is the ratio of capital expenditure to non-cash 
assets. R&D is the ratio of R&D to non-cash assets. Dividends is the ratio of dividends to non-
cash assets. Cash Flow Volatility is the standard deviation of cash flow to non-cash assets in the 
prior five years. Year Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for the years in the sample and 
not reported in the table. Industry Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for the industries 
defined by two-digit SIC codes and not reported in the table. The p-value is calculated based on 
Heteroscedasticity-Consistent standard errors, and is noted in the parentheses. *, **, and *** 
represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  
 
  CAR (0, 0) CAR (-1, +1) 
Intercept    0.094**     0.145*** 
 (0.03) (0.01) 
Bank Lines of Credit Dummy     0.011***   0.010* 
 (0.01) (0.06) 
Mixed Lines & Cash Dummy 0.006 -0.001 
 (0.23) (0.96) 
Relative Value     0.043***     0.073*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Hostile    -0.017***    -0.037*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Size t-1 -0.002*    -0.004*** 
 (0.09) (0.01) 
Cash Flow t-1 0.004   -0.029** 
 (0.87) (0.05) 
M/B t-1 0.001 0.001 
 (0.74) (0.56) 
Leverage t-1 -0.001 0.008 
 (1.00) (0.49) 
Tangibility t-1 -0.001 -0.009 
 (0.94) (0.59) 
Capital Expenditure t-1 0.014 0.007 
 (0.60) (0.85) 
R&D t-1 0.028 0.030 
 (0.43) (0.30) 
Dividends t-1   -0.150**    -0.063*** 
 (0.04) (0.01) 
Cash Flow Volatility t-1 -0.012   -0.027** 
 (0.16) (0.04) 
Year Dummy Variables Yes Yes 
Industry Dummy Variables Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 723 723 
Adjusted R-Square 0.06 0.08 
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Table 3.15A Alternative Measure of Corporate Governance — 
Announcement Returns 
The table shows the sub-group analysis on the relation between sources of financing and 
announcement returns. CAR (-3, +3) is the cumulative abnormal return over days (-3, +3) around 
the announcement date (see text for details). Low (High) Corporate Governance indicates a firm’s 
institutional ownership is below (above) the median institutional ownership. Bank Lines of Credit 
Dummy equals one if an M&A is entirely financed by bank lines of credit, and equals zero 
otherwise. Mixed Lines & Cash Dummy equals one if an M&A is financed by a mix of bank lines 
of credit and corporate cash holdings, and equals zero otherwise. Relative Value is the ratio of 
deal value to the sum of the acquirer’s market value of equity and deal value. Hostile equals one 
if an M&A is hostile, and zero otherwise. Size is the logarithm of non-cash assets. Cash Flow is 
income before extraordinary items divided by non-cash assets. M/B is market value of equity plus 
non-cash assets minus book value of equity, divided by non-cash assets. Leverage is the ratio of 
long-term debt to non-cash assets. Tangibility is the ratio of plant, property and equipment to non-
cash assets. Capital Expenditure is the ratio of capital expenditure to non-cash assets. R&D is 
the ratio of R&D to non-cash assets. Dividends is the ratio of dividends to non-cash assets. Cash 
Flow Volatility is the standard deviation of cash flow to non-cash assets in the prior five years. 
Year Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for the years in the sample and not reported in 
the table. Industry Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for the industries defined by two-
digit SIC codes and not reported in the table. The p-value is calculated based on 
Heteroscedasticity-Consistent standard errors, and is noted in the parentheses. *, **, and *** 
represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  
 CAR (-3,+3) 
 Low Governance High Governance 
Intercept -0.046    0.141** 
 (0.53) (0.02) 
Bank Lines of Credit Dummy   0.018* 0.013 
 (0.08) (0.20) 
Mixed Lines & Cash Dummy -0.001 0.009 
 (0.91) (0.41) 
Relative Value     0.121*** -0.028 
 (0.01) (0.62) 
Hostile -0.054   -0.047** 
 (0.10) (0.05) 
Size t-1 -0.003  -0.005* 
 (0.36) (0.07) 
Cash Flow t-1 0.022 0.089 
 (0.75) (0.19) 
M/B t-1 0.002   -0.009** 
 (0.25) (0.02) 
Leverage t-1   0.038* -0.024 
 (0.06) (0.28) 
Tangibility t-1 -0.007 -0.016 
 (0.78) (0.58) 
Capital Expenditure t-1 0.014 -0.005 
 (0.80) (0.95) 
R&D t-1   -0.060** -0.050 
 (0.03) (0.49) 
Dividends t-1    -0.113*** 0.065 
 (0.01) (0.74) 
Cash Flow Volatility t-1 0.002 -0.024 
 (0.94) (0.38) 
Year Dummy Variables Yes Yes 
Industry Dummy Variables Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 362 361 
Adjusted R-Square 0.08 0.05 
 
186 
 
Table 3.15B Alternative Measure of Corporate Governance — Net Changes 
in Operating Performance 
The table shows the sub-group analysis on the relation between sources of financing and the net 
changes in operating performance. Net ∆ROA is the difference between an acquirer’s change in 
ROA and its matched comparable firm’s change in ROA from year t-1 to t+1, where ROA is the 
ratio of EBIT to non-cash assets. The comparable firms are matched by propensity score 
matching based on size, cash flow, market-to-book ratio, leverage, tangibility, capital expenditure, 
R&D, dividends and cash flow volatility (see text for details). Low (High) Corporate Governance 
indicates a firm’s institutional ownership is below (above) the median institutional ownership. Bank 
Lines of Credit Dummy equals one if an M&A is entirely financed by bank lines of credit, and 
equals zero otherwise. Mixed Lines & Cash Dummy equals one if an M&A is financed by a mix of 
bank lines of credit and corporate cash holdings, and equals zero otherwise. Relative Value is the 
ratio of deal value to the sum of the acquirer’s market value of equity and deal value. Hostile 
equals one if an M&A is hostile, and zero otherwise. Size is the logarithm of non-cash assets. 
M/B is market value of equity plus non-cash assets minus book value of equity, divided by non-
cash assets. Leverage is the ratio of long-term debt to non-cash assets. Tangibility is the ratio of 
plant, property and equipment to non-cash assets. Capital Expenditure is the ratio of capital 
expenditure to non-cash assets. R&D is the ratio of R&D to non-cash assets. Dividends is the 
ratio of dividends to non-cash assets. Cash Flow Volatility is the standard deviation of cash flow 
to non-cash assets in the prior five years. Year Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for 
the years in the sample and not reported in the table. Industry Dummy Variables are the dummy 
variables for the industries defined by two-digit SIC codes and not reported in the table. The p-
value is calculated based on Heteroscedasticity-Consistent standard errors, and is noted in the 
parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  
  Net ∆ROA 
  Low Governance High Governance 
Intercept -0.167 0.108 
 (0.30) (0.47) 
Bank Lines of Credit Dummy     0.073*** 0.001 
 (0.01) (0.96) 
Mixed Lines & Cash Dummy -0.011 0.012 
 (0.64) (0.58) 
Relative Value -0.003 -0.098 
 (0.96) (0.17) 
Hostile   -0.063** 0.027 
 (0.03) (0.66) 
Size t-1 0.012* -0.001 
 (0.06) (0.90) 
ROA t-1    -0.276***    -0.319*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
M/B t-1 0.001 -0.005 
 (0.96) (0.66) 
Leverage t-1 0.060 -0.001 
 (0.17) (0.98) 
Tangibility t-1  -0.100* 0.013 
 (0.07) (0.81) 
Capital Expenditure t-1 0.112 -0.146 
 (0.30) (0.33) 
R&D t-1 -0.192 0.021 
 (0.42) (0.91) 
Dividends t-1 -0.215 0.674 
 (0.66) (0.13) 
Cash Flow Volatility t-1     -0.169*** -0.013 
 (0.01) (0.81) 
Year Dummy Variables Yes Yes 
Industry Dummy Variables Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 344 332 
Adjusted R-Square 0.17 0.24 
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Table 3.16A The Public Status of Target Firms — Announcement Returns 
 
The table reports the impact of the public status of target firms on announcement returns. CAR (-
3, +3) is the cumulative abnormal return over days (-3, +3) around the announcement date (see 
text for details). Bank Lines of Credit Dummy equals one if an M&A is entirely financed by bank 
lines of credit, and equals zero otherwise. Mixed Lines & Cash Dummy equals one if an M&A is 
financed by a mix of bank lines of credit and corporate cash holdings, and equals zero otherwise. 
Public equals one if the target firm of an M&A is public firm. Relative Value is the ratio of deal 
value to the sum of the acquirer’s market value of equity and deal value. Hostile equals one if an 
M&A is hostile, and zero otherwise. Size is the logarithm of non-cash assets. Cash Flow is income 
before extraordinary items divided by non-cash assets. M/B is market value of equity plus non-
cash assets minus book value of equity, divided by non-cash assets. Leverage is the ratio of long-
term debt to non-cash assets. Tangibility is the ratio of plant, property and equipment to non-cash 
assets. Capital Expenditure is the ratio of capital expenditure to non-cash assets. R&D is the ratio 
of R&D to non-cash assets. Dividends is the ratio of dividends to non-cash assets. Cash Flow 
Volatility is the standard deviation of cash flow to non-cash assets in the prior five years. Year 
Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for the years in the sample and not reported in the 
table. Industry Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for the industries defined by two-digit 
SIC codes and not reported in the table. The p-value is calculated based on the 
Heteroscedasticity-Consistent standard errors, and is noted in the parentheses. *, **, and *** 
represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
  CAR (-3, +3) 
Intercept   0.149* 
 (0.06) 
Bank Lines of Credit Dummy     0.019*** 
 (0.01) 
Mixed Lines & Cash Dummy 0.004 
 (0.60) 
Public -0.003 
 (0.74) 
Relative Value 0.049 
 (0.10) 
Hostile  -0.049* 
 (0.06) 
Size t-1  -0.004* 
 (0.06) 
Cash Flow t-1 0.067 
 (0.21) 
M/B t-1 -0.004 
 (0.20) 
Leverage t-1 0.002 
 (0.91) 
Tangibility t-1 -0.009 
 (0.67) 
Capital Expenditure t-1 -0.041 
 (0.49) 
R&D t-1 -0.072 
 (0.27) 
Dividends t-1   -0.333** 
 (0.02) 
Cash Flow Volatility t-1 -0.020 
 (0.26) 
Year Dummy Variables Yes 
Industry Dummy Variables Yes 
Number of Observations 723 
Adjusted R-Square 0.09 
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Table 3.16B The Public Status of Target Firms — Net Changes in 
Operating Performance 
The table reports the impact of the public status of target firms on the changes in operating 
performance. Net ∆ROA is the difference between an acquirer’s change in ROA and its matched 
comparable firm’s change in ROA from year t-1 to t+1, where ROA is the ratio of EBIT to non-
cash assets. The comparable firms are matched by propensity score matching based on size, 
cash flow, market-to-book ratio, leverage, tangibility, capital expenditure, R&D, dividends and 
cash flow volatility (see text for details). Bank Lines of Credit Dummy equals one if an M&A is 
entirely financed by bank lines of credit, and equals zero otherwise. Mixed Lines & Cash Dummy 
equals one if an M&A is financed by a mix of bank lines of credit and corporate cash holdings, 
and equals zero otherwise. Public equals one if the target firm of an M&A is public firm. Relative 
Value is the ratio of deal value to the sum of the acquirer’s market value of equity and deal value. 
Hostile equals one if an M&A is hostile, and zero otherwise. Size is the logarithm of non-cash 
assets. M/B is market value of equity plus non-cash assets minus book value of equity, divided 
by non-cash assets. Leverage is the ratio of long-term debt to non-cash assets. Tangibility is the 
ratio of plant, property and equipment to non-cash assets. Capital Expenditure is the ratio of 
capital expenditure to non-cash assets. R&D is the ratio of R&D to non-cash assets. Dividends is 
the ratio of dividends to non-cash assets. Cash Flow Volatility is the standard deviation of cash 
flow to non-cash assets in the prior five years. Year Dummy Variables are the dummy variables 
for the years in the sample and not reported in the table. Industry Dummy Variables are the 
dummy variables for the industries defined by two-digit SIC codes and not reported in the table. 
The p-value is calculated based on Heteroscedasticity-Consistent standard errors, and is noted 
in the parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  
  ∆ROA Net ∆ROA 
Intercept   -0.248** 0.170 
 (0.02) (0.29) 
Bank Lines of Credit Dummy    0.023**    0.045** 
 (0.05) (0.03) 
Mixed Lines & Cash Dummy 0.012 0.013 
 (0.25) (0.52) 
Public 0.009 -0.027 
 (0.41) (0.22) 
Relative Value -0.001 -0.057 
 (0.99) (0.32) 
Hostile -0.018 0.011 
 (0.47) (0.77) 
Size t-1     0.011*** 0.006 
 (0.01) (0.27) 
ROA t-1    -0.535***    -0.529*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
M/B t-1 0.008 0.002 
 (0.20) (0.81) 
Leverage t-1     0.050*** 0.036 
 (0.01) (0.37) 
Tangibility t-1 -0.002 -0.082 
 (0.95) (0.12) 
Capital Expenditure t-1 -0.097 -0.035 
 (0.11) (0.74) 
R&D t-1 0.055 0.227 
 (0.69) (0.39) 
Dividends t-1 0.348 0.379 
 (0.16) (0.39) 
Cash Flow Volatility t-1 -0.039 -0.085 
 (0.12) (0.10) 
Year Dummy Variables Yes Yes 
Industry Dummy Variables Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 676 676 
Adjusted R-Square 0.35 0.29 
189 
 
Table 3.17 Alternative Comparable Firms 
 
The table shows the relation between sources of financing and the changes in operating 
performance. Net ∆ROA is the difference between an acquirer’s change in ROA and its matched 
comparable firm’s change in ROA from year t-1 to t+1, where ROA is the ratio of EBIT to non-
cash assets. The comparable firms are matched by propensity score matching using the “without 
replacement” method based on size, cash flow, market-to-book ratio, leverage, tangibility, capital 
expenditure, R&D, dividends and cash flow volatility (see text for details). ROA is the ratio of EBIT 
to non-cash assets. Bank Lines of Credit Dummy equals one if an M&A is entirely financed by 
bank lines of credit, and equals zero otherwise. Mixed Lines & Cash Dummy equals one if an 
M&A is financed by a mix of bank lines of credit and corporate cash holdings, and equals zero 
otherwise. Relative Value is the ratio of deal value to the sum of the acquirer’s market value of 
equity and deal value. Hostile equals one if an M&A is hostile, and zero otherwise. Size is the 
logarithm of non-cash assets. M/B is market value of equity plus non-cash assets minus book 
value of equity, divided by non-cash assets. Leverage is the ratio of long-term debt to non-cash 
assets. Tangibility is the ratio of plant, property and equipment to non-cash assets. Capital 
Expenditure is the ratio of capital expenditure to non-cash assets. R&D is the ratio of R&D to non-
cash assets. Dividends is the ratio of dividends to non-cash assets. Cash Flow Volatility is the 
standard deviation of cash flow to non-cash assets in the prior five years. Year Dummy Variables 
are the dummy variables for the years in the sample and not reported in the table. Industry Dummy 
Variables are the dummy variables for the industries defined by two-digit SIC codes and not 
reported in the table. The p-value is calculated based on Heteroscedasticity-Consistent standard 
errors, and is noted in the parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, 
and 1%, respectively.  
 
  Net ∆ROA 
Intercept 0.143 
 (0.59) 
Bank Lines of Credit Dummy    0.047** 
 (0.05) 
Mixed Lines & Cash Dummy 0.006 
 (0.83) 
Relative Value -0.062 
 (0.37) 
Hostile -0.017 
 (0.64) 
Size t-1 0.002 
 (0.84) 
ROA t-1    -0.765*** 
 (0.01) 
M/B t-1 -0.001 
 (0.98) 
Leverage t-1 -0.002 
 (0.97) 
Tangibility t-1 -0.078 
 (0.23) 
Capital Expenditure t-1  -0.197* 
 (0.09) 
R&D t-1 0.783 
 (0.12) 
Dividends t-1 0.186 
 (0.74) 
Cash Flow Volatility t-1 -0.026 
 (0.66) 
Year Dummy Variables Yes 
Industry Dummy Variables Yes 
Number of Observations 676 
Adjusted R-Square 0.35 
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Table 3.18 Institutional Ownership 
 
The table represents the coefficient estimates from regressions relates bank liquidity and firm 
characteristics. Total Line/ (Total Line + Cash) is the ratio of total lines of credit to the sum of total 
lines of credit and cash and marketable securities. Unused Line/ (Unused Line + Cash) is the ratio 
of unused lines of credit to the sum of unused lines of credit and cash and marketable securities. 
Institutional Ownership is the ratio of shares owned by institutional investors to the total shares 
outstanding. EBITDA is the ratio of EBITDA to non-cash assets. Tangibility is the ratio of plant, 
property and equipment to non-cash assets. Size is the logarithm of non-cash assets.  Net Worth 
is non-cash total assets less total liabilities, divided by non-cash assets. M/B is total assets less 
the book value of equity plus the market value of equity less cash, all divided by non-cash total 
assets. Industry Sales Volatility is the industry median standard deviation of sales based on 3-
digit SIC code. Cash Flow Volatility is the standard deviation of annual changes of EBITDA in the 
prior four years, scaled by average non-cash assets in the lagged period. Not in an S&P Index 
equals one if a firm is not in one of the S&P 500, the S&P Midcap 400 and the S&P Smallcap 600, 
and equals zero otherwise. Trade Over the Counter equals one if a firm is trade over the counter, 
and equals zero otherwise. Firm age is the logarithm of firm age. Regressions include year and 
two-digit industry indicator variables. *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 
1%, respectively.  
 
  Probit 
Total Line/ (Total 
Line + Cash) 
Unused Line/ 
(Unused Line + 
Cash) 
Institutional Ownership t-1 0.164 -0.054 -0.041 
 (0.66) (0.21) (0.35) 
EBITDA t-1   1.213*   0.207*   0.207* 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
Tangibilityt-1 0.973 0.070 0.059 
 (0.11) (0.34) (0.45) 
Size t-1     0.121***     0.033***     0.034*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Net Wortht-1 0.108 0.100* 0.073 
 (0.69) (0.07) (0.21) 
M/B t-1    -0.139***    -0.042***    -0.045*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Industry Sales Volatility t-1    41.529*** 0.040 0.248 
 (0.01) (0.96) (0.75) 
Cash Flow Volatility t-1    -4.726***    -1.008***    -0.976*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Not in an S&P Index t-1 0.172     0.138***     0.125*** 
 (0.52) (0.01) (0.01) 
Trade Over the Counter t-1 -0.581 0.043 0.051 
 (0.21) (0.40) (0.33) 
Firm age t-1    -0.434***    -0.040***    -0.047*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Number of Observations 492 492 492 
R-Square 0.37 0.86 0.84 
191 
 
Table 4.1A Summary Statistics: Firm Characteristics 
 
The table reports summary statistics. I use a sample of 449 U.S. M&As with cash payment from 
1985 to 2013. CAR (-3, +3) is the cumulative abnormal return over days (-3, +3) around the 
announcement date (see text for details). Relative Value is the ratio of deal value to the sum of 
the acquirer’s market value of equity and deal value. Cash is the ratio of cash and marketable 
securities to non-cash assets. ROA is the ratio of EBIT to non-cash assets. ΔROA is the change 
in ROA from year t-1 to t+1. Net ΔROA is the difference between an acquirer’s change in ROA 
and its matched comparable firm’s change in ROA from year t-1 to t+1. The comparable firms are 
matched by propensity score matching based on size, cash flow, market-to-book ratio, leverage, 
tangibility, capital expenditure, R&D, dividends and cash flow volatility (see text for details). 
Premium 1 is ratio of the offer price to the target share price one day prior to the acquisition 
announcement. Premium 2 is ratio of the offer price to the target share price one week prior to 
the acquisition announcement. Premium 3 is ratio of the offer price to the target share price four 
weeks prior to the acquisition announcement. Institutional Ownership is the ratio of shares owned 
by institutional investors to the total shares outstanding at the end of a quarter prior to the 
announcement. Size is the logarithm of non-cash assets. Cash Flow is income before 
extraordinary items divided by non-cash assets. M/B is market value of equity plus non-cash 
assets minus book value of equity, divided by non-cash assets. Leverage is the ratio of long-term 
debt to non-cash assets. Tangibility is the ratio of plant, property and equipment to non-cash 
assets. Capital Expenditure is the ratio of capital expenditure to non-cash assets. R&D is the ratio 
of R&D to non-cash assets. Dividends is the ratio of dividends to non-cash assets. Cash Flow 
Volatility is the standard deviation of cash flow to non-cash assets in the prior five years. 
 
Variable Mean 
25th 
Percentile 
Median 
75th 
Percentile 
Std Dev 
CAR (-3,+3) 0.0138 -0.0321 0.0055 0.0561 0.0885 
Relative Value 0.1469 0.0301 0.0911 0.1973 0.1619 
Cash 0.2562 0.0277 0.1085 0.3785 0.3011 
ROA 0.1206 0.0659 0.1134 0.1685 0.1060 
∆ROA -0.0181 -0.0564 -0.0116 0.0222 0.1053 
Net ∆ROA 0.0135 -0.0540 0.0149 0.0849 0.1395 
Premium1 0.3256 0.1308 0.2911 0.4815 0.3082 
Premium2 0.4116 0.1700 0.3850 0.6300 0.3549 
Premium3 0.4864 0.1700 0.4600 0.7000 0.4225 
Institutional Ownership 0.4139 0.0000 0.4361 0.7383 0.3452 
Size 20.0905 18.7508 20.0986 21.4275 2.1685 
Cash Flow 0.0670 0.0269 0.0587 0.1088 0.0830 
M/B 2.3038 1.2325 1.6722 2.5789 1.5677 
Leverage 0.2280 0.0335 0.1779 0.3599 0.2085 
Tangibility 0.3512 0.1397 0.2752 0.5192 0.2586 
Capital Expenditure 0.0819 0.0279 0.0523 0.0952 0.0885 
R&D 0.0360 0.0000 0.0000 0.0451 0.0654 
Dividends 0.0125 0.0000 0.0000 0.0189 0.0195 
Cash Flow Volatility 0.1201 0.0230 0.0474 0.1143 0.1908 
 
Table 4.1B Univariate Statistics 
 
 Number of Deals 
Corporate Cash Holdings 271 
Other Bank Loans 82 
Debt Issues 56 
Equity Issues 40 
Total 449 
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Table 4.2 Univariate Analysis of Announcement Returns 
 
The table reports the univariate analysis on announcement returns. CAR (-3, +3) is the cumulative 
abnormal return over days (-3, +3) around the announcement date (see text for details). Corporate 
Cash Holdings indicates the M&As entirely financed by corporate cash holdings. Other Bank 
Loans indicates the M&As entirely financed by other bank loans. Debt Issues indicates the M&As 
entirely financed by debt issues. Equity Issues indicates the M&As entirely financed by equity 
issues. I report the mean test and the Wilcoxon Signed Rank median test in the table. *, **, and 
*** represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
  Other Bank Loans 
Corporate Cash 
Holdings 
Difference 
 Mean Median Mean Median Mean p-value Median p-value 
CAR (-3,+3)  0.031 0.017 0.002 0.002 0.029*** (0.01) 0.015** (0.04) 
 Debts Issues 
Corporate Cash 
Holdings 
Difference 
  Mean Median Mean Median Mean p-value Median p-value 
CAR (-3,+3)  0.049 0.030 0.002 0.002 0.047*** (0.01) 0.028*** (0.01) 
  Equity Issues 
Corporate Cash 
Holdings 
Difference 
 Mean Median Mean Median Mean p-value Median p-value 
CAR (-3,+3)  0.011 -0.004 0.002 0.002 0.009 (0.50) -0.006 (0.69) 
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Table 4.3 Sources of Financing and Announcement Returns 
 
The table shows the relation between sources of financing and the performance of M&As. CAR 
(-3, +3) is the cumulative abnormal return over days (-3, +3) around the announcement date (see 
text for details). Other Bank Loans Dummy equals one if an M&A is entirely financed by bank 
loans other than bank lines of credit, and equals zero otherwise. Debt Issues Dummy equals one 
if an M&A is entirely financed by debt issues, and equals zero otherwise. Equity Issues Dummy 
equals one if an M&A is entirely financed by equity issues, and equals zero otherwise. Relative 
Value is the ratio of deal value to the sum of the acquirer’s market value of equity and deal value. 
Hostile equals one if an M&A is hostile, and zero otherwise. Size is the logarithm of non-cash 
assets. Cash Flow is income before extraordinary items divided by non-cash assets. M/B is 
market value of equity plus non-cash assets minus book value of equity, divided by non-cash 
assets. Leverage is the ratio of long-term debt to non-cash assets. Tangibility is the ratio of plant, 
property and equipment to non-cash assets. Capital Expenditure is the ratio of capital expenditure 
to non-cash assets. R&D is the ratio of R&D to non-cash assets. Dividends is the ratio of dividends 
to non-cash assets. Cash Flow Volatility is the standard deviation of cash flow to non-cash assets 
in the prior five years. Year Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for the years in the sample 
and not reported in the table. Industry Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for the 
industries defined by two-digit SIC codes and not reported in the table. The p-value is calculated 
based on Heteroscedasticity-Consistent standard errors, and is noted in the parentheses. *, **, 
and *** represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  
 
  CAR (-3, +3) 
Intercept 0.070 
 (0.26) 
Other Bank Loans Dummy   0.021* 
 (0.08) 
Debt Issues Dummy    0.028** 
 (0.05) 
Equity Issues Dummy 0.009 
 (0.62) 
Relative Value     0.142*** 
 (0.01) 
Hostile -0.015 
 (0.64) 
Size t-1 -0.004 
 (0.17) 
Cash Flow t-1 0.006 
 (0.92) 
M/B t-1 -0.001 
 (0.91) 
Leverage t-1 0.017 
 (0.57) 
Tangibility t-1 0.003 
 (0.93) 
Capital Expenditure t-1 -0.114 
 (0.33) 
R&D t-1 -0.006 
 (0.76) 
Dividends t-1 -0.038 
 (0.56) 
Cash Flow Volatility t-1    -0.086*** 
 (0.01) 
Year Dummy Variables Yes 
Industry Dummy Variables Yes 
Number of Observations 449 
Adjusted R-Square 0.13 
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Table 4.4A Propensity Score Matching  
 
The table shows the results for the propensity score matching. I use a logistic regression. There 
are 449 observations of acquirers and 14322 observations of non-acquirers from the Compustat 
database. I match each acquirer firm with a non-acquirer firm by propensity score matching. I 
define non-acquirers as the firms that do not have any M&As in the same fiscal year as the 
acquirers. Matched firms are selected based on nearest propensity score and the same industry 
defined by the 2-digit SIC code.  
 
The dependent variable is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm is an acquirer, and equals 
zero otherwise. Size is the logarithm of non-cash assets. M/B is non-cash assets minus value of 
equity plus market value of equity, divided by non-cash assets. Cash Flow is income before 
extraordinary items divided by non-cash assets. Leverage is the ratio of long-term debt to non-
cash assets. Tangibility is the ratio of plant, property and equipment to non-cash assets. Capital 
Expenditure is the ratio of capital expenditure to non-cash assets. R&D is the ratio of R&D to non-
cash assets. Dividends is the ratio of dividends to non-cash assets. Cash Flow Volatility is the 
standard deviation of cash flow to non-cash assets in the prior five years. The p-value is noted in 
the parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
 Acquirer=1, Non-acquirer=0 
Intercept    11.555*** 
 (0.01) 
Size t-1    -0.474*** 
 (0.01) 
M/B t-1    0.053** 
 (0.02) 
Cash Flow t-1    -3.802*** 
 (0.01) 
Leverage t-1 -0.469 
 (0.10) 
Tangibility t-1     0.769*** 
 (0.01) 
Capital Expenditure t-1    1.315** 
 (0.05) 
R&D t-1   -1.164** 
 (0.03) 
Dividends t-1     7.011*** 
 (0.01) 
Cash Flow Volatility t-1     1.441*** 
 (0.01) 
Number of Observations 14771 
Pseudo R-Square 0.06 
 
 
Table 4.4B Differences in Propensity Score Matching 
 
The table shows the univariate statistics about the difference in propensity score between 
acquiring firms and their matched non-acquiring firm. 
 
  
Difference in the propensity score between acquirer firms and their 
matched non-acquiring firms 
  Mean 
25th 
Percentile 
Median 
75th 
Percentile 
Std Dev 
Propensity Score 0.050 0.003 0.017 0.062 0.078 
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Table 4.4C Sources of Financing and Changes in Operating Performance 
 
The table shows the relation between sources of financing and the changes in operating 
performance. ROA is the ratio of EBIT to non-cash assets. ∆ROA is the change in ROA from year 
t-1 to t+1. Net ∆ROA is the difference between an acquirer’s change in ROA and its matched 
comparable firm’s change in ROA from year t-1 to t+1. The comparable firms are matched by 
propensity score matching based on size, cash flow, market-to-book ratio, leverage, tangibility, 
capital expenditure, R&D, dividends and cash flow volatility (see text for details). Other Bank 
Loans Dummy equals one if an M&A is entirely financed by bank loans other than bank lines of 
credit, and equals zero otherwise. Debt Issues Dummy equals one if an M&A is entirely financed 
by debt issues, and equals zero otherwise.  Equity Issues Dummy equals one if an M&A is entirely 
financed by equity issues, and equals zero otherwise.  Relative Value is the ratio of deal value to 
the sum of the acquirer’s market value of equity and deal value. Hostile equals one if an M&A is 
hostile, and zero otherwise. Size is the logarithm of non-cash assets. M/B is market value of equity 
plus non-cash assets minus book value of equity, divided by non-cash assets. Leverage is the 
ratio of long-term debt to non-cash assets. Tangibility is the ratio of plant, property and equipment 
to non-cash assets. Capital Expenditure is the ratio of capital expenditure to non-cash assets. 
R&D is the ratio of R&D to non-cash assets. Dividends is the ratio of dividends to non-cash assets. 
Cash Flow Volatility is the standard deviation of cash flow to non-cash assets in the prior five 
years. Year Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for the years in the sample and not 
reported in the table. Industry Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for the industries 
defined by two-digit SIC codes and not reported in the table. The p-value is calculated based on 
the Heteroscedasticity-Consistent standard errors, and is noted in the parentheses. *, **, and *** 
represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
  ∆ROA Net ∆ROA 
Intercept -0.078 0.457*** 
 (0.57) (0.01) 
Other Bank Loans Dummy     0.043***   0.043* 
 (0.01) (0.06) 
Debt Issues Dummy 0.027* 0.051* 
 (0.06) (0.08) 
Equity Issues Dummy -0.019 0.049 
 (0.57) (0.39) 
Relative Value -0.023   -0.195** 
 (0.74) (0.03) 
Hostile 0.017 0.002 
 (0.72) (0.95) 
Size t-1 0.006 -0.011 
 (0.23) (0.11) 
ROA t-1    -0.697***    -0.679*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
M/B t-1 0.011    -0.009*** 
 (0.16) (0.01) 
Leverage t-1 0.038 -0.041 
 (0.27) (0.43) 
Tangibility t-1 -0.042 -0.012 
 (0.35) (0.84) 
Capital Expenditure t-1   -0.257* -0.270 
 (0.06) (0.14) 
R&D t-1 0.242 0.215 
 (0.11) (0.32) 
Dividends t-1 0.180 0.801 
 (0.10) (0.24) 
Cash Flow Volatility t-1 -0.056 -0.005 
 (0.11) (0.96) 
Year Dummy Variables Yes Yes 
Industry Dummy Variables Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 425 425 
Adjusted R-Square 0.54 0.33 
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Table 4.5 The Choice of Sources of Financing 
 
The table reports the multinomial logistic regression. The dependent variable is categorical. It 
equals zero if an M&A is entirely financed by corporate cash holdings, equals one if an M&A is 
financed entirely other bank loans, equals two if an M&A is entirely financed by debt issues, and 
equals three if an M&A is entirely financed by equity issues. Relative Value is the ratio of deal 
value to the sum of the acquirer’s market value of equity and deal value. Hostile equals one if an 
M&A is hostile, and zero otherwise. Cash is the ratio of cash and marketable securities to non-
cash assets. Institutional Ownership is the ratio of shares owned by institutional investors to the 
total shares outstanding. Size is the logarithm of non-cash assets. Cash Flow is income before 
extraordinary items divided by non-cash assets. M/B is market value of equity plus non-cash 
assets minus book value of equity, divided by non-cash assets. Leverage is the ratio of long-term 
debt to non-cash assets. Tangibility is the ratio of plant, property and equipment to non-cash 
assets. Capital Expenditure is the ratio of capital expenditure to non-cash assets. R&D is the ratio 
of R&D to non-cash assets. Dividends is the ratio of dividends to non-cash assets. Cash Flow 
Volatility is the standard deviation of cash flow to non-cash assets in the prior five years. Year 
Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for the years in the sample and not reported in the 
table. Industry Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for the industries defined by two-digit 
SIC codes and not reported in the table. The p-value is noted in the parentheses. *, **, and *** 
represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
  Cash=0, Other Bank Loans=1, Debt Issues=2, Equity Issues=3 
  1 2 3 
Intercept -2.446 -4.388 -7.580 
 (0.43) (0.22) (0.71) 
Relative Value     8.993***     9.108***   3.660* 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.07) 
Hostile -0.987 -9.275 -3.910 
 (0.51) (0.76) (0.94) 
Cash t-1    -3.585***    -3.677*** -0.376 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.73) 
Institutional Ownership t-1 -0.431 -0.948 -0.884 
 (0.52) (0.21) (0.25) 
Size t-1 -0.048 -0.033 -0.117 
 (0.71) (0.83) (0.49) 
Cash Flow t-1    7.487** 1.853 -4.417 
 (0.05) (0.64) (0.22) 
M/B t-1 -0.269 0.169 0.216 
 (0.30) (0.43) (0.38) 
Leverage t-1   2.029* -0.385 -0.322 
 (0.08) (0.76) (0.81) 
Tangibility t-1 1.84    3.70**     5.12*** 
 (0.14) (0.02) (0.01) 
Capital Expenditure t-1 1.604 -0.443   -5.883* 
 (0.62) (0.91) (0.09) 
R&D t-1 -2.057 -0.199 -1.605 
 (0.68) (0.90) (0.37) 
Dividends t-1 -19.201 2.941 -16.009 
 (0.18) (0.83) (0.33) 
Cash Flow Volatility t-1 0.435 0.897 2.271 
 (0.78) (0.57) (0.13) 
Year Dummy Variables Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummy Variables Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 353 327 311 
Pseudo R-Square 0.63 0.63 0.63 
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Table 4.6 Acquisition Premiums 
 
The table reports the impact of source of financing on acquisition premiums. Premiums 1 is the 
offer price to the target share price premiums one day prior to the acquisition announcement. 
Premiums 2 is the offer price to the target share price premiums one week prior to the acquisition 
announcement. Premiums 3 is the offer price to the target share price premiums four weeks prior 
to the acquisition announcement. Other Bank Loans Dummy equals one if an M&A is entirely 
financed by bank loans other than bank lines of credit, and equals zero otherwise. Debt Issues 
Dummy equals one if an M&A is entirely financed by debt issues, and equals zero otherwise. 
Equity Issues Dummy equals one if an M&A is entirely financed by equity issues, and equals zero 
otherwise. Relative Value is the ratio of deal value to the sum of the acquirer’s market value of 
equity and deal value. Hostile equals one if an M&A is hostile, and zero otherwise. Size is the 
logarithm of non-cash assets. Cash Flow is income before extraordinary items divided by non-
cash assets. M/B is market value of equity plus non-cash assets minus book value of equity, 
divided by non-cash assets. Leverage is the ratio of long-term debt to non-cash assets. Tangibility 
is the ratio of plant, property and equipment to non-cash assets. Capital Expenditure is the ratio 
of capital expenditure to non-cash assets. R&D is the ratio of R&D to non-cash assets. Dividends 
is the ratio of dividends to non-cash assets. Cash Flow Volatility is the standard deviation of cash 
flow to non-cash assets in the prior five years. Year Dummy Variables are the dummy variables 
for the years in the sample and not reported in the table. Industry Dummy Variables are the 
dummy variables for the industries defined by two-digit SIC codes and not reported in the table. 
The p-value is calculated based on Heteroscedasticity-Consistent standard errors, and is noted 
in the parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  
  Premiums 1 Premiums 2 Premiums 2 
Intercept -0.347 0.356 0.988 
 (0.57) (0.60) (0.21) 
Other Bank Loans Dummy   -0.206**    -0.309***    -0.318** 
 (0.04) (0.01) (0.02) 
Debt Issues Dummy  -0.196* -0.234*  -0.303* 
 (0.07) (0.08) (0.06) 
Equity Issues Dummy -0.214 -0.246 -0.216 
 (0.35) (0.20) (0.20) 
Relative Value 0.406 0.473 -0.118 
 (0.20) (0.20) (0.76) 
Hostile 0.099 0.271* 0.310* 
 (0.57) (0.06) (0.07) 
Size t-1 0.036 0.026 0.014 
 (0.14) (0.28) (0.61) 
Cash Flow t-1 -0.342 -0.379 0.814 
 (0.52) (0.50) (0.25) 
M/B t-1    0.071**     0.088*** 0.047 
 (0.03) (0.01) (0.23) 
Leverage t-1 0.253 0.198 0.262 
 (0.24) (0.37) (0.33) 
Tangibility t-1 0.289 0.525 -0.103 
 (0.45) (0.15) (0.78) 
Capital Expenditure t-1    -2.087***   -2.256**     -2.351*** 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
R&D t-1 -0.069 -0.340 1.186 
 (0.82) (0.62) (0.14) 
Dividends t-1 5.204 1.699 3.486 
 (0.11) (0.37) (0.21) 
Cash Flow Volatility t-1 -0.040 -0.254 0.028 
 (0.86) (0.32) (0.93) 
Year Dummy Variables Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummy Variables Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 125 125 125 
Adjusted R-Square 0.10 0.28 0.23 
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Table 4.7A Sub-Group Analysis based on Block Institutional Ownership — 
Announcement Returns 
The table shows the sub-group analysis on the relation between sources of financing and 
announcement returns. CAR (-3, +3) is the cumulative abnormal return over days (-3, +3) around 
the announcement date (see text for details). Block equals one if there exists a block institutional 
ownership which exceeds 5% of the total shares outstanding, and equals zero otherwise. Other 
Bank Loans Dummy equals one if an M&A is entirely financed by bank loans other than bank 
lines of credit, and equals zero otherwise. Debt Issues Dummy equals one if an M&A is entirely 
financed by debt issues, and equals zero otherwise. Equity Issues Dummy equals one if an M&A 
is entirely financed by equity issues, and equals zero otherwise. Relative Value is the ratio of deal 
value to the sum of the acquirer’s market value of equity and deal value. Hostile equals one if an 
M&A is hostile, and zero otherwise. Size is the logarithm of non-cash assets. Cash Flow is income 
before extraordinary items divided by non-cash assets. M/B is market value of equity plus non-
cash assets minus book value of equity, divided by non-cash assets. Leverage is the ratio of long-
term debt to non-cash assets. Tangibility is the ratio of plant, property and equipment to non-cash 
assets. Capital Expenditure is the ratio of capital expenditure to non-cash assets. R&D is the ratio 
of R&D to non-cash assets. Dividends is the ratio of dividends to non-cash assets. Cash Flow 
Volatility is the standard deviation of cash flow to non-cash assets in the prior five years. Year 
Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for the years in the sample and not reported in the 
table. Industry Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for the industries defined by two-digit 
SIC codes and not reported in the table. The p-value is calculated based on Heteroscedasticity-
Consistent standard errors, and is noted in the parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance 
levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  
  CAR (-3, +3) 
  Block=0 Block=1 
Intercept 0.048 -0.014 
 (0.52) (0.89) 
Other Bank Loans Dummy   0.033* 0.010 
 (0.07) (0.60) 
Debt Issues Dummy    0.038** 0.007 
 (0.05) (0.71) 
Equity Issues Dummy 0.020 0.001 
 (0.48) (0.95) 
Relative Value    0.151**    0.121** 
 (0.02) (0.03) 
Hostile 0.038     -0.101*** 
 (0.20) (0.01) 
Size t-1 -0.002 -0.003 
 (0.62) (0.43) 
Cash Flow t-1 -0.013 -0.017 
 (0.22) (0.68) 
M/B t-1 0.001 -0.002 
 (0.39) (0.66) 
Leverage t-1 0.047 0.005 
 (0.15) (0.84) 
Tangibility t-1 -0.063 0.023 
 (0.11) (0.48) 
Capital Expenditure t-1 -0.066 -0.052 
 (0.44) (0.54) 
R&D t-1   0.230* -0.046 
 (0.07) (0.41) 
Dividends t-1 -0.018 -0.101 
 (0.96) (0.15) 
Cash Flow Volatility t-1   -0.108**   -0.051* 
 (0.02) (0.08) 
Year Dummy Variables Yes Yes 
Industry Dummy Variables Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 202 247 
Adjusted R-Square 0.14 0.11 
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Table 4.7B Sub-Group Analysis Based on Block Institutional Ownership — 
Net Changes in Operating Performance 
The table shows the sub-group analysis on the relation between sources of financing and the net 
changes in operating performance. Net ∆ROA is the difference between an acquirer’s change in 
ROA and its matched comparable firm’s change in ROA from year t-1 to t+1, where ROA is the 
ratio of EBIT to non-cash assets. The comparable firms are matched by propensity score 
matching based on size, cash flow, market-to-book ratio, leverage, tangibility, capital expenditure, 
R&D, dividends and cash flow volatility (see text for details). Block equals one if there exists a 
block institutional ownership which exceeds 5% of the total shares outstanding, and equals zero 
otherwise. Other Bank Loans Dummy equals one if an M&A is entirely financed by bank loans 
other than bank lines of credit, and equals zero otherwise. Debt Issues Dummy equals one if an 
M&A is entirely financed by debt issues, and equals zero otherwise. Equity Issues Dummy equals 
one if an M&A is entirely financed by equity issues, and equals zero otherwise. Relative Value is 
the ratio of deal value to the sum of the acquirer’s market value of equity and deal value. Hostile 
equals one if an M&A is hostile, and zero otherwise. Size is the logarithm of non-cash assets. 
M/B is market value of equity plus non-cash assets minus book value of equity, divided by non-
cash assets. Leverage is the ratio of long-term debt to non-cash assets. Tangibility is the ratio of 
plant, property and equipment to non-cash assets. Capital Expenditure is the ratio of capital 
expenditure to non-cash assets. R&D is the ratio of R&D to non-cash assets. Dividends is the 
ratio of dividends to non-cash assets. Cash Flow Volatility is the standard deviation of cash flow 
to non-cash assets in the prior five years. Year Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for 
the years in the sample and not reported in the table. Industry Dummy Variables are the dummy 
variables for the industries defined by two-digit SIC codes and not reported in the table. The p-
value is calculated based on Heteroscedasticity-Consistent standard errors, and is noted in the 
parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  
  Net ∆ROA 
  Block=0 Block=1 
Intercept -0.264     1.072***  
(0.28) (0.01) 
Other Bank Loans Dummy    0.110** 0.043  
(0.02) (0.26) 
Debt Issues Dummy     0.179*** 0.041 
 (0.01) (0.33) 
Equity Issues Dummy 0.113 -0.065 
 (0.22) (0.23) 
Relative Value -0.133 -0.306  
(0.32) (0.13) 
Hostile -0.013 0.049  
(0.86) (0.54) 
Size t-1 0.017   -0.037** 
 (0.14) (0.02) 
ROA t-1     -0.594***    -1.476***  
(0.01) (0.01) 
M/B t-1 0.006 -0.004 
 (0.64) (0.79) 
Leverage t-1 -0.106 -0.102 
 (0.21) (0.39) 
Tangibility t-1 -0.112 -0.037 
 (0.32) (0.71) 
Capital Expenditure t-1   -0.695** -0.330 
 (0.03) (0.23) 
R&D t-1 -0.187 0.653 
 (0.57) (0.17) 
Dividends t-1 -0.732  1.470* 
 (0.10) (0.09) 
Cash Flow Volatility t-1 -0.051 -0.089 
 (0.66) (0.36) 
Year Dummy Variables Yes Yes 
Industry Dummy Variables Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 199 226 
Adjusted R-Square 0.26 0.25 
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Table 4.7C Sub-Group Analysis Based on Block Institutional Ownership — 
Acquisition Premiums 
The table shows the sub-group analysis on the sources of financing and acquisition premiums. 
Premiums 1 is the offer price to the target share price premiums one day prior to the acquisition 
announcement. Premiums 2 is the offer price to the target share price premiums one week prior 
to the acquisition announcement. Premiums 3 is the offer price to the target share price premiums 
four weeks prior to the acquisition announcement. Block equals one if there exists a block 
institutional ownership which exceeds 5% of the total shares outstanding, and equals zero 
otherwise. Other Bank Loans Dummy equals one if an M&A is entirely financed by bank loans 
other than bank lines of credit, and equals zero otherwise. Debt Issues Dummy equals one if an 
M&A is entirely financed by debt issues, and equals zero otherwise. Equity Issues Dummy equals 
one if an M&A is entirely financed by equity issues, and equals zero otherwise. Relative Value is 
the ratio of deal value to the sum of the acquirer’s market value of equity and deal value. Hostile 
equals one if an M&A is hostile, and zero otherwise. Size is the logarithm of non-cash assets. 
Cash Flow is income before extraordinary items divided by non-cash assets. M/B is market value 
of equity plus non-cash assets minus book value of equity, divided by non-cash assets. Leverage 
is the ratio of long-term debt to non-cash assets. Tangibility is the ratio of plant, property and 
equipment to non-cash assets. Capital Expenditure is the ratio of capital expenditure to non-cash 
assets. R&D is the ratio of R&D to non-cash assets. Dividends is the ratio of dividends to non-
cash assets. Cash Flow Volatility is the standard deviation of cash flow to non-cash assets in the 
prior five years. Year Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for the years in the sample and 
not reported in the table. Industry Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for the industries 
defined by two-digit SIC codes and not reported in the table. The p-value is calculated based on 
Heteroscedasticity-Consistent standard errors, and is noted in the parentheses. *, **, and *** 
represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  
  Premiums 1 Premiums 2 Premiums 3 
  Block=0 Block=1 Block=0 Block=1 Block=0 Block=1 
Intercept 1.280 -0.114 0.712 -0.657    2.668** -0.390 
 (0.15) (0.90) (0.52) (0.44) (0.05) (0.75) 
Other Bank Loans Dummy   -0.292* -0.132   -0.341* -0.220  -0.335* -0.246 
 (0.06) (0.70) (0.07) (0.42) (0.07) (0.32) 
Debt Issues Dummy    -0.480*** 0.017    -0.459*** -0.315   -0.470** -0.274 
 (0.01) (0.93) (0.01) (0.23) (0.05) (0.22) 
Equity Issues Dummy -0.217 0.210 -0.314 -0.066 -0.178 -0.219 
 (0.50) (0.43) (0.37) (0.80) (0.67) (0.42) 
Relative Value -0.756 0.689 -0.719 0.515  -2.009*** 1.088 
 (0.13) (0.44) (0.20) (0.45) (0.01) (0.11) 
Hostile 0.017 0.297    0.232** 0.118   0.448** -0.091 
 (0.83) (0.41) (0.03) (0.75) (0.04) (0.78) 
Size t-1 -0.029   0.089* 0.020  0.124*** -0.046    0.130** 
 (0.38) (0.08) (0.62) (0.01) (0.31) (0.05) 
Cash Flow t-1 -0.561 -0.460    -1.972*** 0.249 -0.536 0.340 
 (0.33) (0.41) (0.01) (0.74) (0.54) (0.72) 
M/B t-1     0.113*** 0.066    0.157*** 0.040 0.104 -0.007 
 (0.01) (0.11) (0.01) (0.55) (0.10) (0.92) 
Leverage t-1  0.817*  1.392*** 0.561 0.518* -0.016 0.390 
 (0.06) (0.01) (0.22) (0.09) (0.97) (0.21) 
Tangibility t-1 0.461  -1.822** 0.618 -0.330 0.251 -0.429 
 (0.28) (0.03) (0.16) (0.65) (0.57) (0.56) 
Capital Expenditure t-1    -3.068***    2.895**    -3.208*** -0.774  -3.256*** -0.214 
 (0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.62) (0.01) (0.89) 
R&D t-1 -0.589 0.905 -1.660* 1.258 -1.076    3.021** 
 (0.45) (0.23) (0.06) (0.18) (0.28) (0.02) 
Dividends t-1 2.927 10.083 0.790 8.689 2.994 4.388 
 (0.15) (0.14) (0.69) (0.22) (0.24) (0.40) 
Cash Flow Volatility t-1 0.288 -0.140 0.336 0.072   1.222** -0.197 
 (0.33) (0.67) (0.33) (0.81) (0.05) (0.58) 
Year Dummy Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummy Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 59 66 59 66 59 66 
Adjusted R-Square 0.27 0.24 0.25 0.16 0.38 0.18 
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Table 4.8A Heckman Two-Stage Estimation — Second Stage: 
Announcement Returns 
The table shows the second stage of Heckman two-stage estimation. CAR (-3, +3) is the 
cumulative abnormal return over days (-3, +3) around the announcement date (see text for 
details). Other Bank Loans Dummy equals one if an M&A is entirely financed by bank loans other 
than bank lines of credit, and equals zero otherwise. Debt Issues Dummy equals one if an M&A 
is entirely financed by debt issues, and equals zero otherwise. Equity Issues Dummy equals one 
if an M&A is entirely financed by equity issues, and equals zero otherwise. Relative Value is the 
ratio of deal value to the sum of the acquirer’s market value of equity and deal value. Hostile 
equals one if an M&A is hostile, and zero otherwise. Size is the logarithm of non-cash assets. 
Cash Flow is income before extraordinary items divided by non-cash assets. M/B is market value 
of equity plus non-cash assets minus book value of equity, divided by non-cash assets. Leverage 
is the ratio of long-term debt to non-cash assets. Tangibility is the ratio of plant, property and 
equipment to non-cash assets. Capital Expenditure is the ratio of capital expenditure to non-cash 
assets. R&D is the ratio of R&D to non-cash assets. Dividends is the ratio of dividends to non-
cash assets. Cash Flow Volatility is the standard deviation of cash flow to non-cash assets in the 
prior five years. Inverse Mills Ratio1 is calculated based on the estimates in the logistic regression 
as reported Table 4.4A. Inverse Mills Ratio 2 is calculated based on the estimates in the 
multinomial logistic regression as reported in Table 4.5. Year Dummy Variables are the dummy 
variables for the years in the sample and not reported in the table. Industry Dummy Variables are 
the dummy variables for the industries defined by two-digit SIC codes and not reported in the 
table. The p-value is calculated based on Heteroscedasticity-Consistent standard errors, and is 
noted in the parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, 
respectively.  
  CAR (-3, +3) 
Intercept 0.123 0.051 0.154 
 (0.12) (0.57) (0.21) 
Other Bank Loans Dummy   0.029*   
 (0.08)   
Debt Issues Dummy    0.039*  
  (0.07)  
Equity Issues Dummy   -0.027 
   (0.33) 
Relative Value      0.109*** 0.094   0.107* 
 (0.01) (0.12) (0.08) 
Hostile -0.008 -0.005 -0.050 
 (0.84) (0.90) (0.21) 
Size t-1  -0.007* -0.004 -0.008 
 (0.08) (0.34) (0.17) 
Cash Flow t-1 0.028 0.008 0.015 
 (0.65) (0.89) (0.82) 
M/B t-1 0.001 0.004 -0.001 
 (0.97) (0.33) (0.97) 
Leverage t-1 0.020 0.046 0.005 
 (0.44) (0.12) (0.87) 
Tangibility t-1 0.020 0.002 0.001 
 (0.47) (0.95) (0.99) 
Capital Expenditure t-1 -0.111 -0.030 -0.077 
 (0.17) (0.75) (0.42) 
R&D t-1 -0.008 -0.090 -0.055 
 (0.90) (0.26) (0.49) 
Dividends t-1 -0.147  -0.341* -0.123 
 (0.44) (0.09) (0.61) 
Cash Flow Volatility t-1 -0.040   -0.071**   -0.057** 
 (0.13) (0.02) (0.05) 
Inverse Mills Ratio 1 0.036 0.007 0.031 
 (0.28) (0.85) (0.47) 
Inverse Mills Ratio 2 -0.012 -0.001 0.022 
 (0.20) (0.89) (0.10) 
Year Dummy Variables Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummy Variables Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 353 327 311 
Adjusted R-Square 0.12 0.13 0.04 
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Table 4.8B Heckman Two-Stage Estimation — Second Stage: Net Changes in 
Operating Performance 
The table shows the second stage of Heckman two-stage estimation. Net ∆ROA is the difference 
between an acquirer’s changes in ROA and its matched comparable firm’s change in ROA from year 
t-1 to t+1, where ROA is the ratio of EBIT to non-cash assets. The comparable firms are matched by 
propensity score matching based on size, cash flow, market-to-book ratio, leverage, tangibility, capital 
expenditure, R&D, dividends and cash flow volatility (see text for details). Other Bank Loans Dummy 
equals one if an M&A is entirely financed by bank loans other than bank lines of credit, and equals 
zero otherwise. Debt Issues Dummy equals one if an M&A is entirely financed by debt issues, and 
equals zero otherwise. Equity Issues Dummy equals one if an M&A is entirely financed by equity issues, 
and equals zero otherwise. Relative Value is the ratio of deal value to the sum of the acquirer’s market 
value of equity and deal value. Hostile equals one if an M&A is hostile, and zero otherwise. Size is the 
logarithm of non-cash assets. M/B is market value of equity plus non-cash assets minus book value of 
equity, divided by non-cash assets. Leverage is the ratio of long-term debt to non-cash assets. 
Tangibility is the ratio of plant, property and equipment to non-cash assets. Capital Expenditure is the 
ratio of capital expenditure to non-cash assets. R&D is the ratio of R&D to non-cash assets. Dividends 
is the ratio of dividends to non-cash assets. Cash Flow Volatility is the standard deviation of cash flow 
to non-cash assets in the prior five years. Inverse Mills Ratio1 is calculated based on the estimates in 
the logistic regression as reported in Table 4.4A. Inverse Mills Ratio 2 is calculated based on the 
estimates in the multinomial logistic regression as reported in Table 4.5. Year Dummy Variables are 
the dummy variables for the years in the sample and not reported in the table. Industry Dummy 
Variables are the dummy variables for the industries defined by two-digit SIC codes and not reported 
in the table. The p-value is calculated based on Heteroscedasticity-Consistent standard errors, and is 
noted in the parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  
  Net ∆ROA 
Intercept 0.199 0.056 0.050 
 (0.44) (0.80) (0.87) 
Other Bank Loans Dummy   0.078*   
 (0.06)   
Debt Issues Dummy    0.085*  
  (0.07)  
Equity Issues Dummy   0.035 
   (0.78) 
Relative Value -0.147 -0.056   -0.332** 
 (0.17) (0.57) (0.04) 
Hostile -0.003 0.045 0.098 
 (0.94) (0.33) (0.11) 
Size t-1 -0.003 0.003 -0.003 
 (0.78) (0.77) (0.83) 
ROA t-1    -0.690***    -0.582***    -0.587*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
M/B t-1    -0.009** 0.012 0.010 
 (0.02) (0.28) (0.42) 
Leverage t-1 -0.040 0.026 0.074 
 (0.48) (0.61) (0.29) 
Tangibility t-1 -0.046 0.052 0.061 
 (0.51) (0.47) (0.50) 
Capital Expenditure t-1 -0.142   -0.351** -0.514* 
 (0.37) (0.05) (0.08) 
R&D t-1    0.421** 0.148 0.099 
 (0.05) (0.52) (0.66) 
Dividends t-1 0.886* 0.059 1.356* 
 (0.07) (0.75) (0.06) 
Cash Flow Volatility t-1    -0.190*** -0.119 -0.049 
 (0.01) (0.21) (0.69) 
Inverse Mills Ratio 1 -0.011 -0.026 -0.058 
 (0.89) (0.73) (0.52) 
Inverse Mills Ratio 2 -0.019 -0.012 0.013 
 (0.39) (0.63) (0.83) 
Year Dummy Variables Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummy Variables Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 332 309 294 
Adjusted R-Square 0.48 0.46 0.39 
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Table 4.9A Sub-Group Analysis Based on Bankruptcy Risk — 
Announcement Returns 
The table shows the sub-group analysis on the relation between sources of financing and 
announcement returns. CAR (-3, +3) is the cumulative abnormal return over days (-3, +3) around 
the announcement date (see text for details). Low (High) Bankruptcy risk indicates a firm’s Altman 
Z-Score is equal or greater (less) than 1.81. Other Bank Loans Dummy equals one if an M&A is 
entirely financed by bank loans other than bank lines of credit, and equals zero otherwise. Debt 
Issues Dummy equals one if an M&A is entirely financed by debt issues, and equals zero 
otherwise. Equity Issues Dummy equals one if an M&A is entirely financed by equity issues, and 
equals zero otherwise. Relative Value is the ratio of deal value to the sum of the acquirer’s market 
value of equity and deal value. Hostile equals one if an M&A is hostile, and zero otherwise. Size 
is the logarithm of non-cash assets. Cash Flow is income before extraordinary items divided by 
non-cash assets. M/B is market value of equity plus non-cash assets minus book value of equity, 
divided by non-cash assets. Leverage is the ratio of long-term debt to non-cash assets. Tangibility 
is the ratio of plant, property and equipment to non-cash assets. Capital Expenditure is the ratio 
of capital expenditure to non-cash assets. R&D is the ratio of R&D to non-cash assets. Dividends 
is the ratio of dividends to non-cash assets. Cash Flow Volatility is the standard deviation of cash 
flow to non-cash assets in the prior five years. Year Dummy Variables are the dummy variables 
for the years in the sample and not reported in the table. Industry Dummy Variables are the 
dummy variables for the industries defined by two-digit SIC codes and not reported in the table. 
The p-value is calculated based on Heteroscedasticity-Consistent standard errors, and is noted 
in the parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  
  CAR (-3, +3) 
  Low Bankruptcy Risk High Bankruptcy Risk 
Intercept 0.092 0.066 
 (0.18) (0.60) 
Other Bank Loans Dummy    0.031** -0.027 
 (0.04) (0.29) 
Debt Issues Dummy   0.027* 0.051 
 (0.08) (0.20) 
Equity Issues Dummy 0.011 0.037 
 (0.56) (0.23) 
Relative Value 0.085     0.217*** 
 (0.12) (0.01) 
Hostile    -0.082***    -0.158** 
 (0.01) (0.05) 
Size t-1 -0.004 -0.007 
 (0.16) (0.18) 
Cash Flow t-1 -0.047    0.613** 
 (0.43) (0.02) 
M/B t-1 -0.003 0.012 
 (0.57) (0.64) 
Leverage t-1 0.009 0.107 
 (0.77) (0.19) 
Tangibility t-1 0.029    -0.184*** 
 (0.40) (0.01) 
Capital Expenditure t-1  -0.231* 0.289 
 (0.07) (0.22) 
R&D t-1 0.001 0.189 
 (0.95) (0.20) 
Dividends t-1 -0.013 -0.163 
 (0.88) (0.58) 
Cash Flow Volatility t-1   -0.072** -0.039 
 (0.03) (0.68) 
Year Dummy Variables Yes Yes 
Industry Dummy Variables Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 362 87 
Adjusted R-Square 0.08 0.33 
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Table 4.9B Sub-Group Analysis Based on Bankruptcy Risk — Net 
Changes in Operating Performance 
The table shows the sub-group analysis on the relation between sources of financing and the net 
changes in operating performance. Net ΔROA is the difference between an acquirer’s change in 
ROA and its matched comparable firm’s change in ROA from year t-1 to t+1, where ROA is the 
ratio of EBIT to non-cash assets. The comparable firms are matched by propensity score 
matching based on size, cash flow, market-to-book ratio, leverage, tangibility, capital expenditure, 
R&D, dividends and cash flow volatility (see text for details). Low (High) Bankruptcy risk indicates 
a firm’s Altman Z-Score is equal or greater (less) than 1.81. Other Bank Loans Dummy equals 
one if an M&A is entirely financed by bank loans other than bank lines of credit, and equals zero 
otherwise. Debt Issues Dummy equals one if an M&A is entirely financed by debt issues, and 
equals zero otherwise. Equity Issues Dummy equals one if an M&A is entirely financed by equity 
issues, and equals zero otherwise. Relative Value is the ratio of deal value to the sum of the 
acquirer’s market value of equity and deal value. Hostile equals one if an M&A is hostile, and zero 
otherwise. Size is the logarithm of non-cash assets. M/B is market value of equity plus non-cash 
assets minus book value of equity, divided by non-cash assets. Leverage is the ratio of long-term 
debt to non-cash assets. Tangibility is the ratio of plant, property and equipment to non-cash 
assets. Capital Expenditure is the ratio of capital expenditure to non-cash assets. R&D is the ratio 
of R&D to non-cash assets. Dividends is the ratio of dividends to non-cash assets. Cash Flow 
Volatility is the standard deviation of cash flow to non-cash assets in the prior five years. Year 
Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for the years in the sample and not reported in the 
table. Industry Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for the industries defined by two-digit 
SIC codes and not reported in the table. The p-value is calculated based on the 
Heteroscedasticity-Consistent standard errors, and is noted in the parentheses. *, **, and *** 
represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
  Net ∆ROA 
  Low Bankruptcy Risk High Bankruptcy Risk 
Intercept    0.419**    -0.470** 
 (0.02) (0.02) 
Other Bank Loans Dummy   0.055* 0.013 
 (0.06) (0.74) 
Debt Issues Dummy    0.066** -0.033 
 (0.05) (0.61) 
Equity Issues Dummy 0.073   -0.130** 
 (0.16) (0.04) 
Relative Value -0.129 0.050 
 (0.19) (0.57) 
Hostile 0.004 0.222 
 (0.90) (0.12) 
Size t-1 -0.010    0.024** 
 (0.20) (0.04) 
ROA t-1    -0.662***    -0.968*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
M/B t-1   -0.009**     0.177*** 
 (0.02) (0.01) 
Leverage t-1 0.027 -0.063 
 (0.73) (0.66) 
Tangibility t-1 0.008 -0.016 
 (0.93) (0.89) 
Capital Expenditure t-1 -0.280 -0.163 
 (0.24) (0.43) 
R&D t-1 0.301    -1.921*** 
 (0.15) (0.01) 
Dividends t-1 0.646 2.119 
 (0.33) (0.26) 
Cash Flow Volatility t-1 -0.032     0.373*** 
 (0.80) (0.01) 
Year Dummy Variables Yes Yes 
Industry Dummy Variables Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 340 85 
Adjusted R-Square 0.37 0.49 
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Table 4.10A Acquirers with Multiple M&As — Announcement Returns 
 
The table shows the relation between sources of financing and announcement returns. CAR (-3, 
+3) is the cumulative abnormal return over days (-3, +3) around the announcement date (see text 
for details). Other Bank Loans Dummy equals one if an M&A is entirely financed by bank loans 
other than bank lines of credit, and equals zero otherwise. Debt Issues Dummy equals one if an 
M&A is entirely financed by debt issues, and equals zero otherwise. Equity Issues Dummy equals 
one if an M&A is entirely financed by equity issues, and equals zero otherwise. Relative Value is 
the ratio of deal value to the sum of the acquirer’s market value of equity and deal value. Hostile 
equals one if an M&A is hostile, and zero otherwise. Size is the logarithm of non-cash assets. 
Cash Flow is income before extraordinary items divided by non-cash assets. M/B is market value 
of equity plus non-cash assets minus book value of equity, divided by non-cash assets. Leverage 
is the ratio of long-term debt to non-cash assets. Tangibility is the ratio of plant, property and 
equipment to non-cash assets. Capital Expenditure is the ratio of capital expenditure to non-cash 
assets. R&D is the ratio of R&D to non-cash assets. Dividends is the ratio of dividends to non-
cash assets. Cash Flow Volatility is the standard deviation of cash flow to non-cash assets in the 
prior five years. Year Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for the years in the sample and 
not reported in the table. Industry Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for the industries 
defined by two-digit SIC codes and not reported in the table. The p-value is calculated based on 
the Heteroscedasticity-Consistent standard errors, and is noted in the parentheses. *, **, and *** 
represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
  CAR (-3, +3) 
Intercept 0.070 
 (0.28) 
Other Bank Loans Dummy   0.022* 
 (0.07) 
Debt Issue Dummy   0.027* 
 (0.07) 
Equity Issues Dummy 0.007 
 (0.69) 
Relative Value     0.141*** 
 (0.01) 
Hostile -0.013 
 (0.70) 
Size t-1 -0.004 
 (0.17) 
Cash Flow t-1 -0.018 
 (0.76) 
M/B t-1 0.002 
 (0.74) 
Leverage t-1 0.018 
 (0.55) 
Tangibility t-1 0.001 
 (0.97) 
Capital Expenditure t-1 -0.102 
 (0.40) 
R&D t-1 -0.010 
 (0.60) 
Dividends t-1 -0.033 
 (0.66) 
Cash Flow Volatility t-1    -0.088*** 
 (0.01) 
Year Dummy Variables Yes 
Industry Dummy Variables Yes 
Number of Observations 431 
Adjusted R-Square 0.11 
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Table 4.10B Acquirers with Multiple M&As — Net Changes in Operating 
Performance 
The table shows the relation between sources of financing and the changes in operating 
performance. ROA is the ratio of EBIT to non-cash assets. ∆ROA is the change in ROA from year 
t-1 to t+1. Net ∆ROA is the difference between an acquirer’s change in ROA and its matched 
comparable firm’s change in ROA from year t-1 to t+1. The comparable firms are matched by 
propensity score matching based on size, cash flow, market-to-book ratio, leverage, tangibility, 
capital expenditure, R&D, dividends and cash flow volatility (see text for details). Other Bank 
Loans Dummy equals one if an M&A is entirely financed by bank loans other than bank lines of 
credit, and equals zero otherwise. Debt Issues Dummy equals one if an M&A is entirely financed 
by debt issues, and equals zero otherwise.  Equity Issues Dummy equals one if an M&A is entirely 
financed by equity issues, and equals zero otherwise.  Relative Value is the ratio of deal value to 
the sum of the acquirer’s market value of equity and deal value. Hostile equals one if an M&A is 
hostile, and zero otherwise. Size is the logarithm of non-cash assets. M/B is market value of equity 
plus non-cash assets minus book value of equity, divided by non-cash assets. Leverage is the 
ratio of long-term debt to non-cash assets. Tangibility is the ratio of plant, property and equipment 
to non-cash assets. Capital Expenditure is the ratio of capital expenditure to non-cash assets. 
R&D is the ratio of R&D to non-cash assets. Dividends is the ratio of dividends to non-cash assets. 
Cash Flow Volatility is the standard deviation of cash flow to non-cash assets in the prior five 
years. Year Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for the years in the sample and not 
reported in the table. Industry Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for the industries 
defined by two-digit SIC codes and not reported in the table. The p-value is calculated based on 
the Heteroscedasticity-Consistent standard errors, and is noted in the parentheses. *, **, and *** 
represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
  ∆ROA Net ∆ROA 
Intercept -0.058     0.501*** 
 (0.69) (0.01) 
Other Bank Loans Dummy     0.046***   0.046* 
 (0.01) (0.06) 
Debt Issues Dummy   0.026*   0.056* 
 (0.08) (0.07) 
Equity Issues Dummy -0.021 0.052 
 (0.55) (0.39) 
Relative Value -0.025   -0.215** 
 (0.73) (0.02) 
Hostile 0.017 0.006 
 (0.72) (0.88) 
Size t-1 0.006 -0.013* 
 (0.32) (0.06) 
ROA t-1    -0.694***    -0.677*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
M/B t-1 0.011    -0.009*** 
 (0.17) (0.01) 
Leverage t-1 0.042 -0.036 
 (0.24) (0.49) 
Tangibility t-1 -0.036 -0.028 
 (0.46) (0.66) 
Capital Expenditure t-1  -0.277* -0.275 
 (0.07) (0.14) 
R&D t-1 0.241 0.249 
 (0.13) (0.23) 
Dividends t-1   0.210* 0.834 
 (0.09) (0.25) 
Cash Flow Volatility t-1 -0.056 -0.018 
 (0.14) (0.88) 
Year Dummy Variables Yes Yes 
Industry Dummy Variables Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 408 408 
Adjusted R-Square 0.54 0.31 
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Table 4.11 Completion Year 
The table shows the relation between sources of financing and the changes in operating 
performance. ROA is the ratio of EBIT to non-cash assets. ∆ROA is the change in ROA from year 
t-1 to t+1, where ROA is the ratio of EBIT to non-cash assets. Net ∆ROA is the difference between 
an acquirer’s change in ROA and its matched comparable firm’s change in ROA from year t-1 to 
t+1 (t defines as the year of completion of an M&A).The comparable firms are matched by 
propensity score matching based on size, cash flow, market-to-book ratio, leverage, tangibility, 
capital expenditure, R&D, dividends and cash flow volatility (see text for details). Other Bank 
Loans Dummy equals one if an M&A is entirely financed by bank loans other than bank lines of 
credit, and equals zero otherwise. Debt Issues Dummy equals one if an M&A is entirely financed 
by debt issues, and equals zero otherwise. Equity Issues Dummy equals one if an M&A is entirely 
financed by equity issues, and equals zero otherwise. Relative Value is the ratio of deal value to 
the sum of the acquirer’s market value of equity and deal value. Hostile equals one if an M&A is 
hostile, and zero otherwise. Size is the logarithm of non-cash assets. M/B is market value of equity 
plus non-cash assets minus book value of equity, divided by non-cash assets. Leverage is the 
ratio of long-term debt to non-cash assets. Tangibility is the ratio of plant, property and equipment 
to non-cash assets. Capital Expenditure is the ratio of capital expenditure to non-cash assets. 
R&D is the ratio of R&D to non-cash assets. Dividends is the ratio of dividends to non-cash assets. 
Cash Flow Volatility is the standard deviation of cash flow to non-cash assets in the prior five 
years. Year Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for the years in the sample and not 
reported in the table. Industry Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for the industries 
defined by two-digit SIC codes and not reported in the table. The p-value is calculated based on 
Heteroscedasticity-Consistent standard errors, and is noted in the parentheses. *, **, and *** 
represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  
  ∆ROA Net ∆ROA 
Intercept -0.118 0.403 
 (0.43) (0.19) 
Other Bank Loans Dummy     0.041***   0.068* 
 (0.01) (0.08) 
Debt Issues Dummy    0.030**   0.061* 
 (0.03) (0.07) 
Equity Issues Dummy -0.021 0.042 
 (0.56) (0.59) 
Relative Value -0.016 0.019 
 (0.83) (0.91) 
Hostile -0.001 0.054 
 (0.98) (0.41) 
Size t-1 0.008 -0.020 
 (0.20) (0.15) 
ROA t-1     -0.549***    -0.738*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
M/B t-1 0.004 0.015 
 (0.11) (0.35) 
Leverage t-1 0.056 -0.061 
 (0.11) (0.42) 
Tangibility t-1 -0.028 -0.008 
 (0.51) (0.96) 
Capital Expenditure t-1   -0.409** -0.116 
 (0.02) (0.83) 
R&D t-1   0.271* 0.227 
 (0.09) (0.47) 
Dividends t-1   0.244*    2.456** 
 (0.08) (0.05) 
Cash Flow Volatility t-1 0.033 -0.030 
 (0.34) (0.79) 
Year Dummy Variables Yes Yes 
Industry Dummy Variables Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 420 420 
Adjusted R-Square 0.48 0.19 
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Table 4.12 Alternative Event Windows 
 
The table shows the sub-group analysis on the relation between sources of financing and 
announcement returns. CAR (0, 0) and (-1, +1) are the cumulative abnormal returns over days (0, 
0) and (-1, +1) around the announcement date (see text for details). Other Bank Loans Dummy 
equals one if an M&A is entirely financed by bank loans other than bank lines of credit, and equals 
zero otherwise. Debt Issues Dummy equals one if an M&A is entirely financed by debt issues, 
and equals zero otherwise. Equity Issues Dummy equals one if an M&A is entirely financed by 
equity issues, and equals zero otherwise. Relative Value is the ratio of deal value to the sum of 
the acquirer’s market value of equity and deal value. Hostile equals one if an M&A is hostile, and 
zero otherwise. Size is the logarithm of non-cash assets. Cash Flow is income before 
extraordinary items divided by non-cash assets. M/B is market value of equity plus non-cash 
assets minus book value of equity, divided by non-cash assets. Leverage is the ratio of long-term 
debt to non-cash assets. Tangibility is the ratio of plant, property and equipment to non-cash 
assets. Capital Expenditure is the ratio of capital expenditure to non-cash assets. R&D is the ratio 
of R&D to non-cash assets. Dividends is the ratio of dividends to non-cash assets. Cash Flow 
Volatility is the standard deviation of cash flow to non-cash assets in the prior five years. Year 
Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for the years in the sample and not reported in the 
table. Industry Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for the industries defined by two-digit 
SIC codes and not reported in the table. The p-value is calculated based on Heteroscedasticity-
Consistent standard errors, and is noted in the parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance 
levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  
  CAR (0, 0) CAR (-1, +1) 
Intercept 0.013    0.085** 
 (0.65) (0.05) 
Other Bank Loans Dummy   0.010*   0.016* 
 (0.08) (0.08) 
Debt Issues Dummy   0.012*   0.021* 
 (0.08) (0.08) 
Equity Issues Dummy 0.005 0.001 
 (0.56) (0.95) 
Relative Value     0.049***     0.098*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Hostile -0.016 0.001 
 (0.12) (0.97) 
Size t-1 -0.001   -0.004** 
 (0.46) (0.04) 
Cash Flow t-1 -0.021   -0.018** 
 (0.15) (0.04) 
M/B t-1    0.001** 0.001 
 (0.04) (0.62) 
Leverage t-1 0.006  -0.001* 
 (0.50) (0.07) 
Tangibility t-1 -0.004 0.006 
 (0.70) (0.70) 
Capital Expenditure t-1 -0.023   -0.076** 
 (0.43) (0.02) 
R&D t-1 -0.018 0.021 
 (0.64) (0.31) 
Dividends t-1 0.025 0.023 
 (0.56) (0.69) 
Cash Flow Volatility t-1 -0.006  -0.043* 
 (0.72) (0.07) 
Year Dummy Variables Yes Yes 
Industry Dummy Variables Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 449 449 
Adjusted R-Square 0.05 0.09 
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Table 4.13A Alternative Measure of Corporate Governance — 
Announcement Returns 
The table shows the sub-group analysis on the relation between sources of financing and 
announcement returns. CAR (-3, +3) is the cumulative abnormal return over days (-3, +3) around 
the announcement date (see text for details). Low (High) Corporate Governance indicates a firm’s 
institutional ownership is below (above) the median institutional ownership. Other Bank Loans 
Dummy equals one if an M&A is entirely financed by bank loans other than bank lines of credit, 
and equals zero otherwise. Debt Issues Dummy equals one if an M&A is entirely financed by debt 
issues, and equals zero otherwise. Equity Issues Dummy equals one if an M&A is entirely 
financed by equity issues, and equals zero otherwise. Relative Value is the ratio of deal value to 
the sum of the acquirer’s market value of equity and deal value. Hostile equals one if an M&A is 
hostile, and zero otherwise. Size is the logarithm of non-cash assets. Cash Flow is income before 
extraordinary items divided by non-cash assets. M/B is market value of equity plus non-cash 
assets minus book value of equity, divided by non-cash assets. Leverage is the ratio of long-term 
debt to non-cash assets. Tangibility is the ratio of plant, property and equipment to non-cash 
assets. Capital Expenditure is the ratio of capital expenditure to non-cash assets. R&D is the ratio 
of R&D to non-cash assets. Dividends is the ratio of dividends to non-cash assets. Cash Flow 
Volatility is the standard deviation of cash flow to non-cash assets in the prior five years. Year 
Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for the years in the sample and not reported in the 
table. Industry Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for the industries defined by two-digit 
SIC codes and not reported in the table. The p-value is calculated based on Heteroscedasticity-
Consistent standard errors, and is noted in the parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance 
levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  
  CAR (-3, +3) 
  Low Corporate Governance High Corporate Governance 
Intercept 0.098 -0.041 
 (0.25) (0.66) 
Other Bank Loans Dummy   0.026* 0.007 
 (0.08) (0.79) 
Debt Issues Dummy    0.042** 0.004 
 (0.04) (0.87) 
Equity Issues Dummy 0.009 -0.002 
 (0.72) (0.94) 
Relative Value     0.149*** 0.085 
 (0.01) (0.29) 
Hostile     0.056***    -0.132*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Size t-1 -0.005 -0.001 
 (0.23) (0.88) 
Cash Flow t-1 -0.019 -0.003 
 (0.13) (0.97) 
M/B t-1   0.001* -0.003 
 (0.08) (0.55) 
Leverage t-1 0.038 0.020 
 (0.17) (0.52) 
Tangibility t-1 0.001 -0.030 
 (0.99) (0.48) 
Capital Expenditure t-1 -0.038 0.060 
 (0.61) (0.56) 
R&D t-1 0.087 -0.035 
 (0.43) (0.55) 
Dividends t-1 -0.170 -0.140 
 (0.64) (0.11) 
Cash Flow Volatility t-1  -0.065* -0.056 
 (0.07) (0.11) 
Year Dummy Variables Yes Yes 
Industry Dummy Variables Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 224 225 
Adjusted R-Square 0.17 0.05 
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Table 4.13B Alternative Measure of Corporate Governance — Net Changes 
in Operating Performance 
The table shows the sub-group analysis on the relation between sources of financing and the net 
changes in operating performance. Net ∆ROA is the difference between an acquirer’s change in 
ROA and its matched comparable firm’s change in ROA from year t-1 to t+1, where ROA is the 
ratio of EBIT to non-cash assets. The comparable firms are matched by propensity score 
matching based on size, cash flow, market-to-book ratio, leverage, tangibility, capital expenditure, 
R&D, dividends and cash flow volatility (see text for details). Low (High) Corporate Governance 
indicates a firm’s institutional ownership is below (above) the median institutional ownership. 
Other Bank Loans Dummy equals one if an M&A is entirely financed by bank loans other than 
bank lines of credit, and equals zero otherwise. Debt Issues Dummy equals one if an M&A is 
entirely financed by debt issues, and equals zero otherwise. Equity Issues Dummy equals one if 
an M&A is entirely financed by equity issues, and equals zero otherwise. Relative Value is the 
ratio of deal value to the sum of the acquirer’s market value of equity and deal value. Hostile 
equals one if an M&A is hostile, and zero otherwise. Size is the logarithm of non-cash assets. 
M/B is market value of equity plus non-cash assets minus book value of equity, divided by non-
cash assets. Leverage is the ratio of long-term debt to non-cash assets. Tangibility is the ratio of 
plant, property and equipment to non-cash assets. Capital Expenditure is the ratio of capital 
expenditure to non-cash assets. R&D is the ratio of R&D to non-cash assets. Dividends is the 
ratio of dividends to non-cash assets. Cash Flow Volatility is the standard deviation of cash flow 
to non-cash assets in the prior five years. Year Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for 
the years in the sample and not reported in the table. Industry Dummy Variables are the dummy 
variables for the industries defined by two-digit SIC codes and not reported in the table. The p-
value is calculated based on Heteroscedasticity-Consistent standard errors, and is noted in the 
parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  
  Net ∆ROA 
  Low Corporate Governance High Corporate Governance 
Intercept 0.179 0.292 
 (0.44) (0.61) 
Other Bank Loans Dummy    0.064** 0.056 
 (0.05) (0.30) 
Debt Issues Dummy     0.131*** 0.022 
 (0.01) (0.61) 
Equity Issues Dummy 0.061 -0.043 
 (0.31) (0.44) 
Relative Value -0.161 -0.227 
 (0.18) (0.35) 
Hostile 0.045 0.030 
 (0.64) (0.72) 
Size t-1 0.007 -0.025 
 (0.43) (0.20) 
ROA t-1    -0.549***    -1.744*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
M/B t-1 0.017 0.025 
 (0.26) (0.16) 
Leverage t-1  -0.136* -0.095 
 (0.07) (0.51) 
Tangibility t-1 -0.052   -0.252** 
 (0.61) (0.04) 
Capital Expenditure t-1    -0.776*** 0.219 
 (0.01) (0.43) 
R&D t-1 -0.460 0.511 
 (0.15) (0.24) 
Dividends t-1 -0.399 0.042 
 (0.19) (0.97) 
Cash Flow Volatility t-1 -0.106 -0.234 
 (0.24) (0.10) 
Year Dummy Variables Yes Yes 
Industry Dummy Variables Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 217 208 
Adjusted R-Square 0.26 0.27 
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Table 4.14A The Public Status of Target Firms — Announcement Returns 
The table reports the impact of the public status of target firms on announcement return. CAR (-
3, +3) is the cumulative abnormal return over days (-3, +3) around the announcement date (see 
text for details). Other Bank Loans Dummy equals one if an M&A is entirely financed by bank 
loans other than bank lines of credit, and equals zero otherwise. Debt Issues Dummy equals one 
if an M&A is entirely financed by debt issues, and equals zero otherwise. Equity Issues Dummy 
equals one if an M&A is entirely financed by equity issues, and equals zero otherwise. Public 
equals one if the target firm of an M&A is public firm. Relative Value is the ratio of deal value to 
the sum of the acquirer’s market value of equity and deal value. Hostile equals one if an M&A is 
hostile, and zero otherwise. Size is the logarithm of non-cash assets. Cash Flow is income before 
extraordinary items divided by non-cash assets. M/B is market value of equity plus non-cash 
assets minus book value of equity, divided by non-cash assets. Leverage is the ratio of long-term 
debt to non-cash assets. Tangibility is the ratio of plant, property and equipment to non-cash 
assets. Capital Expenditure is the ratio of capital expenditure to non-cash assets. R&D is the ratio 
of R&D to non-cash assets. Dividends is the ratio of dividends to non-cash assets. Cash Flow 
Volatility is the standard deviation of cash flow to non-cash assets in the prior five years. Year 
Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for the years in the sample and not reported in the 
table. Industry Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for the industries defined by two-digit 
SIC codes and not reported in the table. The p-value is calculated based on Heteroscedasticity-
Consistent standard errors, and is noted in the parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance 
levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  
  CAR (-3, +3) 
Intercept 0.074 
 (0.24) 
Other Bank Loans Dummy   0.022* 
 (0.07) 
Debt Issues Dummy    0.028** 
 (0.04) 
Equity Issues Dummy 0.009 
 (0.59) 
Public 0.004 
 (0.70) 
Relative Value     0.141*** 
 (0.01) 
Hostile  -0.049* 
 (0.06) 
Size t-1 -0.004 
 (0.16) 
Cash Flow t-1 0.007 
 (0.91) 
M/B t-1 -0.001 
 (0.86) 
Leverage t-1 0.017 
 (0.57) 
Tangibility t-1 0.003 
 (0.93) 
Capital Expenditure t-1 -0.116 
 (0.32) 
R&D t-1 -0.006 
 (0.75) 
Dividends t-1 -0.037 
 (0.57) 
Cash Flow Volatility t-1     -0.086*** 
 (0.01) 
Year Dummy Variables Yes 
Industry Dummy Variables Yes 
Number of Observations 449 
Adjusted R-Square 0.13 
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Table 4.14B The Public Status of Target Firms — Net Changes in 
Operating Performance 
The table reports the impact of the public status of target firms on the changes in operating 
performance. ROA is the ratio of EBIT to non-cash assets. ∆ROA is the change in ROA from year 
t-1 to t+1. Net ∆ROA is the difference between an acquirer’s change in ROA and its matched 
comparable firm’s change in ROA from year t-1 to t+1.The comparable firms are matched by 
propensity score matching based on size, cash flow, market-to-book ratio, leverage, tangibility, 
capital expenditure, R&D, dividends and cash flow volatility (see text for details). Other Bank 
Loans Dummy equals one if an M&A is entirely financed by bank loans other than bank lines of 
credit, and equals zero otherwise. Debt Issues Dummy equals one if an M&A is entirely financed 
by debt issues, and equals zero otherwise. Equity Issues Dummy equals one if an M&A is entirely 
financed by equity issues, and equals zero otherwise. Public equals one if the target firm of an 
M&A is public firm. Relative Value is the ratio of deal value to the sum of the acquirer’s market 
value of equity and deal value. Hostile equals one if an M&A is hostile, and zero otherwise. Size 
is the logarithm of non-cash assets. M/B is market value of equity plus non-cash assets minus 
book value of equity, divided by non-cash assets. Leverage is the ratio of long-term debt to non-
cash assets. Tangibility is the ratio of plant, property and equipment to non-cash assets. Capital 
Expenditure is the ratio of capital expenditure to non-cash assets. R&D is the ratio of R&D to non-
cash assets. Dividends is the ratio of dividends to non-cash assets. Cash Flow Volatility is the 
standard deviation of cash flow to non-cash assets in the prior five years. Year Dummy Variables 
are the dummy variables for the years in the sample and not reported in the table. Industry Dummy 
Variables are the dummy variables for the industries defined by two-digit SIC codes and not 
reported in the table. The p-value is calculated based on Heteroscedasticity-Consistent standard 
errors, and is noted in the parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, 
and 1%, respectively.  
  ∆ROA Net ∆ROA 
Intercept -0.076     0.407*** 
 (0.36) (0.01) 
Other Bank Loans Dummy    0.031**  0.040* 
 (0.01) (0.06) 
Debt Issues Dummy   0.021*   0.062** 
 (0.08) (0.04) 
Equity Issues Dummy 0.002 0.068 
 (0.90) (0.20) 
Public 0.015 0.026 
 (0.20) (0.20) 
Relative Value 0.005    -0.182*** 
 (0.90) (0.01) 
Hostile -0.054 -0.028 
 (0.11) (0.51) 
Size t-1 0.005    -0.013** 
 (0.11) (0.02) 
ROA t-1    -0.653***    -0.699*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
M/B t-1 0.007    -0.010*** 
 (0.20) (0.01) 
Leverage t-1 0.038 -0.041 
 (0.22) (0.41) 
Tangibility t-1 -0.034 -0.018 
 (0.31) (0.76) 
Capital Expenditure t-1  -0.150* -0.187 
 (0.09) (0.17) 
R&D t-1 0.115 0.092 
 (0.33) (0.64) 
Dividends t-1    0.173** 0.769 
 (0.05) (0.23) 
Cash Flow Volatility t-1 -0.036 0.023 
 (0.18) (0.83) 
Year Dummy Variables Yes Yes 
Industry Dummy Variables Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 425 425 
Adjusted R-Square 0.40 0.30 
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Table 4.15 Alternative Comparable Firms  
The table shows the relation between sources of financing and the changes in operating 
performance. Net ∆ROA is the difference between an acquirer’s change in ROA and its matched 
comparable firm’s change in ROA from year t-1 to t+1, where ROA is the ratio of EBIT to non-
cash assets. The comparable firms are matched by propensity score matching using the “without 
replacement” method based on size, cash flow, market-to-book ratio, leverage, tangibility, capital 
expenditure, R&D, dividends and cash flow volatility (see text for details). Other Bank Loans 
Dummy equals one if an M&A is entirely financed by bank loans other than bank lines of credit, 
and equals zero otherwise. Debt Issues Dummy equals one if an M&A is entirely financed by debt 
issues, and equals zero otherwise. Equity Issues Dummy equals one if an M&A is entirely 
financed by equity issues, and equals zero otherwise. Relative Value is the ratio of deal value to 
the sum of the acquirer’s market value of equity and deal value. Hostile equals one if an M&A is 
hostile, and zero otherwise. Size is the logarithm of non-cash assets. M/B is market value of equity 
plus non-cash assets minus book value of equity, divided by non-cash assets. Leverage is the 
ratio of long-term debt to non-cash assets. Tangibility is the ratio of plant, property and equipment 
to non-cash assets. Capital Expenditure is the ratio of capital expenditure to non-cash assets. 
R&D is the ratio of R&D to non-cash assets. Dividends is the ratio of dividends to non-cash assets. 
Cash Flow Volatility is the standard deviation of cash flow to non-cash assets in the prior five 
years. Year Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for the years in the sample and not 
reported in the table. Industry Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for the industries 
defined by two-digit SIC codes and not reported in the table. The p-value is calculated based on 
Heteroscedasticity-Consistent standard errors, and is noted in the parentheses. *, **, and *** 
represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  
  Net ∆ROA 
Intercept     0.516*** 
 (0.01) 
Other Bank Loans Dummy   0.045* 
 (0.07) 
Debt Issues Dummy   0.056* 
 (0.06) 
Equity Issues Dummy 0.047 
 (0.46) 
Relative Value -0.126 
 (0.23) 
Hostile 0.042 
 (0.41) 
Size t-1  -0.014* 
 (0.06) 
ROA t-1    -0.842*** 
 (0.01) 
M/B t-1 0.003 
 (0.27) 
Leverage t-1 -0.067 
 (0.17) 
Tangibility t-1 -0.004 
 (0.95) 
Capital Expenditure t-1    -0.429** 
 (0.05) 
R&D t-1 0.337 
 (0.10) 
Dividends t-1    1.628** 
 (0.02) 
Cash Flow Volatility t-1 -0.125 
 (0.27) 
Year Dummy Variables Yes 
Industry Dummy Variables Yes 
Number of Observations 425 
Adjusted R-Square 0.31 
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Table 5.1A Summary Statistics 
 
The table reports univariate statistics. I use a sample of 623 US M&As with cash payment from 1985 to 2013. 
∆EV Sales Multiple is the difference in Excess Value calculated based on sales multiple between one year 
after acquisition and one year before acquisition (see text for details). Relative Value is the ratio of deal value 
to the sum of the acquirer’s market value of equity and deal value. Size is logarithm of total assets. Profit is 
the ratio of earnings before interest and tax to sales. Growth is the ratio of capital expenditure to sales. LEV is 
the ratio of long-term debt to total assets. Size2 is the square of log of total assets. ∆Adjusted Investment is 
the change of Adjusted Investment between one year after acquisition and one year before acquisition. 
∆Relative Value Added is the change of Relative Value Added between one year after acquisition and one 
year before acquisition. Inverse of Average q equals 1/qe, where qe is the equally weighted average q across 
segments in the firm. Diversity is the standard deviation of a firms’ asset-weighted q divided by equally 
weighted q. Firm Size is logarithm of total sales. Herfindahl Index of Segment Size is based on segment’s 
share of total assets of the firm. Coefficient of Variation of Segment qs is the standard deviation of segment 
qs divided by the mean of segment qs. Coefficient of Variation of Segment size is the standard deviation of 
segment’s share of total firm assets divided by the average segment share. Firm Size is logarithm of sales. 
 
Variable Mean 
25th 
Percentil
e 
Median 
75th 
Percentil
e 
Std Dev 
∆EV Sales Multiple -0.1214 -0.3467 -0.0916 0.1175 0.4640 
Relative Value 0.1401 0.0375 0.0929 0.1942 0.1424 
Size t-1 6.2290 5.0783 6.1771 7.3100 1.7242 
Profit t-1 0.1165 0.0559 0.0982 0.1667 0.1034 
Growth t-1 0.1101 0.0213 0.0418 0.0900 0.1695 
LEV t-1 0.2120 0.0434 0.1824 0.3305 0.1822 
Size2 t-1 41.7686 25.7893 38.1562 53.4361 22.4199 
∆Adjusted Investment in Segments      
Above Firms Average 𝑞 and Weighted 𝑞 0.0005 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0195 
Above Firms Average 𝑞 but Below Weighted 𝑞 0.0026 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0387 
Below Firms Average 𝑞 but Above Weighted 𝑞 -0.0005 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0108 
Below Firms Average 𝑞 and Weighted 𝑞 0.0022 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0416 
∆Relative Value Added 0.0004 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0064 
Herfindahl Index of Segment Size t-1 0.8076 0.5337 1.0000 1.0000 0.2791 
Diversity t-1 0.0884 0.0000 0.0000 0.1109 0.1615 
Firm Size t-1 6.1360 4.9813 6.0808 7.2852 1.8091 
Average of Segment 𝑞 (Equally Weighted) t-1 1.8815 1.3387 1.6417 2.1787 0.7800 
Inverse of Average 𝑞 t-1 0.6023 0.4590 0.6091 0.7470 0.2159 
Coefficient of Variation of Segment 𝑞s t-1 0.0725 0.0000 0.0000 0.0927 0.1376 
Coefficient of Variation of Segment Size t-1 0.2279 0.0000 0.0000 0.3639 0.4022 
 
Table 5.1B Univariate Statistics 
 
 Number of Deals 
Corporate Cash Holdings 233 
Bank Lines of Credit 265 
Mixed Lines & Cash 125 
Total 623 
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Table 5.2 Univariate Analysis of Changes in Excess Value 
 
The table reports the univariate analysis of changes in excess value. ∆EV Sales Multiple is the 
difference in Excess Value calculated based on sales multiple between one year after acquisition and 
one year before acquisition (see text for details). I report the mean test and the Wilcoxon Signed Rank 
median test in the table. *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
 Bank Lines of Credit 
Corporate Cash 
Holdings 
Difference 
 Mean Median Mean Median Mean p-value Median p-value 
∆EV Sales 
Multiple 
-0.086 -0.075 -0.178 -0.135 0.092** (0.03) 0.060** (0.04) 
 Mixed Lines & Cash 
Corporate cash 
holdings 
Difference 
 Mean Median Mean Median Mean p-value Median p-value 
∆EV Sales 
Multiple 
-0.091 -0.055 -0.178 -0.135 0.087 (0.12) 0.080 (0.12) 
 Bank lines of credit Mixed Lines & Cash Difference 
 Mean Median Mean Median Mean p-value Median p-value 
∆EV Sales 
Multiple 
-0.086 -0.075 -0.091 -0.055 0.005 (0.92) -0.020 (0.96) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
216 
 
Table 5.3 Changes in Excess Value 
 
The table represents the effect of sources of financing on the changes of excess value of the firms 
after mergers and acquisitions. Excess Value defines as the log of the ratio of total market value to 
imputed value using median industry multipliers. ∆EV Sales Multiple is the difference in Excess 
Value calculated based on sales multiple between one year after acquisition and one year before 
acquisition (see text for details). Bank Lines of Credit Dummy equals one if an M&A is entirely 
financed by bank lines of credit, and equals zero otherwise. Mixed Lines & Cash Dummy equals 
one if an M&A is financed by a mix of bank lines of credit and corporate cash holdings. Firm 
Diversification is a dummy variable, it equals one for diversified firms and zero for single-segment 
firms. Relative Value is the ratio of deal value to the sum of the acquirer’s market value of equity 
and deal value. Size is logarithm of total assets. Profit is the ratio of earnings before interest and 
tax to sales. Growth is the ratio of capital expenditure to sales. LEV is the ratio of long-term debt to 
total assets. Size2 is the square of log of total assets. Year Dummy Variables are the dummy 
variables for the years in the sample and not reported in the table. Industry Dummy Variables are 
the dummy variables for the industries defined by two-digit SIC codes and not reported in the table. 
The p-value is noted in the parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, 
and 1%, respectively. 
 
  ∆EV Sales Multiple 
Intercept -0.321 
 (0.16) 
Bank Lines of Credit Dummy   0.090* 
 (0.06) 
Mixed Lines & Cash Dummy 0.053 
 (0.32) 
Firm Diversification t-1 0.002 
 (0.96) 
Relative Value 0.226 
 (0.15) 
Size t-1    -0.224*** 
 (0.01) 
Profit t-1 0.412 
 (0.17) 
Growth t-1 0.465 
 (0.13) 
Size t-2     0.253*** 
 (0.01) 
Profit t-2 0.093 
 (0.80) 
Growth t-2 -0.178 
 (0.54) 
Size t-3 -0.019 
 (0.63) 
Profit t-3 -0.355 
 (0.25) 
Growth t-3   -0.589** 
 (0.02) 
LEV t-1 0.124 
 (0.28) 
Size2 t-1 0.001 
 (0.91) 
Year Dummy Variables Yes 
Industry Dummy Variables Yes 
Number of Observations 592 
Adjusted R-Square 0.11 
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Table 5.4 Changes in Internal Resources Transfers 
 
The table represents the relation between the changes in Adjusted Investment and sources of 
financing. ∆Adjusted Investment is the change of Adjusted Investment one year after acquisition and 
one year before acquisition. Bank Lines of Credit Dummy equals one if an M&A is entirely financed by 
bank lines of credit, and equals zero otherwise. Mixed Lines & Cash Dummy equals one if an M&A is 
financed by a mix of bank lines of credit and corporate cash holdings. Relative Value is the ratio of 
deal value to the sum of the acquirer’s market value of equity and deal value. Inverse of Average 
𝑞 equals 1/𝑞𝑒, where 𝑞e is the equally weighted average 𝑞 across segment in the firm. Diversity is the 
standard deviation of a firms’ asset-weighted 𝑞 divided by equally weighted 𝑞. Firm Size is logarithm 
of total sales. Herfindahl Index of Segment Size is based on segment’s share of total assets of the 
firm. Coefficient of Variation of Segment 𝑞s is the standard deviation of segment 𝑞s divided by the 
mean of segment 𝑞s. Coefficient of Variation of Segment size is the standard deviation of segment’s 
share of total firm assets divided by the average segment share. Year Dummy Variables are the 
dummy variables for the years in the sample and not reported in the table. Industry Dummy Variables 
are the dummy variables for the industries defined by two-digit SIC codes and not reported in the table. 
The p-value is calculated based on Heteroscedasticity-Consistent standard errors, and is noted in the 
parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  
 
5.4A: Basic Specification 
 
  ∆Adjusted Investment in Segments with 
 𝑞 > ?̅? 𝑞 > ?̅? 𝑞 < ?̅? 𝑞 < ?̅? 
  𝜆𝑞 > 𝜆𝑞̅̅ ̅ 𝜆𝑞 < 𝜆𝑞̅̅ ̅ 𝜆𝑞 > 𝜆𝑞̅̅ ̅ 𝜆𝑞 < 𝜆𝑞̅̅ ̅ 
Intercept -0.012 0.010 0.007 0.018 
 (0.26) (0.31) (0.28) (0.26) 
Bank Lines of Credit Dummy     0.005*** 0.001 -0.001    -0.009*** 
 (0.01) (0.85) (0.21) (0.01) 
Mixed Lines & Cash Dummy  0.005* -0.006 -0.001 -0.005 
 (0.07) (0.30) (0.82) (0.30) 
Relative Value 0.004 -0.014 -0.001 -0.010 
 (0.56) (0.30) (0.70) (0.52) 
Inverse of Average 𝑞 t-1 -0.001 -0.002 0.001 0.008 
 (0.74) (0.78) (0.91) (0.22) 
Diversity t-1 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.011 
 (0.62) (0.89) (0.50) (0.53) 
Firm Size t-1 -0.001 0.001   -0.001** -0.001 
 (0.74) (0.41) (0.02) (0.34) 
Year Dummy Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummy Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 623 623 623 623 
Adjusted R-Square 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.03 
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5.4B: The Effect of Focus 
 
  ∆Adjusted Investment in Segments with 
 q > q̅ q > q̅ q < q̅ q < q̅ 
  λq > λq̅̅ ̅ λq < λq̅̅ ̅ λq > λq̅̅ ̅ λq < λq̅̅ ̅ 
Intercept 0.001 -0.001 0.009 0.011 
 (0.99) (0.92) (0.16) (0.59) 
Bank Lines of Credit Dummy     0.005*** 0.001 -0.001    -0.009*** 
 (0.01) (0.79) (0.20) (0.01) 
Mixed Lines & Cash Dummy    0.005** -0.006 -0.001 -0.005 
 (0.05) (0.27) (0.85) (0.28) 
Relative Value 0.005 -0.015 -0.001 -0.011 
 (0.45) (0.27) (0.73) (0.50) 
Inverse of Average 𝑞 t-1 -0.001 -0.002 0.001 0.008 
 (0.83) (0.73) (0.88) (0.22) 
Diversity t-1 -0.004 0.008 0.001 0.015 
 (0.43) (0.60) (0.85) (0.47) 
Firm Size t-1 -0.001 0.001    -0.001*** -0.001 
 (0.33) (0.20) (0.01) (0.51) 
Herfindahl Index of Segment Size t-1   -0.011** 0.010 -0.002 0.007 
 (0.04) (0.19) (0.31) (0.47) 
Industry Dummy Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummy Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 623 623 623 623 
Adjusted R-Square 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.03 
 
 
 
5.4C: The Effect of the Coefficient of Variation of Segment q 
 
  ∆Adjusted Investment in Segments with 
 q > q̅ q > q̅ q < q̅ q < q̅ 
  λq > λq̅̅ ̅ λq < λq̅̅ ̅ λq > λq̅̅ ̅ λq < λq̅̅ ̅ 
Intercept -0.012 0.010 0.007 0.018 
 (0.30) (0.33) (0.28) (0.26) 
Bank Lines of Credit Dummy     0.005*** 0.001 -0.001    -0.009*** 
 (0.01) (0.88) (0.21) (0.01) 
Mixed Lines & Cash Dummy    0.006** -0.006 -0.001 -0.005 
 (0.04) (0.26) (0.82) (0.25) 
Relative Value 0.002 -0.013 -0.001 -0.009 
 (0.76) (0.34) (0.70) (0.56) 
Inverse of Average 𝑞 t-1 0.001 -0.003 0.001 0.007 
 (0.87) (0.65) (0.91) (0.28) 
Diversity t-1 -0.009 0.008 0.002 0.017 
 (0.16) (0.64) (0.53) (0.47) 
Firm Size t-1 -0.001 0.001   -0.001** -0.001 
 (0.38) (0.30) (0.02) (0.46) 
Coeff. Variation of 𝑞 t-1       0.026** -0.014 0.001 -0.013 
 (0.03) (0.43) (0.99) (0.50) 
Industry Dummy Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummy Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 623 623 623 623 
Adjusted R-Square 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.03 
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5.4D: The Effect of the Coefficient of Variation of Segment Size 
 
 
  ∆Adjusted Investment in Segments with 
 q > q̅ q > q̅ q < q̅ q < q̅ 
  λq > λq̅̅ ̅ λq < λq̅̅ ̅ λq > λq̅̅ ̅ λq < λq̅̅ ̅ 
Intercept -0.011 0.013 0.006 0.017 
 (0.29) (0.19) (0.31) (0.29) 
Bank Lines of Credit Dummy     0.005*** 0.001 -0.001    -0.009*** 
 (0.01) (0.86) (0.21) (0.01) 
Mixed Lines & Cash Dummy   0.005* -0.005 -0.001 -0.005 
 (0.07) (0.31) (0.78) (0.29) 
Relative Value 0.004 -0.012 -0.002 -0.012 
 (0.49) (0.34) (0.63) (0.46) 
Inverse of Average 𝑞 t-1 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.008 
 (0.77) (0.82) (0.95) (0.22) 
Diversity t-1 -0.020 -0.053   0.016*   0.053* 
 (0.14) (0.12) (0.06) (0.09) 
Firm Size t-1 -0.001 0.001  -0.001* -0.001 
 (0.49) (0.90) (0.07) (0.56) 
Coeff. Variation of segment size t-1  0.010* 0.025 -0.006 -0.019 
 (0.08) (0.14) (0.11) (0.12) 
Industry Dummy Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummy Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 623 623 623 623 
Adjusted R-Square 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.03 
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Table 5.5 Changes in Overall Efficiency of Transfers 
 
The table reports the relation between the changes in value added by allocation and sources of 
financing.  ∆Relative Value Added is the change of Relative Value Added one year after 
acquisition and one year before acquisition. Bank Lines of Credit Dummy equals one if an M&A 
is entirely financed by bank lines of credit, and equals zero otherwise. Mixed Lines & Cash Dummy 
equals one if an M&A is financed by a mix of bank lines of credit and corporate cash holdings. 
Relative Value is the ratio of deal value to the sum of the acquirer’s market value of equity and 
deal value. Inverse of Average 𝑞 equals 1/𝑞𝑒, where 𝑞e is the equally weighted average 𝑞 across 
segment in the firm. Diversity is the standard deviation of a firms’ asset-weighted 𝑞 divided by 
equally weighted 𝑞. Firm Size is logarithm of total sales. Year Dummy Variables are the dummy 
variables for the years in the sample and not reported in the table. Industry Dummy Variables are 
the dummy variables for the industries defined by two-digit SIC codes and not reported in the 
table. The p-value is calculated based on Heteroscedasticity-Consistent standard errors, and is 
noted in the parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, 
respectively.  
 
  ∆Relative Value Added 
Intercept   -0.007** 
 (0.02) 
Bank Lines of Credit Dummy    0.001** 
 (0.03) 
Mixed Lines & Cash Dummy 0.001 
 (0.74) 
Relative Value 0.001 
 (0.67) 
Inverse of Average 𝑞 t-1 -0.002 
 (0.14) 
Diversity t-1 -0.001 
 (0.61) 
Firm Size t-1 0.001 
 (0.28) 
Year Dummy Variables Yes 
Industry Dummy Variables Yes 
Number of Observations 623 
Adjusted R-Square 0.07 
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Table 5.6 The Choice of Sources of Financing 
 
The table reports the multinomial logistic regression. The dependent variable is categorical. It 
equals zero if an M&A is entirely financed by corporate cash holdings, equals one if an M&A is 
entirely financed by bank lines of credit, and equals two if an M&A is financed by a mixed source 
of bank lines of credit and corporate cash holdings. Relative Value is the ratio of deal value to the 
sum of the acquirer’s market value of equity and deal value. Cash is the ratio of cash and 
marketable securities to non-cash assets. Firm Diversification is a dummy variable, it equals one 
for diversified firms and zero for single-segment firms. Unused Lines of Credit is the ratio of 
unused lines of credit to non-cash assets. Institutional Ownership is the ratio of shares owned by 
institutional investors to the total shares outstanding. Size is the logarithm of non-cash assets. 
Cash Flow is income before extraordinary items divided by non-cash assets. M/B is market value 
of equity plus non-cash assets minus book value of equity, divided by non-cash assets. Leverage 
is the ratio of long-term debt to non-cash assets. Tangibility is the ratio of plant, property and 
equipment to non-cash assets. Capital Expenditure is the ratio of capital expenditure to non-cash 
assets. R&D is the ratio of R&D to non-cash assets. Dividends is the ratio of dividends to non-
cash assets. Cash Flow Volatility is the standard deviation of cash flow to non-cash assets in the 
prior five years. Year Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for the years in the sample and 
not reported in the table. Industry Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for the industries 
defined by two-digit SIC codes and not reported in the table. The p-value is noted in the 
parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
  Cash=0, Line=1, Mixed Line & Cash= 2 
  1 2 
Intercept    14.224*** 4.218 
 (0.01) (0.29) 
Relative Value     9.238***     8.858*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Firm Diversification t-1 0.015 0.531 
 (0.97) (0.22) 
Cash t-1   -13.010***    -4.890*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Unused Lines of Credit t-1     7.559***   3.767* 
 (0.01) (0.08) 
Institutional Ownership t-1    1.511**     2.380*** 
 (0.03) (0.01) 
Size t-1    -0.734*** -0.247 
 (0.01) (0.15) 
Cash Flow t-1 -1.429 0.601 
 (0.68) (0.85) 
M/B t-1    0.636**    0.518** 
 (0.02) (0.02) 
Leverage t-1 1.097 -0.667 
 (0.37) (0.60) 
Tangibility t-1 -1.686 -0.635 
 (0.27) (0.69) 
Capital Expenditure t-1 4.593 -0.760 
 (0.24) (0.85) 
R&D t-1 -1.213 -2.416 
 (0.85) (0.64) 
Dividends t-1 -2.895 1.155 
 (0.80) (0.92) 
Cash Flow Volatility t-1 -0.702 0.181 
 (0.57) (0.89) 
Year Dummy Variables Yes Yes 
Industry Dummy Variables Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 350 248 
Pseudo R-Square 0.63 0.63 
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Table 5.7A Heckman Two-Stage Estimation — Second Stage: Excess 
Value 
The table represents the effect of sources of financing on the changes of excess value of the firms 
after mergers and acquisitions. Excess Value defines as the log of the ratio of total market value 
to imputed value using median industry multipliers. ∆EV Sales Multiple is the difference in Excess 
Value calculated based on sales multiple between one year after acquisition and one year before 
acquisition (see text for details). Bank Lines of Credit Dummy equals one if an M&A is entirely 
financed by bank lines of credit, and equals zero otherwise. Mixed Lines & Cash Dummy equals 
one if an M&A is financed by a mix of bank lines of credit and corporate cash holdings. Firm 
Diversification is a dummy variable, it equals one for diversified firms and zero for single-segment 
firms. Relative Value is the ratio of deal value to the sum of the acquirer’s market value of equity 
and deal value. Size is logarithm of total assets. Profit is the ratio of earnings before interest and 
tax to sales. Growth is the ratio of capital expenditure to sales. LEV is the ratio of long-term debt 
to total assets. Size2 is the square of log of total assets. Inverse Mills Ratio is calculated based 
on the estimates in the multinomial logistic regression as reported in Table 5.6. Year Dummy 
Variables are the dummy variables for the years in the sample and not reported in the table. 
Industry Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for the industries defined by two-digit SIC 
codes and not reported in the table. The p-value is noted in the parentheses. *, **, and *** 
represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
  ∆EV Sales Multiple ∆EV Sales Multiple 
Intercept -0.232 -0.280 
 (0.58) (0.59) 
Bank Lines of Credit Dummy    0.181**  
 (0.02)  
Mixed Lines & Cash Dummy  0.150 
  (0.20) 
Firm Diversification t-1 0.027 -0.022 
 (0.65) (0.78) 
Relative Value 0.176 -0.319 
 (0.47) (0.44) 
Size t-1  -0.273* -0.295 
 (0.06) (0.13) 
Profit t-1 0.366 0.766 
 (0.36) (0.25) 
Growth t-1 -0.019 -1.009 
 (0.96) (0.31) 
Size t-2   0.247*   0.342* 
 (0.06) (0.07) 
Profit t-2 0.269 0.070 
 (0.60) (0.93) 
Growth t-2 -0.376 -0.224 
 (0.36) (0.80) 
Size t-3 -0.049 -0.077 
 (0.53) (0.47) 
Profit t-3 -0.223 -0.566 
 (0.59) (0.31) 
Growth t-3 0.009 0.592 
 (0.98) (0.36) 
LEV t-1 0.048 0.288 
 (0.77) (0.19) 
Size2 t-1 0.006 0.003 
 (0.45) (0.72) 
Inverse Mills Ratio  -0.037 -0.032 
 (0.39) (0.60) 
Year Dummy Variables Yes Yes 
Industry Dummy Variables Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 341 246 
Adjusted R-Square 0.08 0.17 
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Table 5.7B Heckman Two-Stage Estimation — Second Stage: Internal Resources Transfers 
 
The table represents the relation between changes in Adjusted Investment and sources of financing. ∆Adjusted Investment is the change of Adjusted Investment 
one year after acquisition and one year before acquisition. Bank Lines of Credit Dummy equals one if an M&A is entirely financed by bank lines of credit, and 
equals zero otherwise. Mixed Lines & Cash Dummy equals one if an M&A is financed by a mix of bank lines of credit and corporate cash holdings. Relative 
Value is the ratio of deal value to the sum of the acquirer’s market value of equity and deal value. Inverse of Average 𝑞 equals 1/𝑞𝑒, where 𝑞e is the equally 
weighted average 𝑞 across segment in the firm. Diversity is the standard deviation of a firms’ asset-weighted 𝑞 divided by equally weighted 𝑞. Firm Size is 
logarithm of total sales. Inverse Mills Ratio is calculated based on the estimates in the multinomial logistic regression as reported in Table 5.6 Year Dummy 
Variables are the dummy variables for the years in the sample and not reported in the table. Industry Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for the 
industries defined by two-digit SIC codes and not reported in the table. The p-value is calculated based on Heteroscedasticity-Consistent standard errors, and 
is noted in the parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  
  ∆Adjusted Investment in Segments with 
 𝑞 > ?̅? 𝑞 > ?̅? 𝑞 < ?̅? 𝑞 < ?̅? 𝑞 > ?̅? 𝑞 > ?̅? 𝑞 < ?̅? 𝑞 < ?̅? 
  𝜆𝑞 > 𝜆𝑞̅̅ ̅ 𝜆𝑞 < 𝜆𝑞̅̅ ̅ 𝜆𝑞 > 𝜆𝑞̅̅ ̅ 𝜆𝑞 < 𝜆𝑞̅̅ ̅ 𝜆𝑞 > 𝜆𝑞̅̅ ̅ 𝜆𝑞 < 𝜆𝑞̅̅ ̅ 𝜆𝑞 > 𝜆𝑞̅̅ ̅ 𝜆𝑞 < 𝜆𝑞̅̅ ̅ 
Intercept -0.015 -0.006 0.005 0.020 0.004    0.045** 0.004 -0.012 
 (0.24) (0.57) (0.23) (0.31) (0.68) (0.02) (0.32) (0.57) 
Bank Lines of Credit Dummy   0.004* 0.001 0.001    -0.012***     
 (0.08) (0.76) (0.81) (0.01)     
Mixed Lines & Cash Dummy     -0.004 0.002 0.002 -0.005 
     (0.23) (0.83) (0.31) (0.44) 
Relative Value 0.006 0.017   -0.011** 0.022 0.009  -0.049* -0.004 -0.028 
 (0.50) (0.29) (0.04) (0.35) (0.50) (0.06) (0.56) (0.37) 
Inverse of Average 𝑞 t-1 0.002 -0.006 0.001 0.002 -0.008 -0.001   0.004* 0.011 
 (0.60) (0.35) (0.75) (0.78) (0.13) (0.99) (0.09) (0.24) 
Diversity t-1 0.005 -0.016 0.003 -0.031 0.005    0.042** -0.003 0.047 
 (0.46) (0.39) (0.36) (0.18) (0.49) (0.05) (0.23) (0.17) 
Firm Size t-1 -0.001 -0.001  -0.001* 0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 0.002 
 (0.42) (0.85) (0.08) (0.94) (0.53) (0.31) (0.74) (0.26) 
Inverse Mills Ratio  0.002 0.004   -0.002** 0.003 0.002 0.004  -0.002* 0.002 
 (0.30) (0.21) (0.02) (0.29) (0.31) (0.26) (0.08) (0.63) 
Year Dummy Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummy Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 348 348 348 348 248 248 248 248 
Adjusted R-Square 0.03 0.15 0.07 0.03 0.06 0.18 0.18 0.02 
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Table 5.7C Heckman Two-Stage Estimation — Second Stage: Overall 
Efficiency of Transfers 
 
The table reports the relation between the changes in value added by allocation and sources of 
financing. ∆Relative Value Added is the change of Relative Value Added one year after acquisition 
and one year before acquisition. Bank Lines of Credit Dummy equals one if an M&A is entirely 
financed by bank lines of credit, and equals zero otherwise. Mixed Lines & Cash Dummy equals 
one if an M&A is financed by a mix of bank lines of credit and corporate cash holdings. Relative 
Value is the ratio of deal value to the sum of the acquirer’s market value of equity and deal value. 
Inverse of Average 𝑞 equals 1/𝑞𝑒, where 𝑞e is the equally weighted average 𝑞 across segment 
in the firm. Diversity is the standard deviation of a firms’ asset-weighted 𝑞 divided by equally 
weighted 𝑞. Firm Size is logarithm of total sales. Year Dummy Variables are the dummy variables 
for the years in the sample and not reported in the table. Inverse Mills Ratio is calculated based 
on the estimates in the multinomial logistic regression as reported in Table 5.6. Industry Dummy 
Variables are the dummy variables for the industries defined by two-digit SIC codes and not 
reported in the table. The p-value is calculated based on Heteroscedasticity-Consistent standard 
errors, and is noted in the parentheses.  *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, 
and 1%, respectively. 
 
  ∆Relative Value Added 
Intercept  -0.005*   -0.006** 
 (0.07) (0.04) 
Bank Lines of Credit Dummy   0.002* 
 
 (0.08) 
 
Mixed Lines & Cash Dummy  -0.002 
 
 (0.20) 
Relative Value 0.003 0.004 
 (0.36) (0.31) 
Inverse of Average 𝑞 t-1 -0.001  -0.003* 
 (0.39) (0.09) 
Diversity t-1 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.62) (0.85) 
Firm Size t-1   0.001* 0.001 
 (0.06) (0.53) 
Inverse Mills Ratio  -0.001 0.001 
 (0.89) (0.71) 
Year Dummy Variables Yes Yes 
Industry Dummy Variables Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 348 248 
Adjusted R-Square 0.06 0.12 
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Table 5.8A Sub-Group Analysis Based on Block Institutional Ownership — 
Changes in Excess Value 
 
The table represents the effect of sources of financing on the changes of excess value of the firms 
after mergers and acquisitions. Excess Value defines as the log of the ratio of total market value 
to imputed value using median industry multipliers. ∆EV Sales Multiple is the difference in Excess 
Value calculated based on sales multiple between one year after acquisition and one year before 
acquisition (see text for details). Block equals one if there exists a block institutional ownership 
which exceeds 5% of the total shares outstanding, and equals zero otherwise. Bank Lines of 
Credit Dummy equals one if an M&A is entirely financed by bank lines of credit, and equals zero 
otherwise. Mixed Lines & Cash Dummy equals one if an M&A is financed by a mix of bank lines 
of credit and corporate cash holdings. Firm Diversification is a dummy variable, it equals one for 
diversified firms and zero for single-segment firms. Relative Value is the ratio of deal value to the 
sum of the acquirer’s market value of equity and deal value. Size is logarithm of total assets. Profit 
is the ratio of earnings before interest and tax to sales. Growth is the ratio of capital expenditure 
to sales. LEV is the ratio of long-term debt to total assets. Size2 is the square of log of total assets. 
Year Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for the years in the sample and not reported in 
the table. Industry Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for the industries defined by two-
digit SIC codes and not reported in the table. The p-value is noted in the parentheses. *, **, and 
*** represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
  ∆EV Sales Multiple 
  Block=0 Block=1 
Intercept -0.216 -0.519 
 (0.35) (0.39) 
Bank Lines of Credit Dummy   0.134* 0.081 
 (0.08) (0.21) 
Mixed Lines & Cash Dummy 0.116 0.021 
 (0.20) (0.77) 
Firm Diversification t-1 0.008 -0.023 
 (0.90) (0.68) 
Relative Value -0.107     0.637*** 
 (0.63) (0.01) 
Size t-1 -0.051    -0.299** 
 (0.67) (0.03) 
Profit t-1     1.401*** 0.284 
 (0.01) (0.48) 
Growth t-1 0.398 0.382 
 (0.45) (0.37) 
Size t-2 0.078     0.486*** 
 (0.49) (0.01) 
Profit t-2  -1.176* 0.493 
 (0.07) (0.33) 
Growth t-2 -0.634 0.030 
 (0.19) (0.95) 
Size t-3 -0.020    -0.183** 
 (0.68) (0.03) 
Profit t-3 -0.114 -0.491 
 (0.80) (0.28) 
Growth t-3 -0.142 -0.633 
 (0.69) (0.14) 
LEV t-1 0.026 0.148 
 (0.89) (0.35) 
Size2 t-1 -0.001 0.002 
 (0.87) (0.85) 
Year Dummy Variables Yes Yes 
Industry Dummy Variables Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 212 380 
Adjusted R-Square 0.07 0.17 
226 
 
Table 5.8B Sub-Group Analysis Based on Block Institutional Ownership — 
Changes in Internal Resources Transfers 
 
The table represents the relation between changes in Adjusted Investment and sources of 
financing. ∆Adjusted Investment is the change of Adjusted Investment one year after acquisition 
and one year before acquisition. Block equals one if there exists a block institutional ownership 
which exceeds 5% of the total shares outstanding, and equals zero otherwise. Bank Lines of 
Credit Dummy equals one if an M&A is entirely financed by bank lines of credit, and equals zero 
otherwise. Mixed Lines & Cash Dummy equals one if an M&A is financed by a mix of bank lines 
of credit and corporate cash holdings. Relative Value is the ratio of deal value to the sum of the 
acquirer’s market value of equity and deal value. Inverse of Average 𝑞 equals 1/𝑞𝑒, where 𝑞e is 
the equally weighted average 𝑞 across segment in the firm. Diversity is the standard deviation of 
a firms’ asset-weighted 𝑞 divided by equally weighted 𝑞. Firm Size is logarithm of total sales. Year 
Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for the years in the sample and not reported in the 
table. Industry Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for the industries defined by two-digit 
SIC codes and not reported in the table. The p-value is calculated based on Heteroscedasticity-
Consistent standard errors, and is noted in the parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance 
levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
  ∆Adjusted Investment in Segments with 
 𝑞 > ?̅? 
𝜆𝑞 > 𝜆𝑞̅̅ ̅ 
𝑞 < ?̅? 
𝜆𝑞 < 𝜆𝑞̅̅ ̅  
  Block=0 Block=1 Block=0 Block=1 
Intercept 0.002 -0.003 0.010 0.006 
 (0.64) (0.70) (0.51) (0.44) 
Bank Lines of Credit Dummy   0.005** 0.003  -0.015** -0.003 
 (0.04) (0.23) (0.03) (0.40) 
Mixed Lines & Cash Dummy  0.005* 0.002 -0.003 -0.005 
 (0.08) (0.45) (0.79) (0.20) 
Relative Value -0.007 0.002 0.007 0.011 
 (0.40) (0.77) (0.84) (0.52) 
Inverse of Average 𝑞 t-1 0.004 -0.006 0.012 -0.001 
 (0.44) (0.22) (0.31) (0.98) 
Diversity t-1 -0.005 0.001     0.079*** -0.012 
 (0.33) (0.78) (0.01) (0.49) 
Firm Size t-1 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 
 (0.39) (0.69) (0.68) (0.97) 
Year Dummy Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummy Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 232 391 232 391 
Adjusted R-Square 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.02 
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Table 5.8C Sub-Group Analysis Based on Block Institutional Ownership — 
Changes in Overall Efficiency of Transfers 
 
The table reports the relation between the changes in value added by allocation and sources of 
financing. ∆Relative Value Added is the change of Relative Value Added one year after acquisition 
and one year before acquisition. Block equals one if there exists a block institutional ownership 
which exceeds 5% of the total shares outstanding, and equals zero otherwise. Bank Lines of 
Credit Dummy equals one if an M&A is entirely financed by bank lines of credit, and equals zero 
otherwise. Mixed Lines & Cash Dummy equals one if an M&A is financed by a mix of bank lines 
of credit and corporate cash holdings. Relative Value is the ratio of deal value to the sum of the 
acquirer’s market value of equity and deal value. Inverse of Average 𝑞 equals 1/𝑞𝑒, where 𝑞e is 
the equally weighted average 𝑞 across segment in the firm. Diversity is the standard deviation of 
a firms’ asset-weighted 𝑞 divided by equally weighted 𝑞. Firm Size is logarithm of total sales. Year 
Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for the years in the sample and not reported in the 
table. Industry Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for the industries defined by two-digit 
SIC codes and not reported in the table. The p-value is calculated based on Heteroscedasticity-
Consistent standard errors, and is noted in the parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance 
levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
  ∆Relative Value Added  
  Block=0 Block=1 
Intercept 0.002 -0.003 
 (0.16) (0.20) 
Bank Lines of Credit Dummy   0.001* 0.001 
 (0.06) (0.20) 
Mixed Lines & Cash Dummy 0.001 -0.001 
 (0.20) (0.97) 
Relative Value -0.002 0.003 
 (0.38) (0.29) 
Inverse of Average 𝑞 t-1 -0.001 -0.002 
 (0.91) (0.14) 
Diversity t-1 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.21) (0.41) 
Firm Size t-1 -0.001 0.001 
 (0.35) (0.15) 
Year Dummy Variables Yes Yes 
Industry Dummy Variables Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 232 391 
Adjusted R-Square 0.10 0.09 
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Table 5.9A Sub-Group Analysis Based on Bankruptcy Risk — Changes in 
Excess Value 
The table represents the effect of sources of financing on the changes of excess value of the firms 
after mergers and acquisitions. Excess Value defines as the log of the ratio of total market value 
to imputed value using median industry multipliers. ∆EV Sales Multiple is the difference in Excess 
Value calculated based on sales multiple between one year after acquisition and one year before 
acquisition (see text for details). Low (High) Bankruptcy risk indicates a firm’s Altman Z-Score is 
equal or greater (less) than 1.81.Bank Lines of Credit Dummy equals one if an M&A is entirely 
financed by bank lines of credit, and equals zero otherwise. Mixed Lines & Cash Dummy equals 
one if an M&A is financed by a mix of bank lines of credit and corporate cash holdings. Firm 
Diversification is a dummy variable, it equals one for diversified firms and zero for single-segment 
firms. Relative Value is the ratio of deal value to the sum of the acquirer’s market value of equity 
and deal value. Size is logarithm of total assets. Profit is the ratio of earnings before interest and 
tax to sales. Growth is the ratio of capital expenditure to sales. LEV is the ratio of long-term debt 
to total assets. Size2 is the square of log of total assets. Year Dummy Variables are the dummy 
variables for the years in the sample and not reported in the table. Industry Dummy Variables are 
the dummy variables for the industries defined by two-digit SIC codes and not reported in the 
table. The p-value is noted in the parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 10%, 
5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
  ∆EV Sales Multiple 
  Low Bankruptcy Risk High Bankruptcy Risk 
Intercept   -0.550**   -1.926** 
 (0.02) (0.05) 
Bank Lines of Credit Dummy   0.094* 0.129 
 (0.06) (0.26) 
Mixed Lines & Cash Dummy 0.057 0.100 
 (0.31) (0.47) 
Firm Diversification t-1 -0.004 0.117 
 (0.93) (0.44) 
Relative Value    0.340** 0.048 
 (0.05) (0.87) 
Size t-1 -0.149 0.111 
 (0.10) (0.73) 
Profit t-1 0.452 0.363 
 (0.22) (0.47) 
Growth t-1 0.527 0.227 
 (0.20) (0.75) 
Size t-2    0.259** 0.039 
 (0.02) (0.80) 
Profit t-2 0.452 0.309 
 (0.31) (0.58) 
Growth t-2 -0.419 0.634 
 (0.26) (0.17) 
Size t-3 -0.051     0.239*** 
 (0.43) (0.01) 
Profit t-3   -0.834** -0.058 
 (0.02) (0.89) 
Growth t-3  -0.589* -0.678 
 (0.06) (0.14) 
LEV t-1 0.131 0.515 
 (0.35) (0.21) 
Size2 t-1 -0.003 -0.030 
 (0.54) (0.26) 
Year Dummy Variables Yes Yes 
Industry Dummy Variables Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 502 90 
Adjusted R-Square 0.11 0.62 
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Table 5.9B Sub-Group Analysis Based on Bankruptcy Risk — Changes in 
Internal Resources Transfers 
 
The table represents the relation between changes in Adjusted Investment and sources of 
financing. ∆Adjusted Investment is the change of Adjusted Investment one year after acquisition 
and one year before acquisition. H Low (High) Bankruptcy risk indicates a firm’s Altman Z-Score 
is equal or greater (less) than 1.81. Bank Lines of Credit Dummy equals one if an M&A is entirely 
financed by bank lines of credit, and equals zero otherwise. Mixed Lines & Cash Dummy equals 
one if an M&A is financed by a mix of bank lines of credit and corporate cash holdings. Relative 
Value is the ratio of deal value to the sum of the acquirer’s market value of equity and deal value. 
Inverse of Average 𝑞 equals 1/𝑞𝑒, where 𝑞e is the equally weighted average 𝑞 across segment 
in the firm. Diversity is the standard deviation of a firms’ asset-weighted 𝑞 divided by equally 
weighted 𝑞. Firm Size is logarithm of total sales. Year Dummy Variables are the dummy variables 
for the years in the sample and not reported in the table. Industry Dummy Variables are the 
dummy variables for the industries defined by two-digit SIC codes and not reported in the table. 
The p-value is calculated based on Heteroscedasticity-Consistent standard errors, and is noted 
in the parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  
 
  ∆Adjusted Investment in Segments with 
 𝑞 > ?̅? 
𝜆𝑞 > 𝜆𝑞̅̅ ̅ 
𝑞 < ?̅? 
𝜆𝑞 < 𝜆𝑞̅̅ ̅  
  
Low 
Bankruptcy 
Risk 
High 
Bankruptcy 
Risk 
Low 
Bankruptcy 
Risk 
High 
Bankruptcy 
Risk 
Intercept -0.018     0.059*** 0.015   -0.126** 
 (0.12) (0.01) (0.35) (0.03) 
Bank Lines of Credit Dummy   0.004* 0.001   -0.008** -0.022 
 (0.07) (0.85) (0.02) (0.21) 
Mixed Lines & Cash Dummy 0.003 0.001 -0.005 0.010 
 (0.20) (0.86) (0.20) (0.70) 
Relative Value 0.008 0.003 0.002 -0.073* 
 (0.27) (0.69) (0.88) (0.08) 
Inverse of Average 𝑞 t-1 -0.001 -0.009 0.010 0.022 
 (0.75) (0.36) (0.12) (0.47) 
Diversity t-1 0.001 0.006 0.014 -0.043 
 (0.82) (0.35) (0.30) (0.25) 
Firm Size t-1 0.001    -0.006***  -0.002*     0.020*** 
 (0.40) (0.01) (0.08) (0.01) 
Year Dummy Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummy Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 526 97 526 97 
Adjusted R-Square 0.06 0.35 0.03 0.17 
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Table 5.9C Sub-Group Analysis Based on Bankruptcy Risk — Changes in 
Overall Efficiency of Transfers 
 
The table reports the relation between the changes in value added by allocation and sources of 
financing. ∆Relative Value Added is the change of Relative Value Added one year after acquisition 
and one year before acquisition. Low (High) Bankruptcy risk indicates a firm’s Altman Z-Score is 
equal or greater (less) than 1.81. Bank Lines of Credit Dummy equals one if an M&A is entirely 
financed by bank lines of credit, and equals zero otherwise. Mixed Lines & Cash Dummy equals 
one if an M&A is financed by a mix of bank lines of credit and corporate cash holdings. Relative 
Value is the ratio of deal value to the sum of the acquirer’s market value of equity and deal value. 
Inverse of Average 𝑞 equals 1/𝑞𝑒, where 𝑞e is the equally weighted average 𝑞 across segment 
in the firm. Diversity is the standard deviation of a firms’ asset-weighted 𝑞 divided by equally 
weighted 𝑞. Firm Size is logarithm of total sales. Year Dummy Variables are the dummy variables 
for the years in the sample and not reported in the table. Industry Dummy Variables are the 
dummy variables for the industries defined by two-digit SIC codes and not reported in the table. 
The p-value is calculated based on Heteroscedasticity-Consistent standard errors, and is noted 
in the parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  
 
  ∆Relative Value Added 
  Low Bankruptcy Risk High Bankruptcy Risk 
Intercept    -0.009***     0.027*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Bank Lines of Credit Dummy   0.001*    -0.004*** 
 (0.06) (0.01) 
Mixed Lines & Cash Dummy -0.001 0.001 
 (0.68) (0.71) 
Relative Value 0.003 0.004 
 (0.33) (0.14) 
Inverse of Average 𝑞 t-1 -0.002    -0.010*** 
 (0.18) (0.01) 
Diversity t-1 -0.002 -0.001 
 (0.34) (0.96) 
Firm Size t-1   0.001*    -0.002*** 
 (0.08) (0.01) 
Year Dummy Variables Yes Yes 
Industry Dummy Variables Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 526 97 
Adjusted R-Square 0.10 0.48 
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Table 5.10A Acquirers with Multiple M&As — Changes in Excess Value 
 
The table represents the effect of sources of financing on the changes of excess value of the firms 
after mergers and acquisitions. Excess Value defines as the log of the ratio of total market value 
to imputed value using median industry multipliers. ∆EV Sales Multiple is the difference in Excess 
Value calculated based on sales multiple between one year after acquisition and one year before 
acquisition (see text for details). Bank Lines of Credit Dummy equals one if an M&A is entirely 
financed by bank lines of credit, and equals zero otherwise. Mixed Lines & Cash Dummy equals 
one if an M&A is financed by a mix of bank lines of credit and corporate cash holdings. Firm 
Diversification is a dummy variable, it equals one for diversified firms and zero for single-segment 
firms. Relative Value is the ratio of deal value to the sum of the acquirer’s market value of equity 
and deal value. Size is logarithm of total assets. Profit is the ratio of earnings before interest and 
tax to sales. Growth is the ratio of capital expenditure to sales. LEV is the ratio of long-term debt 
to total assets. Size2 is the square of log of total assets. Year Dummy Variables are the dummy 
variables for the years in the sample and not reported in the table. Industry Dummy Variables are 
the dummy variables for the industries defined by two-digit SIC codes and not reported in the 
table. The p-value is noted in the parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 10%, 
5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
 ∆EV Sales Multiple 
Intercept -0.230 
 (0.35) 
Bank Lines of Credit Dummy   0.091* 
 (0.08) 
Mixed Lines & Cash Dummy 0.070 
 (0.22) 
Firm Diversification t-1 -0.003 
 (0.94) 
Relative Value 0.245 
 (0.14) 
Size t-1    -0.248*** 
 (0.01) 
Profit t-1 0.345 
 (0.29) 
Growth t-1    0.610** 
 (0.04) 
Size t-2     0.243*** 
 (0.01) 
Profit t-2 0.193 
 (0.64) 
Growth t-2 -0.337 
 (0.28) 
Size t-3 -0.013 
 (0.75) 
Profit t-3 -0.355 
 (0.29) 
Growth t-3 -0.356 
 (0.20) 
LEV t-1 0.144 
 (0.24) 
Size2 t-1 0.003 
 (0.62) 
Year Dummy Variables Yes 
Industry Dummy Variables Yes 
Number of Observations 555 
Adjusted R-Square 0.07 
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Table 5.10B Acquirers with Multiple M&As — Changes in Internal 
Resources Transfers 
 
The table represents the relation between changes in Adjusted Investment and sources of 
financing. ∆Adjusted Investment is the change of Adjusted Investment one year after acquisition 
and one year before acquisition. Bank Lines of Credit Dummy equals one if an M&A is entirely 
financed by bank lines of credit, and equals zero otherwise. Mixed Lines & Cash Dummy equals 
one if an M&A is financed by a mix of bank lines of credit and corporate cash holdings. Relative 
Value is the ratio of deal value to the sum of the acquirer’s market value of equity and deal value. 
Inverse of Average 𝑞 equals 1/𝑞𝑒, where 𝑞e is the equally weighted average 𝑞 across segment 
in the firm. Diversity is the standard deviation of a firms’ asset-weighted 𝑞 divided by equally 
weighted 𝑞. Firm Size is logarithm of total sales. Year Dummy Variables are the dummy variables 
for the years in the sample and not reported in the table. Industry Dummy Variables are the 
dummy variables for the industries defined by two-digit SIC codes and not reported in the table. 
The p-value is calculated based on Heteroscedasticity-Consistent standard errors, and is noted 
in the parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  
 
  ∆Adjusted Investment in Segments with 
  𝑞 > ?̅? 𝑞 > ?̅? 𝑞 < ?̅? 𝑞 < ?̅? 
 𝜆𝑞 > 𝜆𝑞̅̅ ̅ 𝜆𝑞 < 𝜆𝑞̅̅ ̅ 𝜆𝑞 > 𝜆𝑞̅̅ ̅ 𝜆𝑞 < 𝜆𝑞̅̅ ̅ 
Intercept -0.008 0.001    0.006** 0.009 
 (0.38) (0.89) (0.03) (0.30) 
Bank Lines of Credit Dummy    0.005** 0.001 -0.001    -0.009*** 
 (0.02) (0.96) (0.36) (0.01) 
Mixed Lines & Cash Dummy   0.005* -0.005 -0.001 -0.005 
 (0.07) (0.37) (0.79) (0.26) 
Relative Value 0.002 -0.011 -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.76) (0.39) (0.41) (0.82) 
Inverse of Average 𝑞 t-1 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.008 
 (0.84) (0.80) (0.69) (0.24) 
Diversity t-1 0.001 0.008 0.002 0.008 
 (0.82) (0.55) (0.50) (0.67) 
Firm Size t-1 -0.001 0.001    -0.001*** -0.001 
 (0.56) (0.35) (0.01) (0.52) 
Year Dummy Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummy Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 584 584 584 584 
Adjusted R-Square 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.04 
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Table 5.10C Acquirers with Multiple M&As — Changes in Overall 
Efficiency of Transfers 
 
The table reports the relation between the changes in value added by allocation and sources of 
financing. ∆Relative Value Added is the change of Relative Value Added one year after acquisition 
and one year before acquisition. Bank Lines of Credit Dummy equals one if an M&A is entirely 
financed by bank lines of credit, and equals zero otherwise. Mixed Lines & Cash Dummy equals 
one if an M&A is financed by a mix of bank lines of credit and corporate cash holdings. Relative 
Value is the ratio of deal value to the sum of the acquirer’s market value of equity and deal value. 
Inverse of Average 𝑞 equals 1/𝑞𝑒, where 𝑞e is the equally weighted average 𝑞 across segment 
in the firm. Diversity is the standard deviation of a firms’ asset-weighted 𝑞 divided by equally 
weighted 𝑞. Firm Size is logarithm of total sales. Year Dummy Variables are the dummy variables 
for the years in the sample and not reported in the table. Industry Dummy Variables are the 
dummy variables for the industries defined by two-digit SIC codes and not reported in the table. 
The p-value is calculated based on Heteroscedasticity-Consistent standard errors, and is noted 
in the parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  
 
  ∆Relative Value Added 
Intercept -0.002 
 (0.24) 
Bank Lines of Credit Dummy    0.001** 
 (0.02) 
Mixed Lines & Cash Dummy 0.001 
 (0.94) 
Relative Value 0.001 
 (0.50) 
Inverse of Average 𝑞 t-1  -0.002* 
 (0.09) 
Diversity t-1 -0.001 
 (0.52) 
Firm Size t-1 0.001 
 (0.18) 
Year Dummy Variables Yes 
Industry Dummy Variables Yes 
Number of Observations 584 
Adjusted R-Square 0.03 
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Table 5.11A Completion Year — Changes in Excess Value 
  
The table represents the effect of sources of financing on the changes of excess value of the firms 
after mergers and acquisitions. Excess Value defines as the log of the ratio of total market value 
to imputed value using median industry multipliers. ∆EV Sales Multiple is the difference in Excess 
Value calculated based on sales multiple between one year after acquisition and one year before 
acquisition (see text for details). Bank Lines of Credit Dummy equals one if an M&A is entirely 
financed by bank lines of credit, and equals zero otherwise. Mixed Lines & Cash Dummy equals 
one if an M&A is financed by a mix of bank lines of credit and corporate cash holdings. Firm 
Diversification is a dummy variable, it equals one for diversified firms and zero for single-segment 
firms. Relative Value is the ratio of deal value to the sum of the acquirer’s market value of equity 
and deal value. Size is logarithm of total assets. Profit is the ratio of earnings before interest and 
tax to sales. Growth is the ratio of capital expenditure to sales. LEV is the ratio of long-term debt 
to total assets. Size2 is the square of log of total assets. Year Dummy Variables are the dummy 
variables for the years in the sample and not reported in the table. Industry Dummy Variables are 
the dummy variables for the industries defined by two-digit SIC codes and not reported in the 
table. The p-value is noted in the parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 10%, 
5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
 ∆EV Sales Multiple 
Intercept -0.225 
 (0.66) 
Bank Lines of Credit Dummy    0.104** 
 (0.04) 
Mixed Lines & Cash Dummy 0.072 
 (0.20) 
Firm Diversification t-1 -0.012 
 (0.78) 
Relative Value   0.280* 
 (0.08) 
Size t-1    -0.332*** 
 (0.01) 
Profit t-1 0.169 
 (0.12) 
Growth t-1 0.364 
 (0.18) 
Size t-2     0.240*** 
 (0.01) 
Profit t-2 -0.095 
 (0.66) 
Growth t-2 -0.086 
 (0.77) 
Size t-3 -0.001 
 (0.98) 
Profit t-3 0.128 
 (0.41) 
Growth t-3 -0.342 
 (0.22) 
LEV t-1 0.105 
 (0.37) 
Size2 t-1 0.010 
 (0.11) 
Year Dummy Variables Yes 
Industry Dummy Variables Yes 
Number of Observations 581 
Adjusted R-Square 0.14 
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Table 5.11B Completion Year — Changes in Internal Resources Transfers 
 
The table represents the relation between changes in Adjusted Investment and sources of 
financing. ∆Adjusted Investment is the change of Adjusted Investment one year after acquisition 
and one year before acquisition. Bank Lines of Credit Dummy equals one if an M&A is entirely 
financed by bank lines of credit, and equals zero otherwise. Mixed Lines & Cash Dummy equals 
one if an M&A is financed by a mix of bank lines of credit and corporate cash holdings. Relative 
Value is the ratio of deal value to the sum of the acquirer’s market value of equity and deal value. 
Inverse of Average 𝑞 equals 1/𝑞𝑒, where 𝑞e is the equally weighted average 𝑞 across segment 
in the firm. Diversity is the standard deviation of a firms’ asset-weighted 𝑞 divided by equally 
weighted 𝑞. Firm Size is logarithm of total sales. Year Dummy Variables are the dummy variables 
for the years in the sample and not reported in the table. Industry Dummy Variables are the 
dummy variables for the industries defined by two-digit SIC codes and not reported in the table. 
The p-value is calculated based on Heteroscedasticity-Consistent standard errors, and is noted 
in the parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  
 
  ∆Adjusted Investment in Segments with 
  𝑞 > ?̅? 𝑞 > ?̅? 𝑞 < ?̅? 𝑞 < ?̅? 
 𝜆𝑞 > 𝜆𝑞̅̅ ̅ 𝜆𝑞 < 𝜆𝑞̅̅ ̅ 𝜆𝑞 > 𝜆𝑞̅̅ ̅ 𝜆𝑞 < 𝜆𝑞̅̅ ̅ 
Intercept -0.010 0.012 0.004 0.011 
 (0.38) (0.28) (0.41) (0.15) 
Bank Lines of Credit Dummy     0.005*** -0.001 -0.001  -0.006* 
 (0.01) (0.73) (0.47) (0.07) 
Mixed Lines & Cash Dummy    0.006** -0.006 -0.001 -0.004 
 (0.04) (0.28) (0.93) (0.47) 
Relative Value -0.003 -0.012 -0.003 0.019 
 (0.63) (0.37) (0.54) (0.24) 
Inverse of Average 𝑞 t-1 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (1.00) (0.88) (0.91) (0.90) 
Diversity t-1 0.006 0.003 0.003 -0.001 
 (0.17) (0.85) (0.24) (0.96) 
Firm Size t-1 -0.001 0.001   -0.001** -0.001 
 (0.91) (0.45) (0.03) (0.85) 
Year Dummy Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummy Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 610 610 610 610 
Adjusted R-Square 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 
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Table 5.11C Completion Year — Changes in Overall Efficiency of 
Transfers 
 
The table reports the relation between the changes in value added by allocation and sources of 
financing. ∆Relative Value Added is the change of Relative Value Added one year after acquisition 
and one year before acquisition. Bank Lines of Credit Dummy equals one if an M&A is entirely 
financed by bank lines of credit, and equals zero otherwise. Mixed Lines & Cash Dummy equals 
one if an M&A is financed by a mix of bank lines of credit and corporate cash holdings. Relative 
Value is the ratio of deal value to the sum of the acquirer’s market value of equity and deal value. 
Inverse of Average 𝑞 equals 1/𝑞𝑒, where 𝑞e is the equally weighted average 𝑞 across segment 
in the firm. Diversity is the standard deviation of a firms’ asset-weighted 𝑞 divided by equally 
weighted 𝑞. Firm Size is logarithm of total sales. Year Dummy Variables are the dummy variables 
for the years in the sample and not reported in the table. Industry Dummy Variables are the 
dummy variables for the industries defined by two-digit SIC codes and not reported in the table. 
The p-value is calculated based on Heteroscedasticity-Consistent standard errors, and is noted 
in the parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.   
 
  ∆Relative Value Added 
Intercept -0.001 
 (0.62) 
Bank Lines of Credit Dummy    0.001** 
 (0.04) 
Mixed Lines & Cash Dummy 0.001 
 (0.85) 
Relative Value -0.001 
 (0.75) 
Inverse of Average 𝑞 t-1 -0.001 
 (0.24) 
Diversity t-1 0.001 
 (0.68) 
Firm Size t-1 0.001 
 (0.38) 
Year Dummy Variables Yes 
Industry Dummy Variables Yes 
Number of Observations 610 
Adjusted R-Square 0.06 
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Table 5.12 Alternative Measure of Excess Value 
 
The table represents the effect of sources of financing on the changes of excess value of the firms 
after mergers and acquisitions. Excess Value defines as the log of the ratio of total market value 
to imputed value using median industry multipliers. ∆EV Sales Multiple is the difference in Excess 
Value calculated based on assets multiple between one year after acquisition and one year before 
acquisition. Bank Lines of Credit Dummy equals one if an M&A is entirely financed by bank lines 
of credit, and equals zero otherwise. Mixed Lines & Cash Dummy equals one if an M&A is 
financed by a mix of bank lines of credit and corporate cash holdings. Firm Diversification is a 
dummy variable, it equals one for diversified firms and zero for single-segment firms. Relative 
Value is the ratio of deal value to the sum of the acquirer’s market value of equity and deal value. 
Size is logarithm of total assets. Profit is the ratio of earnings before interest and tax to sales. 
Growth is the ratio of capital expenditure to sales. LEV is the ratio of long-term debt to total assets. 
Size2 is the square of log of total assets. Year Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for the 
years in the sample and not reported in the table. Industry Dummy Variables are the dummy 
variables for the industries defined by two-digit SIC codes and not reported in the table. The p-
value is noted in the parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, 
respectively. 
 
  ∆EV Assets Multiple 
Intercept    -0.429*** 
 (0.01) 
Bank Lines of Credit Dummy  0.066* 
 (0.08) 
Mixed Lines & Cash Dummy 0.055 
 (0.20) 
Firm Diversification t-1 -0.021 
 (0.51) 
Relative Value    0.227** 
 (0.05) 
Size t-1 -0.061 
 (0.21) 
Profit t-1 -0.298 
 (0.24) 
Growth t-1 0.171 
 (0.41) 
Size t-2 0.100 
 (0.16) 
Profit t-2 -0.236 
 (0.45) 
Growth t-2 0.432 
 (0.22) 
Size t-3 0.032 
 (0.47) 
Profit t-3 0.291 
 (0.25) 
Growth t-3 -0.443 
 (0.16) 
LEV t-1     0.216*** 
 (0.01) 
Size2 t-1 -0.003 
 (0.30) 
Year Dummy Variables Yes 
Industry Dummy Variables Yes 
Number of Observations 592 
Adjusted R-Square 0.08 
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Table 5.13A Alternative Measure of Corporate Governance — Changes in 
Excess Value 
The table represents the effect of sources of financing on the changes of excess value of the firms 
after mergers and acquisitions. Excess Value defines as the log of the ratio of total market value 
to imputed value using median industry multipliers. ∆EV Sales Multiple is the difference in Excess 
Value calculated based on sales multiple between one year after acquisition and one year before 
acquisition (see text for details). Low (High) Corporate Governance indicates a firm’s institutional 
ownership is below (above) the median institutional ownership. Bank Lines of Credit Dummy 
equals one if an M&A is entirely financed by bank lines of credit, and equals zero otherwise. Mixed 
Lines & Cash Dummy equals one if an M&A is financed by a mix of bank lines of credit and 
corporate cash holdings. Firm Diversification is a dummy variable, it equals one for diversified 
firms and zero for single-segment firms. Relative Value is the ratio of deal value to the sum of the 
acquirer’s market value of equity and deal value. Size is logarithm of total assets. Profit is the 
ratio of earnings before interest and tax to sales. Growth is the ratio of capital expenditure to sales. 
LEV is the ratio of long-term debt to total assets. Size2 is the square of log of total assets. Year 
Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for the years in the sample and not reported in the 
table. Industry Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for the industries defined by two-digit 
SIC codes and not reported in the table. The p-value is noted in the parentheses. *, **, and *** 
represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
  ∆EV Sales Multiple 
  Low Corporate Governance High Corporate Governance 
Intercept -0.298 -0.412 
 (0.16) (0.52) 
Bank Lines of Credit Dummy   0.114* 0.092 
 (0.08) (0.20) 
Mixed Lines & Cash Dummy 0.036 0.069 
 (0.66) (0.35) 
Firm Diversification t-1 0.075   -0.122** 
 (0.20) (0.03) 
Relative Value 0.033    0.538** 
 (0.86) (0.04) 
Size t-1 -0.098 -0.335* 
 (0.26) (0.06) 
Profit t-1 0.633 0.346 
 (0.14) (0.42) 
Growth t-1 0.197 0.356 
 (0.58) (0.54) 
Size t-2 0.177     0.426*** 
 (0.14) (0.01) 
Profit t-2 -0.133 0.058 
 (0.79) (0.92) 
Growth t-2 -0.132 0.207 
 (0.70) (0.72) 
Size t-3 -0.042 -0.074 
 (0.58) (0.42) 
Profit t-3 -0.512 -0.170 
 (0.19) (0.76) 
Growth t-3  -0.588* -0.525 
 (0.06) (0.25) 
LEV t-1 0.084 0.113 
 (0.58) (0.51) 
Size2 t-1 -0.002 -0.001 
 (0.69) (0.96) 
Year Dummy Variables Yes Yes 
Industry Dummy Variables Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 286 306 
Adjusted R-Square 0.08 0.13 
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Table 5.13B Alternative Measure of Corporate Governance — Changes in 
Internal Resources Transfers 
 
The table represents the relation between changes in Adjusted Investment and sources of 
financing. ∆Adjusted Investment is the change of Adjusted Investment one year after acquisition 
and one year before acquisition. Low (High) Corporate Governance indicates a firm’s institutional 
ownership is below (above) the median institutional ownership. Bank Lines of Credit Dummy 
equals one if an M&A is entirely financed by bank lines of credit, and equals zero otherwise. Mixed 
Lines & Cash Dummy equals one if an M&A is financed by a mix of bank lines of credit and 
corporate cash holdings. Relative Value is the ratio of deal value to the sum of the acquirer’s 
market value of equity and deal value. Inverse of Average 𝑞 equals 1/𝑞𝑒, where 𝑞e is the equally 
weighted average 𝑞 across segment in the firm. Diversity is the standard deviation of a firms’ 
asset-weighted 𝑞  divided by equally weighted 𝑞 . Firm Size is logarithm of total sales. Year 
Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for the years in the sample and not reported in the 
table. Industry Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for the industries defined by two-digit 
SIC codes and not reported in the table. The p-value is calculated based on Heteroscedasticity-
Consistent standard errors, and is noted in the parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance 
levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  
 
 ∆Adjusted Investment in Segments with  
𝑞 > ?̅? 
𝜆𝑞 > 𝜆𝑞̅̅ ̅ 
𝑞 < ?̅? 
𝜆𝑞 < 𝜆𝑞̅̅ ̅ 
  
 
Low 
Corporate 
Governance 
High 
Corporate 
Governance 
Low 
Corporate 
Governance 
High 
Corporate 
Governance 
Intercept  -0.019* -0.004 0.024 0.004 
 (0.07) (0.68) (0.14) (0.71) 
Bank Lines of Credit Dummy     0.005*** 0.003    -0.011*** -0.003 
 (0.01) (0.25) (0.01) (0.54) 
Mixed Lines & Cash Dummy 0.002 0.004 0.006 -0.006 
 (0.46) (0.21) (0.28) (0.20) 
Relative Value 0.004 -0.001    -0.045*** 0.006 
 (0.46) (0.88) (0.01) (0.74) 
Inverse of Average 𝑞 t-1 -0.002 -0.001    0.019** -0.005 
 (0.55) (0.76) (0.04) (0.51) 
Diversity t-1 -0.009 0.004 -0.007   0.033* 
 (0.14) (0.43) (0.76) (0.06) 
Firm Size t-1 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 0.001 
 (0.38) (0.46) (0.17) (1.00) 
Year Dummy Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummy Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 312 311 312 311 
Adjusted R-Square 0.03 0.11 0.09 0.08 
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Table 5.13C Alternative Measure of Corporate Governance — Changes in 
Overall Efficiency of Transfers 
 
The table represents the relation between changes in Adjusted Investment and sources of 
financing. ∆Relative Value Added is the change of Relative Value Added one year after acquisition 
and one year before acquisition. Low (High) Corporate Governance indicates a firm’s institutional 
ownership is below (above) the median institutional ownership. Bank Lines of Credit Dummy 
equals one if an M&A is entirely financed by bank lines of credit, and equals zero otherwise. Mixed 
Lines & Cash Dummy equals one if an M&A is financed by a mix of bank lines of credit and 
corporate cash holdings. Relative Value is the ratio of deal value to the sum of the acquirer’s 
market value of equity and deal value. Inverse of Average 𝑞 equals 1/𝑞𝑒, where 𝑞e is the equally 
weighted average 𝑞 across segment in the firm. Diversity is the standard deviation of a firms’ 
asset-weighted 𝑞  divided by equally weighted 𝑞 . Firm Size is logarithm of total sales. Year 
Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for the years in the sample and not reported in the 
table. Industry Dummy Variables are the dummy variables for the industries defined by two-digit 
SIC codes and not reported in the table. The p-value is calculated based on Heteroscedasticity-
Consistent standard errors, and is noted in the parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance 
levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  
 
 ∆Relative Value Added 
 Low Corporate Governance High Corporate Governance 
Intercept 0.001 0.002 
 (0.79) (0.56) 
Bank Lines of Credit Dummy     0.002*** 0.001 
 (0.01) (0.63) 
Mixed Lines & Cash Dummy -0.001 0.001 
 (0.63) (0.64) 
Relative Value -0.003 -0.002 
 (0.88) (0.65) 
Inverse of Average 𝑞 t-1 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.23) (0.95) 
Diversity t-1 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.30) (0.43) 
Firm Size t-1 0.001 -0.001 
 (0.73) (0.35) 
Year Dummy Variables Yes Yes 
Industry Dummy Variables Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 312 311 
Adjusted R-Square 0.04 0.13 
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Appendix 
Variable Definitions 
Excess Value 
Following  Berger and Ofek (1995), Excess Value is defined as,  
                                                 𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 = 𝐿𝑛(𝑉 𝐼(𝑉)⁄ )                                              (1) 
                                                   𝐼𝑉 = ∑ 𝐴𝐼𝑖 ∗ (𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖(𝑉 𝐴𝐼⁄ )𝑚𝑓)                                        (2) 
𝑛
𝑖=1                   
 
Where 𝑉 is firm’s total capital (market value of common equity plus book value 
of debt), 
𝑛 is total number of segment 𝑖’s firm,  
𝐼(𝑉) is imputed value of the sum of a firm’s segments as stand-alone firms, 
𝐴𝐼𝑖 is segment 𝑖’s value of accounting item used in the valuation multiple, 
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖(𝑉 𝐴𝐼⁄ )𝑚𝑓 is multiple of total capital to an accounting item for the median 
single-segment firm in the in segment 𝑖’s industry.  
 
 
 
Adjusted Investment Ratio 
 
Following Rajan et al. (2000), Adjusted Investment Ratio is defined as, 
 
                                        
𝐼𝑗
𝐵𝐴𝑗
−
𝐼𝑗
𝑠𝑠
𝐵𝐴𝑗
𝑠𝑠 − ∑ 𝑤𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1
(
𝐼𝑗
𝐵𝐴𝑗
−
𝐼𝑗
𝑠𝑠
𝐵𝐴𝑗
𝑠𝑠)                                       (3) 
 
Where ss refers to single segment firms,  
𝐼𝑗 is capital expenditure of segment 𝑗, 
𝐵𝐴𝑗 is the book value of assets of segment 𝑗, 
( 𝐼𝑗
𝑠𝑠 𝐵𝐴𝑗
𝑠𝑠⁄ ) is the asset-weighted average capital expenditure to assets ratio 
for the single segment firms in the corresponding industry, 
𝑤𝑗 is the ratio of segment assets to firm assets.  
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Relative Value Added by Allocation 
 
Following Rajan et al. (2000), Relative Value Added by allocation is define as, 
                
∑ 𝐵𝐴𝑗(𝑞𝑗 − ?̅?) (
𝐼𝑗
𝐵𝐴𝑗
−
𝐼𝑗
𝑠𝑠
𝐵𝐴𝑗
𝑠𝑠 − ∑ 𝑤𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1 (
𝐼𝑗
𝐵𝐴𝑗
−
𝐼𝑗
𝑠𝑠
𝐵𝐴𝑗
𝑠𝑠))
𝑛
𝑗=1
𝐵𝐴
                  (4) 
 
Where ss refers to single segment firms,  
?̅? is the asset-weighted average of segment 𝑞’s for the firm.   
𝐼𝑗 is capital expenditure of segment 𝑗.  
𝐵𝐴j is the book value of assets of segment j.  
( 𝐼𝑗
𝑠𝑠 𝐵𝐴𝑗
𝑠𝑠⁄ ) is the asset-weighted average capital expenditure to assets ratio 
for the single segment firms in the corresponding industry.  
 𝑤𝑗 is the ratio of segment assets to firm assets.  
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